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Abstract 
Major accidents and incidents, such as Three Mile Island or the Bristol Royal 
Infinnary Inquiry (a.k.a. the Bristol Baby Case, Kennedy et aI., 2000) are often 
mediated by what is tenned 'human error'. The analysis of these 'human errors' 
provides the basis for safety recommendations and thus has a crucial, albeit indirect 
impact on system design and the prevention of future accidents. 
The analysis process often entails instances of erroneous behaviour (or its effects) 
being classified according to error taxonomies. These taxonomies might be grounded 
in psychological theory in order to provide more analytic power to the investigator. 
However, the classification process itself is often left unsupported when using these 
psychological error taxonomies as part of accident or incident investigation. 
The reasoning process behind classification decisions is typically not being made 
explicit in the analysis process, and thus suffers from a lack of traceability. Human 
error classification that uses psychologically grounded taxonomies depends heavily 
on the expertise of the analyst. Although error categorizations are a useful basis for 
quantitative analysis as part of system safety management, they tend to elucidate 
mainly the ''what'' and "how" of an accident's causation, and not the "why". 
TIle reasoning process that leads to the categorization often embodies several 
competing causal hypotheses being generated and tested by the analyst. This 
reasoning process itself, if documented, can provide valuable diagnostic insights into 
the complexity of an accident's cause. It can also embody important analytical 
infonnation for the investigator when considering safety recommendations that are to 
address the system's weakness. 
In this thesis, a cognitive error analysis framework is proposed as a tool to support 
accident and incident investigators in the analysis of "human error". A cognitive 
architecture is used to provide an analytic vocabulary that is grounded in 
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psychological theory. This cognitive error analysis approach provides a structured 
framework for expert analysts to reason about competing hypotheses on the role of 
'human error' in an accident's or incident's causation. 
By using the proposed cognitive error analysis approach, the rationale behind error 
analysis and classification can be made more transparent and be documented for 
future reference. The cognitive framework can provide a structured, grounded 
vocabulary for validating and reasoning about competing error explanations and 
safety recommendations. 
These arguments will be illustrated in this thesis by means of case studies in human 
error analysis in accident and incident investigation. Retrospective analyses of 
accident and incident data drawn from aviation and medical work domains provide 
proof of concept and initial insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the 
cognitive error analysis approach that is proposed in this thesis. 
The two core case studies presented here both concern the analysis of human error in 
incident investigation in intensive care units. The cognitive error analysis approach 
was applied both times in the context of real existing safety management in two 
Scottish hospitals (referred to as 'the Edinburgh scheme' and 'the Glasgow scheme' 
respectively). Both case studies were conducted in collaboration with the local 
medical and nursing staff. 
A database of 10 years' worth of medical incident data gathered in an Edinburgh 
Intensive Care Unit was analyzed using the proposed cognitive error analysis 
approach. In the second live case study, the error analysis approach was evaluated in 
the field by applying it to incident reporting data that was collected with a newly 
implemented incident reporting scheme in a Glasgow Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. 
The insights gained by analyzing the Edinburgh incident scheme were used to inform 
the design and implementation of the Glasgow incident scheme as part of the unit's 
existing safety management. Since both were local incident reporting schemes, it was 
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seen as an important factor for its success to take the local context and conditions into 
account while situating the cognitive error analysis approach as part of these 
hospitals' safety management strategies. 
The evaluation of this incident reporting and analysis framework demonstrated the 
benefits of a structured, psychological "human error" analysis approach that centres 
on the human aspect of the incident, without isolating it from its context. It is argued 
that not only could the understanding of the underlying error mechanisms be 
improved for individual incidents, but the generation of safety recommendations 
could be supported, and these could then also be evaluated as to their impact on the 
human "in the loop". The resulting error analysis models could further be used as 
basis for comparing competing analyses, and also improve analysis traceability by 
documenting the analysis process and its resulting safety recommendations. Further 
work is needed in providing "best practices" for the application of the cognitive 
analytical framework. Further work is also needed in formalizing a way to situate the 
cognitive error analysis approach within the investigation of local work system 
factors in the search for the overall incident and accident causation. 
Thesis statement 
This thesis aims at demonstrating the benefits of grounding the analysis of human 
error as part of incident and accident reporting in a cognitive theoretical framework. 
This will provide the means and the vocabulary to reason about alternative causal 
hypotheses while also acting as a tool to document and communicate the 
psychological analysis of human error and its resulting safety recommendations. This 
approach is proposed as complementing the analysis of human error data by means of 
error taxonomies grounded in psychological theory. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
MOTIVATION 
Human involvement often plays a major role in the occurrence of accidents in safety 
critical systems such as in aviation, hospital systems, or nuclear power plants 
(Reason, 1990). Accident reports often resort to naming human error ("pilot error", 
"operator error") as the 'reason' why the accident happened. This 'blame' approach 
has frequently been criticized (op. cit.) but it still seems to prevail, such as illustrated 
by the all too frequent mention of it in news coverage of accidents and incidents (e.g. 
Kleinfield,2001) 
Identifying human involvement in an accident's causation does not necessarily mean 
that "human error" is the cause, or the only cause, of that accident. Human action (or 
inaction) is always stimulated by either the external context or an internal motivation 
(such as a set of expectations), it does not take place in a vacuum. Therefore, the 
identification of "human error" in an accident's causation should more often than not 
be the starting case for further investigation, rather than provide a convenient 
category where blame apparently has been found, and no need for more in-depth 
analysis exists. The label "human error" should not be equated with a stopping case 
for accident analysis. 
The following case study of recent events illustrates this further. In the American 
Airlines crash of an Airbus A-300 in Queens, NY, on November 12th 2001 
(Kleinfield, 2001), 260 passengers and all crew died when the plane plunged into a 
residential neighbourhood minutes after leaving Kennedy International Airport at 
9: 14 am for Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic). Eyewitnesses said they saw the 
burning engine separating from the plane and plummeting to the ground shortly 
before the crash. 
The plane had broken into pieces in midair, with parts of the tail, most of the fuselage 
and both engines having broken off the plane and fallen to the ground. Although 
initially considered a material fault, later this was hypothesized as caused by the 
pilots' performance putting too much stress on the tail through the rudders "more than 
they were designed to handle". Thus, after initially concluding the accident was the 
result of a mechanical, the New York Times announced on January 5th 2002 that now 
the "crash inquiry is focusing on the pilots" (op. cit.). 
By international regulation, a civil aircraft's tail is supposed to be able to withstand a 
force 50 percent stronger than the largest it is likely to ever encounter, and the A300 
tail exceeded even that standard. However, certain rudder manoeuvres are known to 
temporarily increase a force that is seemingly larger than "likely ever to be 
encountered", and this had been known to aircraft manufacturers for a number of 
years. Crews at American Airline were trained in the mid-1990's to use the rudder to 
recover from "flight upsets", but Airbus, Boeing and the F.A.A. later warned against 
this practice, saying it could produce "dangerous stresses". American Airlines said it 
changed its training in 1999 to de-emphasize use of the rudder. However, the 
training's effectiveness might need to be evaluated, since evidence recovered from 
the plane'S data recorder indicates that the pilots were using the rudder to try and 
stabilize the plane. This might have led to stress on the plane's tail that eventually led 
to the plane breaking apart. Furthermore, it might be argued that since it is known that 
these rudder manoeuvres create untenable material stress, pilot should be prohibited 
from carrying out these manoeuvres through the system's design, not through a 
"blame and train" approach. This, however, is likely to require further analysis of 
how pilots interact with the system in order to find an optimal technical design 
solution. 
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Implicating "pilot perfonnance" in an accident's causation still means that this human 
behaviour needs to be contextualized and analyzed in order to shed light on its origin 
and potential courses of action to improve future safety performance. Thus, 
identifying hazardous human involvement in accidents does not necessarily imply the 
identification of the actual 'cause' of the accident. The design of technology, task 
procedures, or organisational issues may be precursors to "human error", for instance 
if they are not well matched to human capabilities and thus present an 'unkind' work 
environment that precipitates the occurrence of human error. Analysis of the human 
factor in an accident's causation, therefore, cannot just focus on the human 
component alone, but must see it in relation and in interaction with the system which 
suffered the accident. This thesis builds on this insight and views errors and accidents 
as the result of a 'mismatch' between human capabilities and system design (see e.g. 
Rasmussen, 1982). It thus postulates viewing the human as 'just another system 
component' (with some set of known characteristics such as human cognitive 
capabilities and limitations). This human system component is seen as being in 
continuous interplay with the other system components, rather than as a malleable 
entity external to (and interfering with) the system. Thus, this 'human factors' 
approach to accident analysis (which corresponds to a 'human computer interaction' 
approach when dealing with computerized systems) stresses the need to consider the 
interaction between the human and the system in the accident's causation, with view 
of determining potential mismatches that could be remedied through system re-
design. 
The understanding of human error and its relationship to the overall system is thus 
essential to further our understanding of accidents in complex systems. Insights into 
the causes and the course of accidents will help avoid similar events and situations in 
the future. For this goal it is necessary to more thoroughly understand why "human 
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error'" occurred and to be able to offer a sound basis for safety recommendations 
from the analysis process. 
BACKGROUND 
Human Error analysis in incident and accident investigation is often supported by 
error taxonomies or classification schemes (Maddox and Reason, 1996). These 
provide 'buckets' of common characteristics of error classes in which instances of 
assumed erroneous behaviour can be categorized. Some of these taxonomies aim at 
being grounded in some theoretical framework (e.g. a psychological theory of human 
action), others aim at being comprehensive in describing surface characteristics of 
incidents, and thus tend to be more domain-dependent (i.e. the behaviour and 
circumstances are not described generically, but in relation to their situated work 
context). These taxonomies also offer a terminology to describe, distinguish, and 
compare errors, or instances of erroneous behaviour. 
However, these error categories can be ambiguous, vague, and overlapping (Busse, 
1998). This is further exacerbated by error data often being under-specified and 
conflicting, requiring a high degree of interpretation on part of the analyst. For 
instance, a medical incident analyst might be presented with a description of a 
proximal incident cause that reads "forgot to check heart monitor". Given analysis 
, "Human Error" is the term that is commonly used in contemporary work on the 
subject to denote human involvement in an accident's causation. It is an arguably 
controversial term, but it will be used throughout this dissertation (interchangeably 
with related terms such as the 'human factor' in accidents' causation, or 'human 
involvemenf). The decision to use this term was made not only since the term has 
been coined by leaders of the field (e.g. Reason, 1990), but also because the 
juxtaposition of this term with the central thesis of this work (the relativity of 'human 
error') will further highlight the benefit of the suggested error analysis approach. 
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taxonomies such as the one used in the Australian Incident Monitoring Scheme 
(AIMS) (Runciman et aI., 1993), the incident analyst will then have a choice of 
categories such as "inattention", "fatigue", "haste", or "stress" to document the 
underlying 'cause' of the human error. Clearly, any choice of categories in this 
situation must be pure conjecture, relying solely on the "good judgement" of the 
analyst. Furthermore, such categories do not provide much substance or 
discriminatory power to help describe, distinguish, and compare errors in a 
meaningful way. 
Thus, these error taxonomies often do not attempt to provide a 'causal' explanation as 
to why the error occurred. Instead, they list descriptive categories of what happened, 
and how. (I will return to this in more detail in Chapter 5 when evaluating the 
Edinburgh I~cident Reporting Scheme). 
There are more analytic taxonomies that ground the classification of erroneous 
behaviour in theoretical frameworks. For instance, Reason's (1990) error taxonomy 
bases its error categorization scheme on generic underlying cognitive mechanisms, 
such as cognitive biases (e.g. it defines cognitive biases such as the "confirmation 
bias" which has been shown to hold for human decision-making: humans tend to 
form an initial hypothesis to understand a situation, and thereafter are biased towards 
only collecting evidence which further confirms this initial hypothesis2). But even 
these present in their categorization at most the result of a 'causa\' analysis, but not 
how these conclusions were arrived at. Thus the path from the incident description to 
the categorization of the instance of human behaviour is a) based on the analysts 
'good judgement' and b) not documented. 
2 It could be argued that this is one reason why "scientific" (i.e. unbiased and 
objective) decision-making does not come natural to humans, and why there needs to 
a rigorous method in place (such as the idea of 'hypothesis falsification') in order to 
avoid un-scientific, "common sense", decision-making tainting analytic conclusions 
(e.g. Popper, 1934). 
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The rationale for choosing one error category over another is not documented, but left 
implicit. In this way, the reasoning behind the safety recommendations that result 
from the investigation process often cannot be traced back to the original error 
analysis. Safety recommendations provide the bridge between accidents and the 
prevention of future occurrences through advocating changes in the total system's 
design. Thus, the error analysis process will impact system redesign through its 
resulting recommendations, and would benefit from being documented. 
The following list summarizes the weaknesses of current human error analysis 
approaches that this thesis will try to address. 
In the case of error analysis by means of classification (common for incident 
reporting schemes): 
• Incident and accident related error data is often underspecified and 
conflicting. Several layers of interpretation thus taint the eventual result of 
the incident's analysis. Especially in incident reporting, this is exacerbated 
by inadequate data collection tools and mechanisms, and poor staff 
awareness. 
• Domain-dependent taxonomies are not generalizable (which prohibits e.g. 
cross-industry fertilisation, or even cross-department comparisons and 
exchange), they are inflexible and thus not change absorbent (cannot 
accommodate new technology, new procedures) 
• Theoretical error taxonomies' categories can be ambiguous, vague, and 
overlapping, so that error classification does not show high reliability even 
given adequate data. 
• Both domain-dependent and theoretical taxonomies can be pitched at 
different levels: the more detailed and low-level the classification the less 
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generalizability it affords, the more high-level and abstract the taxonomy, 
the less valuable information (understanding, precision in its specification, 
discriminatory value) it embodies and conveys. 
• The classification process typically is not documented, nor is a justification 
of the classification provided. Classification decisions, especially in 
ambiguous category cases, can therefore seem arbitrary, and the taxonomies' 
reliability is further reduced. 
In the case of error analysis without classification (the case of traditional accident 
reports): 
• error analysis that is based mostly on 'common sense', i.e. that benefits from 
the analysts' expertise, but relies on implicit and highly individual 
knowledge 
• Implicit use of error theories and taxonomies (such as 'slip') that have made 
their way into the expertise's knowledge base 
• Imprecise and ill-defined use of error descriptors (such as 'mistake') 
• The documentation of the analysis and conclusion finding proceeds in the 
form of the accident report. There are numerous problems associated with 
such a natural language based approach (Burns, 2000) 
• There is a gap between the generation of safety recommendations and both 
taxonomical as well as natural language analysis data; intervention points for 
system redesign are not suggested or revealed by traditional analysis 
techniques. So far, the analyst'S decision is left unsupported by the analysis 
methodology. 
• In traditional analysis techniques there is no method of validating the chosen 
intervention points and the outcome of suggested interventions. 
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THESIS GOALS 
The principal goal of this thesis is to introduce an approach to support the human 
error analysis process that addresses its above-mentioned weaknesses. To this end, 
cognitive modeIling techniques are employed as a tool to reason about competing 
interpretations of human error and its underlying cognitive processes. Thus, the goal 
for the approach that is put forward here is to guide error classification, while basing 
the error analysis in a cognitive-analytical framework rather than a behavioural-
descriptive one. Furthermore, the reasoning process underlying the classification will 
be explicated and documented. An additional goal is for the cognitive error modelling 
approach to strengthen the bridge between the analysis of the 'causes' of human error 
and the resulting safety recommendations, and thus measures for system redesign. 
The cognitive error modelling approach thus also aims at providing support for the 
choice of system redesign decisions by grounding them in cognitive theory. In this 
way, the link between the analysis of human error and its implications for safety 
recommendations is made explicit and substantiated by an analysis that is situated in 
a cognitive theoretical framework. 
This benefit of this error analysis approach will be illustrated throughout this 
dissertation by use of real-life case studies drawn from the domains of aviation and 
medicine. An incident reporting scheme was implemented from scratch in a Neonatal 
Intensive Care Unit addressing above-mentioned issues of data collection and staff 
awareness, and demonstrating the cognitive error modelling technique in the context 
of a clinical safety management framework. 
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PROOF OF CONCEPT 
The cognitive error modelling approach that is put forward in this thesis was piloted 
in an initial study that involved analysing user error when interacting with the 
Netscape internet browser (Busse and Johnson, 1998) (see Appendix A). The study 
confirmed the above-mentioned weaknesses of commonly used human error 
taxonomies, and the need for documenting the error analysis process. It was 
concluded that this approach of cognitive error modelling supported the analysis 
process. It offered a framework and method for evaluating competing error 
categorisations based on cognitive theory. Thus, interpretations of user behaviour and 
hypotheses as to its motivation could be expressed, compared and evaluated in a 
cognitive framework. The results also showed how design recommendations could be 
based on an in-depth cognitive analysis of user error, which thus provided a means 
for justifying and documenting design choices. Thus, this pilot work showed 
promising results for the cognitive error modelling framework to be applied to error 
analysis. The observations made in this investigation of user error refined the goals 
for this thesis. 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD 
The core contributions to the field of the work presented here is the examination of 
the weaknesses of current error analysis practices in incident and accident 
investigation, and addressing these with the application of a novel cognitive error 
modelling approach in a revised incident reporting framework. 
This dissertation provides theoretical justifications and practical, worked examples of 
how the analysis of human error in accidents and incidents can be supported by 
cognitive error modelling. It provides a framework for reasoning about alternative 
classifications and causal hypotheses. It also deals with the relationship between error 
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analysis and the resulting safety recommendations. A goal of this work is to support 
the generation and corroboration of safety recommendations by grounding error 
analysis and its implication for system redesign in a cognitive theoretical framework. 
This thesis gives examples of how an error analysis that is supported by cognitive 
error modelling can be used to compare choices of safety recommendations and 
substantiate system redesign decisions. 
A further goal is to support the practice of human error analysis in a real-life 
application. Thus, the analysis is not limited to the retrospective investigation of error 
as described in. accident reports. It could be shown (see chapter 5) that a post-hoc 
cognitive analysis of error data in accident reports can be used to evaluate safety 
recommendations. 
However, accident reports are rhetorical documents (Snowdon and Johnson, 1998), 
and can serve to layout an argument that justifies the investigation's conclusions 
more than portray the analysis process. Therefore, the cognitive error modelling 
approach was also applied to error data drawn from incidents reports. Incidents are 
near-miss accidents, where the chain of events leading to an accident was recognised 
in time and the accident was prevented from occurring. This means, the potential 
causation of accidents is investigated, rather than a post-hoc analysis of the causation 
of an accident that actually occurred. Incident reports are a means of documenting 
those near-miss system breakdowns and are authored solely by the person who 
detected the deviation and prevented the accident. 
Thus, the error data drawn from near-miss incident reports provide less of a rhetoric 
argumentation but an (albeit subjective) description and interpretation of events 
leading to a near-miss system breakdown. This description presents raw error data 
with no other level of interpretation than that of the witness filtering the information. 
Therefore, one of the goals of this thesis is to propose a cognitive error modelling 
approach to support the analysis of error and the validation of safety 
recommendations when dealing with data drawn from incident reports. 
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An intermediate benefit of the work presented here also is to test the transferability of 
human error analysis concepts and techniques researched in safety-critical fields such 
as aviation and process control to the domain of medical (clinical) environments from 
a safety-critical field with high demands for error management techniques (Leape et 
aI., 1991). A further goal addressed in this report, therefore, is to cover a range of 
characteristically different domains, such as aviation and medicine, in the application 
of our cognitive error modelling approach. 
Subgoals also include a comparative evaluation of different cognitive architectures 
and their use as error analysis supporting expressive frameworks. The architectures 
considered here are EPIC and ICS (see Chapter 3). 
CAVEAT 
This thesis does not present a novel cognitive framework or architecture - it draws on 
existing work in the field of cognitive psychology. The error analysis approach in this 
thesis is also does not supposed to replace existing error taxonomies, but to 
complement their value and support their application. Furthermore, the cognitive 
error analysis approach that is proposed in this thesis has not yet been cross-validated 
in the context of human error analysis in incident and accident investigation. 
Currently, it has only been applied to the field of safety-critical systems analysis 
within the Glasgow Accident Analysis Group. The approach has been, however, 
cross-validated in its original field of applications, Human-Computer Interaction 
(Buckingham-Shum et aI., 1996). 
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CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
Chapter 2 will introduce the state of the art of error analysis in accident and incident 
investigation, and point out weaknesses in current error analysis methods. 
Chapter 3 suggests the use of cognitive modelling techniques to aid human error 
analysis in accident and incident reporting. It investigates and outlines the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of different cognitive modelling traditions when used to 
tackle human error analysis. One focus of this chapter is to provide a comparative 
evaluation of two architectures as to their suitability to support the error analysis 
process. After having identified one suitable cognitive architecture for error analysis, 
the chapter demonstrates a proof of concept of how this cognitive modelling 
technique can aid human error analysis from data drawn from an aviation accident 
report. A further implication of the analysis carried out in the work presented in 
chapter 3 will be shown to be the value of cognitive modelling in the grounding of 
safety recommendations. 
In Chapter 4, it is shown how this cognitive error modelling technique can be used to 
complement conventional error analysis. This will be demonstrated by retrospectively 
re-analysing the human factor in the causation of selected aviation incidents and 
accidents. 
In Chapter 5, the error modelling technique is taken to a real-life setting (rather than 
being applied retrospectively to an existing report). The established safety 
management process in a real-life clinical environment is investigated, and it is 
shown how it can benefit from using the cognitive error modelling approach for its 
error analysis process as put forward by this thesis. The application of cognitive 
modelling to error data drawn from a clinical incident reporting scheme is examined. 
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This chapter also again explicitly tackles the relationship of human error analysis and 
safety recommendations for system redesign. 
In Chapter 6, the process of establishing an incident reporting scheme that is specially 
designed for contextual human error analysis is documented. Conventional treatment 
of human error analysis has been shown to be at times insufficient and at worst 
misleading, and thus alternatives are spelled out in this demonstration of a safety 
management approach that is geared towards a meaningful, contextual analysis of 
human error. 
The final chapter (Chapter 7) provides a summary of our findings, conclusions, and 
suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 HUMAN ERROR 
ANALYSIS IN ACCIDENT AND 
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
In the field of accident analysis, there has been much discussion as to the difference 
between terms such as 'failure', 'accident', 'incident', 'occurrence', or 'adverse 
event'. This is partly since they are used differently in the various domains that 
concern themselves with accident analysis (aviation, medicine, process control to 
name but a few). In this chapter, I will give definitions and an introduction to these 
key concepts of this thesis. I will also present an overview of the current state of the 
art research and practice in human error analysis in incident and accident 
investigation in safety-critical domains. Throughout this overview, I will highlight the 
role of human involvement in an accident's causal chain, and how this is dealt with in 
the relevant research and practice. 
In this dissertation, a 'failure' refers to a system failure, in which there is a "non-
performance or inability of the system or component to perform its intended function 
for a specified time under specified environmental conditions" (Leveson, 1995). A 
system failure does not necessarily lead to undesirable consequences. It might not 
even ever be detected. 'System failure' is often used implicitly to denote a purely 
mechanical failure, with no human involvement. However, a human interacting with 
the system is necessarily to be seen as one of its components. This dissertation will 
explicitly note human involvement (or lack of it) whenever it is relevant when talking 
about 'system failures'. 
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An 'accident' is defined as "an undesired and unplanned [ .. J event that resulted in (at 
least) a specified level of loss" (op.cit.). A incident (referred to interchangeably as 
'critical incident') is here defined as an event ''that involves no loss (or only minor 
loss) but with potential for loss under different circumstances" (op.cit.). 
Leveson does not explicitly refer to the medical domain in her definitions of accidents 
and incidents. As is often the case, terms take on different meanings in other domains, 
and so the term 'accident' takes on a different meaning in the medial domain. What is 
referred to as an "accident" in e.g. aviation is referred to in medicine as an 'adverse 
event'. Thus, in this thesis the definitions of accidents and incidents will be modified 
to suit the appropriate terminology as this work progresses to discuss "human error" 
in the domain of medicine. Other terms relevant to the medical domain in this context 
are the concepts of "iatrogenic injury" or "iatrogenic events". These refer to 
''treatment-caused injury" (sometimes commonly referred to as "doctor-caused 
injury"), and these terms are specific to the clinical field. 
'Human Error' is here defined as any (expected or unexpected) human behaviour 
(including lack of action) that led to undesirable consequences of some specified level 
(i.e. not including violations, and not of terrorist intent, or sabotage) in the case of an 
accident, or that could have led to undesirable consequences of (at least) some 
specified level, in the case of an incident (as defined above). "Undesirable 
consequences" includes a specified level of loss (in the case of an accident). 
"Unexpected behaviour" here refers to both "unplanned" (i.e. unexpected by the 
individual) and "planned behaviour", and it is also set in relation to other people's 
expectations. The latter is of course subjective, and thus often brought in relation to 
rules laid down by a working community, such as standards and protocols, but also 
implicit 'best practice'. 
It can also refer to behaviour that was planned by the individual, but where the plan 
was either inappropriate (i.e. it was correct plan to achieve some goal, but the wrong 
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situation (or goal) to apply it to), wrong, or incomplete (again, as measured against 
the (potential) negative consequences of that behaviour resulting from the plan). 
Crucially, 'human error' as used in the literature can also refer to expected human 
behaviour (not in relation to an inappropriate, wrong and incomplete plan) that 
nevertheless resulted in some level of loss, or had the potential to do so. 
The example given in the introduction of the November accident of Flight 587 is a 
case in point. The pilots had been trained to use the rudder, and to their best 
knowledge the rudder was supposed to adhere to the international standard of 
withstanding any pressure level that could possibly occur during flight. But when the 
rudder failed to withstand the pressure of their manoeuvring, accident investigation 
turned to the pilots' performance as the "cause" of the accident. 
The above definition of 'human error' reflects one interpretation of error that is 
prevalent in the literature (e.g. Reason, 1990) and it will be this definition that is 
referred to in this dissertation. However, this definition can invite contradiction and 
misunderstandings, and this thesis aims at elucidating why this is so, and suggests 
ways of dealing with 'human error' to avoid these pitfalls. 
For instance, expected 'work according to rule' is near equivalent of "strike" in any 
trade-union's book, and implicit rules are still to a large part subjective and flexible. 
Often, standards contain inappropriate, wrong, or incomplete rules that are 
compensated for by humans. They may even contain contradictory rules, which the 
nurse or pilot must choose from without guidance and at their own risk. Plans often 
are trained, and expectations are set in advance, often without choice or control of the 
individual. Furthermore, the design of machines, devices, interfaces, and work 
contexts might be more error-inducing than helpful, with humans often compensating 
for their weaknesses (Kanse and van der Schaaf, 2000). 
'Human error' can also be seen as inevitable part of human behavioural variability, 
and thus as the flipside of the coin that also enables humans to think and act flexibly 
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and economically, to compensate for poor machine design, poor work protocols, and 
sub-optimal work conditions, to recover a system from near-miss incidents back into 
a healthy state, and also often enough to prevent accidents from occurring. This view 
thus holds that the variability of behaviour that includes 'human error' is inevitable, 
and thus the design of the work system must take this human variability into account, 
and be error-tolerant, 'forgiving', and aim at an optimal match with humans' abilities. 
The above definition of 'human error' will require further discussion throughout this 
dissertation, especially, as will be shown, when placed in the context of categorizing 
accident causes and instances of human behaviour involved in the chain of causation. 
This is exacerbated by the need for any definition of human error in the context of 
categorization to enable a "relevant" description (i.e. providing an analytic, 
constructive vocabulary), the distinction and comparison of instances of human 
behaviour over time, and across individuals, situations, locations and even domains. 
The dissertation examines accidents and incidents in "safety-critical systems". These 
are here defined to be systems whose incorrect function (Le. failure) may have very 
serious consequences, such as loss of human life, severe injuries, large scale 
environmental damage, or considerable economical penalties. The safety-critical 
systems dealt with in this dissertation are the domains of aviation and clinical 
medicine (intensive care). Other domains that are defined as safety-critical and that 
the field of accident analysis deals with are e.g. process control (especially in nuclear 
power plants and chemical plants, but also manufacturing), the naval domain, 
automobile engineering and traffic, fire safety (internal and external) and associated 
crowd control. These are the fields that most of the work relevant to this thesis' 
accident analysis aspects is informed by. In the following section, I will introduce the 
current state of the art in accident analysis research as the basis of this thesis. 
17 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
Accident analysis should be an integral part of safety management in any safety-
critical organisation or industry. Morone and Woodhouse (1986) identified "learning 
from experience", which takes place thorough incident and accident analysis, as one 
of five vital strategies for risk regulation in safety critical domains, next to e.g. 
"protection against potential hazards", and "prioritising potential risks". 
Next to the financial implications of the loss associated with accidents, there is also 
the moral obligation of accident prevention towards the employees that are at risk in 
safety-critical industries, towards anyone who might be impacted by the negative 
consequences of accidents, and also to society at large in terms of economic impact 
or, in the worst case, large-scale loss of life. Public scrutiny therefore rests on these 
industries, which will not only have to try their best to prevent (seemingly inevitable) 
accidents from happening, but also present a transparency of their decision-making 
processes concerning safety management, documenting any measures taken in the 
name of accident prevention, and their justification. 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) document of "International 
Standards and Recommended Practices: Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 
- Annex )3" (ICAO, 1994) details the standards and recommended practices of 
reporting, analyzing, and acting upon civil aviation accidents and incidents. I will use 
this standard as a baseline to illustrate the current state of the art in accident analysis 
practices in this chapter. In contrast, the later sections in this chapter will delve deeper 
into current accident analysis research. 
Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident Inquiries were first 
adopted by the ICAO Council in 1951 (op. cit.). The document details the duties and 
recommendations for every contracting state with respect to accident investigation, 
and especially, as is stressed in the document, the prompt dissemination of accident 
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occurrences, and of the analysis results. The ICAO document clearly lays down that 
"the sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the 
prevention of accidents and incidents." It further stresses explicitly that "it is not the 
purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability" (op. cit.). The ICOA 
recommended format of aviation accident and incident reports is taken as a blueprint 
(or at least as a framework) for accident reporting by ICOA's contracting states. The 
following lists the sections and accident report format that is recommended by ICAO 
(see Figure 2-1). 
It is noted that much diverse expertise is brought to populating these sections -
meteorologists, metallurgists, fire safety experts, and of course aircraft specialists, 
and many others, all contribute to the analysis of these sets of factors. Under analysis, 
ICAO recommends to "analyse, as appropriate, only the information documented 
[under "Factual Information"] and which is relevant to the determination of 
conclusions and causes." There is only one section out of 19 main sections of the 
report format's body, however, that concerns itself with the human factor in the 
accidents causation, "personnel information". 
This section, "Personnel information", includes the following, according to ICAO: 
I. Pertinent information concerning each of the flight crew members, including: 
age, validity of licenses, ratings, mandatory checks, flying experience (total 
and on type), and relevant information on duty time. 
2. Brief statement of qualifications and experience of other crew members. 
3. Pertinent information regarding other personnel, such as air traffic services, 
maintenance, etc. when relevant. 
These are all factors that impact the flight crew members' psychological 
predisposition, and their psychological disposition (their mental abilities, decision-
making powers, concentration levels etc.) at the time of the accident. However, it is 
unclear how these factors got to be included in this list of "factors influencing human 
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cognition", (do they all stem from one coherent psychological theory?), or why other 
psychological factors were left out. 
On another level, however, it is, surprising that 'human error' does not warrant its 
own analytical section, given the fact that it is so often described as the major single 
cause of modern accidents (up to 80% of aviation accident and medical adverse 
events are frequently cited as the accident's cause, see e.g. (Busse and Johnson, 
1999». 
There seems to be a tendency to assume that if 'the system' ostensibly did not do 
wrong, there must have been a mistake by the people who operated the machines. 
This is corroborated by the observation which I will return to in later chapters, that 
accident causation taxonomies tend to focus on the classification of technical causes 
(material conditions), and environmental conditions, such as weather. The part of 
those taxonomies that relates to "human error" often serves as a bucket for instances 
of human behaviour that are associated with one or other non-human causal event in 
the accident chain for which no sufficiently satisfying technical explanation can be 
found (Hollnagel, 1983). 
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1. Title 
2. Synopsis 
3. Body 
a. Factual Information 
I. History of the flight 
ii. Injuries to persons 
iii. Damage to aircraft 
iv. Other damage 
v. Personnel information 
VI. Aircraft information 
VII. Meteorological information 
Vlll. Aids to navigation 
ix. Communications 
x. Aerodrome information 
XI. FI ight recorders 
xii. Wreckage and impact information 
XlII. Medical and pathological information 
xiv. Fire 
xv. Survival aspects 
XVI. Tests and research 
xvii. Organizational and management information 
XVIII. Additional information 
xix. Useful or effective investigation techniques 
h. Analysis 
c. Conclusions 
d. Safety Recommendations 
4. Appendices 
Figure 2-1- ICAO recommended accident report format 
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There is typically no justification, however, why that instance of human behaviour is 
assumed to have caused' this accident chain4, rather than just being associated (i.e. 
correlated) with i{ Moreover, the "analysis" of human factors that then takes place 
often is constrained to take place within the boundaries of this category, neglecting 
the interaction of human behaviour with the environmental context. Whether the 
human involvement in an accidents' chain of events is explicitly considered or not, it 
is often implied as the 'final' cause (or the "root cause") in the absence of any 
'satisfying' technical or environmental factors. It has been noted that this decision 
often is a highly subjective one6, and especially the interpretation and analysis of that 
instance of human behaviour that is reasoned to have 'caused' the accident is often 
implicitly influenced by background 'knowledge' and assumptions on part of the 
analyse. This phenomenon has also been investigated empirically by Lekberg (1997), 
with comparable conclusions. 
3 See the second half of this Chapter (on 'Human Error') for a discussion and 
definition of the term 'cause'. 
4 Benner refers to the beginnings of accident analysis theory to explain this 
phenomenon: He states that "the statistical work of Greenwood and Woods in ]919 
[ .. ] suggested the "accident proneness" concept. Their work still influences some 
accident investigation [ .. ]. Investigators still look for data in accidents that will 
support the idea that "conditions" such as attitudes, attentiveness and so forth "cause" 
accidents. This statistical work focused on static conditions and set the pattern for 
untold man years of research into "unsafe conditions" as causes of accidents" 
(Benner, 1975). 
5 The confusion between correlation and causation is common in "common sense" 
thinking, and has been pointed out especially by statisticians repeatedly (e.g. Blalock, 
]972). 
6 See for instance, (Snowdon and Johnson, 1998), and Snowdon, 2002. 
7 "Investigators unconsciously base their investigative methods on methodologies 
adapted from their academic disciplines or previous work experience; this leads to 
highly individualized, personalized investigative methodologies" (Benner, ] 98]). 
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Furthermore, point 3d ("Safety Recommendations") only states "[aJs appropriate, 
briefly state any recommendations made for the purpose of accident prevention and 
any resultant corrective action. There is no recommendation of linking the "causal 
analysis of factual information" to the generation of safety recommendation, as would 
be necessary in order to trace back the justifications for certain recommendations, and 
in order to review the recommendations in case other factors come to light, and the 
analysis process is to be revised. 
Of interest is the inclusion of point of 3.a.xix: "useful or effective investigation 
techniques". This section recommends that "wheI1 useful or effective investigation 
techniques have been used during the investigation" analysts should "briefly indicate 
the reason for using these techniques and refer [ .. J to the main features as well as 
describing the results under the appropriate subheadings [ .. J." This point is of interest 
since its frequent omission in ICAO inspired accident reports leads to the question 
whether the investigation techniques used are indeed hardly useful or effective 
enough to be mentioned8• 
The official accident investigation handbook by the US Department of Energy (DoE, 
1997) similarly short-changes human error investigation methods. In chapter 7, it lists 
recommended analysis techniques to address critical areas of investigation. Under 
"advanced methods", fault tree techniques such as MORT (Management Oversight 
and Risk Tree, e.g. Knox and Eicher, 1980), but only under "other analytic 
techniques" can a mention of human factors analysis techniques be found. To quote, 
it states that "Human factors analysis identifies elements that influence task 
performance, focusing on operability, work environment, and management elements. 
Humans are often the weakest link in a system and can be the system component 
8 see for instance http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/guery.asp, the US National Transport-
ation and Safety Board's Aviation Accident Database and collection of aviation 
accident synopses (current January 8th, 2002). 
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most likely to fail. Often machines are not optimally designed for operators, thereby 
increasing the risk of error. High-stress situations can cause personnel fatigue and 
increase the likelihood of error and failure. Therefore, methods that focus on human 
factors are useful when human error is determined to be a direct or contributing cause 
of an accident." But despite these insights, and the fact that 60-80 % of accidents are 
said to involve 'human error', the DoE handbook does not list or recommend any 
specific human factors investigation technique. 
Accident Causation 
Accident analysis is informed, albeit often implicitly (Bibbings, 200 I), by accident 
causation models. In accident causation models, as is shown below, any system's 
human component is central to the system description that forms the framework to 
describe the web of contributing factors that led to the accident. Human involvement 
in any accident is seen as inevitable when looked at from the perspective of 'active 
and latent' human error (see chapter 5 for an in-depth discussion). Whatever the focus 
of the investigation, accident causation models make clear that the accident's 
causation needs to be viewed from several different levels of system components. 
Accident Causation: Causal Trees 
Arguably one of the most common and intuitive approaches to the analysis of causal 
factors that led to the accident, next to the chronological time line of events, is the 
"causal tree" family of methods. 
An accident seldom happens in isolation: usually it is a concatenation of events. This 
idea initially gave rise to the concept of a 'causal chain' (e.g. Heinrich's Domino 
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Theory, 1936). However, this concept is mostly unhelpful in a meaningful analysis of 
the accident, since it is an oversimplification that ignores the interplay of causal and 
environmental factors (see also e.g. Perrow, 1984). 
The reality is likely to be a complex web of interacting events, culminating in the 
accident. To grasp such a web of events while investigating the accident can be 
difficult. To present it in purely verbal form in an accident report, in such a way as to 
be comprehensible to even a well-informed reader, can be very difficult, if not 
impossible (Zotov, 1996). 
Fault trees are a family of analysis and investigation methods that support the 
uncovering of the multitude of casual factors during accident analysis. Most fault tree 
methods are diagrammatic, and can facilitate the presentation of the culmination of 
events leading to an accident. They require the system, task, procedure, or component 
in question to be logically decomposed into functional elements. Once the 
relationships among these elements are identified, a diagram is developed that depicts 
the elements and their relationships. A typical fault tree consists of an outcome (either 
successful operation or a particular failure) shown at the top, or most general level, of 
the tree. Elements that contribute to the outcome are listed below it in the diagram 
with connections (branches) showing the logical relationship between the element and 
the outcome. Once an outcome is defined, then contributing factors are identified and 
placed into the diagram. The appearance of a fault tree is that many elements 
combine, in pyramid fashion, to produce a single outcome. The trick is to identify all 
of the underlying elements (and combinations of elements) that might combine to 
produce a particular outcome (Reason and Maddox, 1996). 
Fault trees are used specifically in the field of Probabilistic Risk and Safety Analysis 
(e.g. Fullwood and Hall, 1988), and some variants of it concern themselves explicitly 
with 'human error' next to technical risks and faults. 
25 
For instance, the NTSB accident/incident database contains sections with factual 
elements ("who, what, where"), sequence of events, and a narrative description of the 
incident. The NTSB uses a multiple-cause classification system with allowance for up 
to seven "occurrences", and several "findings" for each occurrence. Any of the 
findings may be prescribed as a cause or contributory factor. The probable cause 
statement is usually an integrated text. Each "finding" may, in turn, be divided into 
"subjects". The subjects come from a coded list and refer to whether the finding was 
person-related, and whether it was a proximal cause or not (NTSB, 1998). Therefore, 
the database allows for a causal tree being constructed by ascribing the level of 
proximity of the findings to the reported occurrence. Thus, it can be distinguished 
between causal factors and conditions facilitating the occurrence, and suggested root 
causes. However, the available constructs largely identify who was involved in a 
finding but often stop short of an assessment of why the error was made. Even the 
probable cause statements are largely descriptive in nature, without reference to latent 
failures or human information processing. This information, however, is important in 
developing preventive strategies (Luxhoj et aI., 1997). 
It has thus been pointed out repeatedly in the recent past that accidents that 
presumably result from "human error" are better characterized as a complex interplay 
of technical, social, organisational, and managerial factors (e.g. Leveson and Turner, 
1993). Thus, the design of the operating environment - displays, controls, and so on 
(Norman, 1983; 1990; Rizzo et aI., 1996) - has profound implications for the ability 
of the system to be maintained effectively and safely. More progressive models of 
accident causation attempt to capture the broader view on human error, taking the 
'total system' view. Two established models that take a broader view are Helmreich's 
and Reason's. Both aim at contextualising the human factors in accident causation, by 
placing the human and the 'erroneous' behaviour in relation to other factors, such as 
the environment, and also the technical system. These two models are introduced in 
the upcoming section. 
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Helmreich's Accident Causation Model 
Helmreich envisaged e.g. aircraft crews as working within a series of environments, 
each of which might put pressure on the crew, and degrade their performance. This 
series of environments was visualised as concentric spheres of influence, each 
affecting those inside (see Figure 2-2). In this diagram, the innermost environment 
concerns matters among the crew such as communication, personality, and Crew 
Resource Management. The crew is affected by the physical environment: the 
aircraft, with its idiosyncrasies, defects, and performance characteristics; the weather, 
both local and general; and the aerodrome environment. Outside these is the 
organisation of the airline, which purchased and maintained the aircraft, trained the 
crews, and should support their actions. Surrounding all of these is the regulatory 
environment, in which regulatory action by e.g. Transport Canada (i.e. the relevant 
regulatory authority) should ensure safe standards of operation. 
Reason's Accident Causation Model 
To produce effective recommendations from accident analysis, the information 
collected and the conclusions reached must be analysed in a way that reveals the 
relationships between the individuals associated with the occurrence, and the design 
and characteristics of the systems within which those individuals operate. 
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Regulatory 
Organisational 
Physical 
Figure 2-2 - Flightcrew Environments: Factors Influencing Behaviour 
(Helmreich et aI., 1990) 
For the purposes of broad systems analysis, an analytical model researched and 
developed by James Reason can be used. The Reason accident causation model is 
becoming an industry standard, and has been recommended by ICAO (1993) for use 
in investigating the role of management policies and procedures in aircraft accidents 
and incidents (Zotov, 1996). 
Central to Reason's approach is the concept ofthe 'organisational accident', in which 
latent failures arising mainly in the managerial and organisational spheres combine 
adversely with local triggering events (weather, location, etc.) and with the active 
failures of individuals at the 'sharp end' (errors and procedural violations) (Reason, 
1990). 
The relationship between these elements in the process of accident causation is shown 
in the accompanying diagram (Figure 2-3). 
28 
Organisation Task/Environment Individuals Defences 
Organisational Local Factors Active Failures ~ Factors • Morale Slips/Lapses Communicati L Fatigue Mistakes 
• ons Equipment Violations 
Management • Procedures 
structure etc. 
• IncomMlihie 
Latent Failures (L) 
Figure 2-3 - ' Organisational Accidents (Reason, 1997) 
Thus in both these influential accident causation models, 'human error' as a causal 
factor is een as intertwined with 'causes ' of vel)' diverging origins - from 
technological failure to managerial oversight, to organizational weakness or 
vu lnerability (Johnson, 1999). These factors are demonstrated to not only stand in 
relation with the ' human error' but more drastically, the instance of 'erroneous' 
human beha iour would not have occurred were it not for the circumstances. Thus, 
the situational context can be seen as defining the causation of ' 'human error". 
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
Accident in estigation is a form of post-hoc analysis, i.e. it is done after the fact. The 
under! ing goal of any accident analysis is to prevent future accidents. Accident 
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analysis is employed towards this goal (as stated in the above-mentioned ICAO 
reporting standard), since it is reasoned that an understanding of one accident's 
causation can lead to safety recommendations that improve on the system sufficiently 
. 9 to prevent Its reoccurrence . 
This pressing motivation (the goal to prevent future accidents) has led to the idea of 
"early warning systems" (Van der Schaaf et aI., 1991). This refers to incident 
reporting schemes (or: "Critical Incident Reporting"), i.e. schemes that record near-
miss accidents. These are seen as indications of accident potential within a system, 
and it is reasoned that if the thus identified weakness in the system is addressed as 
soon as a near-miss accident is identified, then actual accidents can be prevented from 
occurring. Not surprisingly, the concepts of causal analysis for accidents and 
incidents are closely related. 
In many medical incident reporting schemes, in-depth analysis and a search for the 
root causes of adverse events does not take place (Leape, 1994; Chappell, 1996). In 
contrast, the formal investigation of adverse events in industry is an increasingly 
well-established concept. Studies of accidents in industry, transport and military 
spheres have led to a much broader understanding of accident causation, with less 
focus on the individual who makes the error, and more on pre-existing organisational 
factors. 
9 The shorter term vIew on the benefits of accident analysis also stresses the 
importance of prompt dissemination of the accident's occurrence, the identified 
circumstances and causation, and the "lessons learned", i.e. the safety 
recommendations. In the case of an aviation accident, or course the airline company 
needs to be notified promptly, as well as the manufacturer. But also other airlines that 
fly the same planes, or use the same procedures, or use the same runways etc. need to 
be notified. This communication of accident data is seen as crucial in the overall 
strategy of future accident prevention (ICAO, 1994). 
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For instance, Reason's organisational accident causation model (see Figure 2-3) 
shows how latent failures can pave the way for an accident to occur. To produce 
effective recommendations, the information collected must be analyzed in a way that 
reveals the relationships between the human error that occurred, the design, and 
characteristics of the systems. 
The benefits of analysing a case using a formalised model are that it allows an 
analysis in a structured format based on theories of accident causation and human 
error. This type of analysis allows analysts not only to identify the active failures, 
which they are accustomed to do, but also the potentially more important latent 
failures which create the conditions in which people make errors. Stanhope et al. 
(1997) suggested that a more systematic approach dealing with a smaller number of 
cases in more depth is likely to yield greater dividends in understanding incident 
causation and generating action recommendation than the 'many' cases currently 
analysed quite briefly and hence less effectively. 
Barnhart et al. (1975) present a seminal paper on NASA's accident investigation 
method. Combined with Reason's accident causation model (Eagle et aI., 1992), it 
can be described as consisting of three steps: 
"When": 
• Assembly of facts and generation oftimeJine 
• Embed event within task sequence 
"What": 
• Identification of active failures 
• Description of all behaviours 
• Root Cause Analysis, assembling proximal and distal causes and work 
conditions factors 
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"Why" 
• Identification of latent failures, for instance: 
• "Information Processing Analysis", e.g.: 
• sources of information available (latent) 
• what information perceived, used, and in what ways 
• which decisions made, listing all choices 
• whether actions matched decisions (latent and active) 
• consideration of managerial and organisational failures; follow-up of root 
cause analysis 
Therefore, this model extends the above-described NTSB model by including the 
analysis of the "why" of the incident. The incident analysis proceeds from 
identification of 'active failures' and local working conditions that precipitate those to 
the identification of latent system failures. For instance, Reason (1990) has proposed 
a list of General Failure Types of organizations. They include: incompatible goals; 
organizational deficiencies; inadequate communications; poor planning; inadequate 
control and monitoring; design failures; inadequate defences; unsuitable materials; 
poor procedures; poor training; inadequate maintenance management; and inadequate 
regulation. 
I will return to incident reporting in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis (and in detail also 
in Appendices B and C). 
32 
THE ROLE OF HUMAN ERROR 
Introduction and Definition of Terms 
Next to accident causation models, accident analysis is typically informed just as 
implicitly by the analyst's model of the nature of human error lO• The human factor is 
a central part in the above-mentioned accident causation models. The human 
operators can thus be seen as another "system component" that needs to be 
investigated in accident and incident analysis. Therefore, methods are needed that 
specialize in the analysis of the human contribution to an accident's causation. 
There are many theories on the causation and underlying mechanisms of human error, 
just as there are as many on the general workings of the human mind. The human 
error models used in accident analysis, however, (or those found in the literature on 
accident analysis, even if they are not explicitly used in the process) are not solely 
influenced by psychological theory. 
Human error research is traditionally not bound to anyone particular discipline, but is 
distributed over several communities, such as psychology, reliability analysis, system, 
software and usability engineering, and cognitive science. Within each paradigm, the 
domain specific perspective dominates definition and scope of the term 'human 
error'. As we will see later, research into error focuses on those aspects of the topic 
that are relevant to the respective discipline or perspective. 
The First Human Error Conference in Maine (see Reason, 1990) (and the preceding 
Three Mile Island accident) in 1980 brought into being a human error research 
community that started to pool the efforts scattered across disciplinary boundaries. 
10 There are some notable examples where the theories that were assumed to explain 
"erroneous" human behaviour were made explicit in accident reports (BASI, 1994). 
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The body of research has grown considerably since then, lead prominently by 
cognitive engineers and psychologists such as Jens Rasmussen, James Reason, and 
e.g. Veronique DeKeyser. 
In order to review the field of error research, I will first draw attention to different 
views on what constitutes an 'error', and specifically, a 'human error'. 
Within psychology, human error is typically viewed as a deviation from an 
individual's preliminary intention to reach a norm (Bes and Johnson, 1998). Error is 
seen in the context of cognitive processing and decision-making models (see for 
instance Ashcraft, 1994). For instance, Reason states that human error occurs because 
of either inappropriate planning (action specification), or inappropriate action 
execution on side of the individual (see Norman's Action Theory below). 
In a system failure ll context, the term 'human error' might be misleading (see for 
instance Leveson, 1995). An 'error', according to Reason (1990), is the consequence 
and not tantamount to 'erroneous action'. The term 'human error' is seen by manyl2 
as conveying oft-unjustified responsibility and blame in a system failure context. 
1\ A Failure is defined to be the non-performance or inability of the system or 
component [including the human as a component] to perform its intended function for 
a specified time under specified environmental conditions (Leveson, 1995) 
12 Rasmussen (Rasmussen et aI., 1987, see below), in his error taxonomy uses the 
descriptive phrase 'external mode of human malfunctioning' (inappropriate task 
performance) in order to avoid the term 'human error' "with its flavour of guilt". 
Norman (1990) suggests that: "one major step would be to remove the term 'Human 
Error' from our vocabulary and re-evaluate our need to blame individuals". This is an 
attempt to shift away from blame, error, and cause. The search for cause, as Norman 
(1990) further suggests, ends the search for meaning, for once we have found the 
cause we can 'explain' it away. The idea of 'cause' can be seen as a legacy of the 
legal community (Hale et at., 1997). 
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Senders and Moray (1991) point out one useful distinction between system fault and 
human error. In the former the system did not provide the functionality necessary for 
performing certain tasks. In the latter, the system did provide the 'tools' (such as 
actions, operators and information) for carrying out a task, but the user failed to 'use' 
them. However, this distinction poses further questions. 
For instance, Rasmussen et al. (1987) point out that, in accident analysis, the 
identification of an event as a human error depends entirely upon the stop rule applied 
for the explanatory search after the fact. 
The backtracking of the causal chain will stop, according to Rasmussen et al. (op. 
cit.), when one or more changes are found which are familiar and therefore acceptable 
as explanations, and to which something can be done for correction. He states that the 
characteristics of a fault (which might include human error)13 are: 
I. It is the cause of deviation from a standard 
2. It is found on the causal path backwards from this effect 
3. It is accepted as a familiar and therefore reasonable explanation 
4. A cure is known 
This means, he says, that allocation of causes to people or technical parts in the 
system is a purely pragmatic question regarding the stop rule applied for analysis 
Hollnagel (Hollnagel, 1 991)argues the idea of 'human error' should be removed and 
replaced with a less emotive term like 'erroneous action'. 
13 A fault is to be distinguished from failure (Leveson, 1995). Failure is defined to be 
the event (a behaviour) (i.e. something fails). All failures are faults. Not all faults are, 
or lead to, failures. Failures are basic abnormal occurrences. Faults are higher-order 
events. 
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after the fact. There is thus no defined 'start' of the causal chain involved III 
accidents, and this fact should be reflected in the error data taxonomy. 
Events, according to Rasmussen et al. (op. cit.), should be considered occurrences of 
a man-machine mismatch, which can only be characterised by a multifaceted 
description (see below). Faults and errors cannot be defined objectively by 
considering the performance of humans or equipment in isolation. 
Furthermore, since the system itself is built, programmed, and maintained by humans 
one can argue that faults are ultimately human error. Indeed, one school of thought 
seeks to ascribe the cause of all failures to human origins (Bignell and Fortune, 1984). 
Reason picked up on this by pointing out, as noted above, that an error is not to be 
seen as the accident or failure itself, but as preceding the failure (Reason, 1990). 
'Error' can lead to 'active failure' as well as 'latent failure'. 
Reason maintains that active failure is usually associated with the performance of 
'front-line' operators (such as pilots and control room crews) and has an immediate 
impact upon the system. Latent failure is most often generated by those at the 'blunt 
end' of the system (designers, high-level decision-makers, construction crews, 
managers, etc.) and may lie dormant for a long time. 
In this thesis I will concentrate on 'human error' leading to active failure. The 
analysis of these is most likely to benefit from cognitive modelling techniques. Latent 
failures are best analysed in 'total system' approaches, which go beyond individuals' 
cognition and take for instance organisational aspects into account (see also Reason 
and Maddox, 1996; or Hale et aI., 1997). 
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THE NATURE OF HUMAN ERROR: MODELS AND 
TAXONOMIES 
Given a more defined scope of 'error', the question 'what is human error, and how 
does it come about?' is still subject of discussion, and several theories and approaches 
have been put forward, each with their perspective on this issue, or sometimes 
building up on, or modifying, previous work (e.g. Reason, 1990). I will discuss some 
of the most influential approaches in the following sections. 
Error classification's distinction between varieties of human error are important 
because different error types have different underlying mechanisms (different 
psychological origins), occur in different parts of the system, and require different 
methods of error management, and remediation (Reason and Maddox, 1996). 
Although a classification system is not likely to give insights into the underlying 
causes of error, Freitag (1997) notes that "the philosopher's stone which we are all 
seeking is how to recognise the events we can learn from without actually having to 
analyse them all in detail first" (compromise between the generation of enough events 
to learn from, and avoiding swamping the analysis system with too much work which 
will cost more than its added value for improving management). 
The distinction between varieties of human error plays a significant role in accident 
analysis because different error types have different underlying mechanisms 
(different psychological origins), occur in different parts of the system, and require 
different methods of error management and remediation (Reason and Maddox, 1996). 
The nature of 'human error' is still subject of discussion, and several theories and 
approaches have been put forward. I will discuss some of the most influential 
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approaches in the following sections, notably Rasmussen's Skill, Rule, Knowledge 
(SRK) framework, and Reason's Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS). 
Behavioural Classification 
Norman (1981) pointed out that error data examination reveals that errors can be 
categorised and fall into patterns. However, the categorisation and interpretation is 
theory dependent. There have been several attempts to categorise human error in 
terms of behaviouristic criteria (errors of commission, of omission, of substitution) 
(op. cit.). 
Most notably, Hollnagel (1991) suggested focusing on the overt behaviour of the 
human leading to, or constituting an 'error'. 
Thus, Reason (1990) argues that Hollnagel's error classification scheme is an 
example of a behaviour-based taxonomy of human error. It starts with the observable 
phenomena, such as errors of omission or commission, rather than cognitive theories. 
The observable phenomena, he states, make up the empirical basis for error 
classification. He referred to these behavioural descriptions as the phenotype of 
human error. The error genotype denotes the mental mechanism hypothesised to 
underlie the overt erroneous behaviour. 
The main aim of this approach at the time was to develop a system that can recognise 
possible erroneous actions and alert the user of their occurrence. From this point of 
view, Hollnagel argues, it is in principle sufficient to be concerned only with the 
phenotype of erroneous actions. The purpose of his taxonomy of phenotypes of 
erroneous actions is to establish a basis for a working, computationally implemented, 
action classification system. It does not attempt to explain the erroneous actions. 
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Behaviourist classifications such as Hollnagel's do not aid in understanding the 
underlying mechanism. Hollnagel points out that the phenotype is useful for 
computerised detection, but, since it does not provide any explanation, it cannot be 
used for correction and improvement. For that purpose a theory of error genotypes is 
needed. This will be a model description of human erroneous behaviour, which can 
be useful in clarifying how the user-system interaction takes place, and thus how it 
can be improved when necessary (op. cit.). 
Moreover, behavioural classifications quickly become large and unwieldy. A 
complete error theory seems likely to require autonomous, subconscious processing, 
with intentions, past habits, thoughts, and memories all playing some role in 
corrupting the intended behaviour (Norman, 1981). Also, Rasmussen (1987) 
observes, that if the analysis is based only on the consideration of human error in 
terms of their external manifestation (such as omission, commission, and 
inappropriate timing) a priori error identification will be hindered by a combinatorial 
explosion. 
Conceptual Classification Schemes 
At the conceptual level of classification, assumptions about the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in error production are the basis for human error taxonomies (Reason, 
1990). In contrast to the behavioural level, these classifications are based more upon 
theoretical inference than on observable characteristics. Conceptual categorisation 
schemes seek to identify causal mechanisms underlying human error. 
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Action Theory and Errors 
Theories of action present core concepts of applied cognitive theory. They often form 
the basis for the conceptual error models introduced below. For instance, Norman's 
Seven Stages of Action model (Figure 2-4) combines a simple cognitive processing 
model with action stages of human-computer interaction. It suggests how an intention 
is represented and acted upon. He articulates how the Gulf of Execution (stages of 
intention, specification of action sequence, and execution) and the Gulf of Evaluation 
(stages of perception, interpretation, and evaluation) bridge between the user's goal 
and the world. 
Several errors can arise along the line of these gulfs. Norman in particular 
distinguished between slips and mistakes. Mistakes were defined as inappropriate 
planning (action specification), whereas slips are inappropriate action execution. This 
distinction, along with the assumptions embodied in the above action theory playa 
major role in the following conceptual error models. 
Level of Performance and Human Error 
One influential model of human decision making in complex environments is 
Rasmussen's (1986) decision ladder (Figure 2-5) that distinguishes between skill-, 
rule-, and knowledge-based behaviour. As Reason (1990) and Sanderson and 
Harewood (1988) pointed out, Rasmussen's Skill-Rule-Knowledge framework has 
become "a 'market standard' for the human reliability community the world over". 
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Figure 2-4 - Norman's (1988) Seven Stages of Action 
Levels of Performance: Skill, Rule, Knowledge (SRK) 
Skill-based behaviour represents sensory-motor performance during acts or activities 
that, after a statement of an intention, take place without conscious control as smooth, 
automated, and highly integrated patterns of behaviour. 
In rule-based behaviour, the composition of a sequence of subroutines in a familiar 
work situation is typically consciously controlled by a stored rule or procedure. A rule 
41 
----- ----- -
may have been derived empirically during previous occasions, communicated from 
other persons' knowledge as an instruction, or it may be prepared on occasion by 
conscious problem solving or planning. 
In general, skill-based performance flows without conscious attention and the actor 
will be unable to describe the information used to act. The higher level rule-based co-
ordination in general is based on explicit know-how, and the rules used can be 
reported by the person, although the cues releasing a rule may not be explicitly 
known. 
During unfamiliar situations, for which no rules for control are available from 
previous encounters, the control must move to a higher conceptual level, in which 
performance is goal controlled and knowledge based. The goal is explicitly 
formulated. Then a useful plan is developed. Different plans are considered and their 
effect tested against the goal, physically by trial and error, or conceptually by means 
of 'thought experiments' . 
Rasmussen (1990) maintains that a very important aspect of the cognitive control to 
be captured by models of human behaviour is the dynamic interaction between the 
activities at the three levels. Only insights into this interaction would make cognitive 
models of human performance fit for complex environments, and thus for cognitive 
engineering; cognitive models derived from the cognitive science tradition suffers in 
this novel context from focusing on a well-bounded aspect of mental representation. 
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Figure 2-5 Rasmussen's Decision Ladder (1987) 
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Errors as Human-Machine Mismatch 
Rasmussen et al. (1987) see human error as man-machine or man-task mismatch. In 
the case of systematic or frequent mismatches, the cause can typically be considered a 
design error. Occasional mismatches are either caused by variability on part of the 
system or the human, and will typically be considered component failures or human 
errors, respectively. 
Rasmussen states that human variability is an important ingredient in adaptation and 
learning, and the ability to adapt to peculiarities in system performance and optimise 
interaction is the very reason for having people in the syst~m. Human errors can in a 
way be considered to be unsuccessful experiments with unacceptable consequences. 
An 'unkind' work environment is then defined by the fact that it is not possible for a 
man to correct the effects of inappropriate variations in performance before they lead 
to unacceptable consequences. 
Error Taxonomy 
Rasmussen et al. (1987) stress that a consistent taxonomy (see Figure 2-6) is 
necessary in order to extract data from reports on accidents and incidents. The 
analysis of this data is for instance useful for design of error-tolerant systems (see 
also Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989). 
Rasmussen's 'External Mode of Malfunction' can be seen as a counterpart of 
Hollnagel's phenotype description. The SRK framework, however, also aims at 
relating mismatches to psychological mechanisms. 
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Causes of Human Malfunction Situation Factors 
• 
• 
External Events (distraction etc) 
Expressive Task Demand 
(force, time, knowledge, etc) 
• 
• 
• 
Task characteristics 
Physical environment 
Work time characteristics 
• Operator incapacitated 
(sickness etc) 
• Intrinsic human variability 
Mechanisms of Malfunction 
• Discrimination 
• Input Information 
Processing 
• Recall 
• Inference 
• Physical Co-ordination 
Factors affecting Performance 
Subjective goals and intentions 
Mental load, resources 
Affective factors 
Personnel Task 
• Equipment Design 
• Procedure Design 
• Fabrication 
• Installation 
• 
Internal Human Malfunction 
• Detection 
/ 
Inspection 
• Operation 
• Test and calibration 
• Maintenance, Repair 
• Identification • 
• 
• Decision 
• 
• Action 
External Mode of Malfunction 
• Specified task not performed 
• Omission of act 
• Inaccurate performance 
• Wrong timing 
• Commission of erroneous act 
• Commission of extraneous act 
• Sneak-path (accidental timing of several events 
or faults) 
Logistics 
Administration 
Management 
Figure 2-6 - Taxonomy for Description and Analysis of Events involving 
Human Malfunction (Rasmussen, 1982) 
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For this purpose, a cognitive task analysis '4 (within the SRK framework) is necessary 
(see also Chapter 3) to identifY the element of the internal cognitive decision process 
which was affected, either by not being properly performed or by being improperly 
bypassed by a habitual short-cut. Rasmussen (1987) states, that for the more familiar 
routine task'5 it is possible for a knowledgeable expert to judge the internal mode of 
malfunction from a case study. 
Consideration of the 'mechanisms of malfunction', in terms of the above described 
levels of performance and control, further characterises an event. 
Rasmussen (op. cit.) points out, that human system interaction cannot be described 
adequately on Iy considering the cognitive level. The dimensions 'Personnel task', 
'Factors Affecting Performance (FAP)" and 'Situation Factors' are therefore also to 
be taken into account in the analysis of the event. Importantly, these dimensions, 
along with the dimension 'Causes of human malfunction' (similar to the FAP 
dimension, but with discrete events as opposed to continuing conditions), allow the 
causal backtracking to be continued "upstream from the human" (op. cit.). Thus it can 
help to bridge the gap between models of human error and system failure. 
Rasmussen suggests a multifaceted description system rather than an exclusive, 
generic classification tree (see Figure 2-6). The described taxonomy is not intended to 
lead to a generic, hierarchical classification system. Complex scenarios can be 
identified (i.e. errors can be classified and analysed) directly from the underlying 
14 Rasmussen's work epitomises the introduction of Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA). 
The decision ladder (Figure 2-5) is used as a framework to carry out CT A. It defines a 
set of prototypical information processing activities and reSUlting states of 
knowledge, which are used for examining task strategies and cognitive functions (Bes 
and Johnson, 1998) 
IS this refers to the rule-based level of performance only. 
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psychological mechanisms. So human error (or 'events involving human 
malfunction') is categorised on the basis of the mechanisms at its origin. 
Concluding Remarks on the SRK Model 
Rasmussen's SRK framework can in particular account for rule-based errors. There is 
no detailed method to investigate the nature of occurring slips other than a one-way 
short cut on the decision ladder, and behaviourist identification on the overall 
framework level. Slips, however, make up a significant proportion of operator error 
(since expertise makes them possible in the first place), and are also much more 
readily predictable than for instance knowledge-based mistakes (Rasmussen, 1987). 
SRK does not deal with knowledge-based mistakes. Rasmussen (op. cit.) notes that 
on the other levels, error mechanisms are described in terms of established, 'normal' 
action sequences (rules, procedures) in a rather behaviourist way (based on task 
analysis). On the knowledge level this is impossible. It is thus very difficult to 
cha~cterise the mental data processing and the related mechanisms leading to 
mismatch. The sequence of arguments an operator will use during problem solving 
cannot be described in general terms (see also Reason, 1988). The goal to pursue 
must be explicitly considered, and the actual choice depends on very SUbjective and 
situation-dependent features. Rasmussen maintains that in present-day control rooms, 
the context in which operators make decisions at the knowledge level is far too 
unstructured to allow the development of a model of their problem-solving process, 
and hence, to identify typical error modes, except in very general terms. 
This also leads to the observation that Rasmussen's model, though aiming at being a 
generic cognitive performance model, has its origins and application in control rooms 
of for instance nuclear power plants (NPPs), and is limited in the sense that it is 
domain dependent. In NPPs' control rooms, operators' tasks are proceduralised to a 
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high degree. Knowledge-level perfonnance, as is needed when faced with novel 
situations, is to be avoided. The same holds for skill-based tasks, since monotony 
often related with automated task perfonnance is highly error-prone, too. Thus, SRK 
focuses on the rule-based level of behaviour, having evolved in response to NPP 
requirements. 
Furthennore, the representation of cognitive processing is pitched on a considerably 
high level, when compared to local theories of cognitive functioningl6• Since not 
intended as such, the SRK model is something rather different from a psychological 
model. It emphasises psychological products rather than processes (Sanderson and 
Harwood, 1988). It is intended to be a "functional model to illustrate general aspects 
of the operator's situation at a higher level as seen by the system designer" 
(Rasmussen, 1969, cited in op. cit.). This hinders a thorough analysis of the cognitive 
processing underlying the 'external human malfunction'. 
Furthennore, in a study of several Human Error Identification (HEI) techniques in 
1992 (Kirwan, 1992), SRK obtained the lowest ratings on all but one category. Only 
its theoretical validity was judged moderately satisfactory, but on scales concerned 
with for instance comprehensiveness, consistency, validity, and acceptability (usage 
to date and availability of technique) it performed very poorly. However, 
Rasmussen's SRK model paved the way for several other techniques, such as 
Reason's, as described next. 
Cognitive Primitives, Cognitive Biases, and Human Error 
Reason's (1990) taxonomy of human error also represents a conceptual classification 
of error. It is predicated on assumptions about the cognitive mechanisms involved in 
error production. He locates basic human error tendencies within the general working 
16 As opposed to framework theories (Reason, 1988) 
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mechanism of the human cognitive system, paying particular attention to cognitive 
primitives and biases, rather than detailed information processing principles. His 
categorisation scheme is widely referred to in research into error modelling (Logan, 
1984; Green, 1985; Rasmussen, 1985; Rouse and Morris, 1987; Woods and Roth, 
1988; De Keyser, 1989; Rouse and Cody, 1989; Rasmussen, 1990; Rasmussen, 
1990). 
Rasmussen's SRK model is at the heart of Reason's model of human error 
tendencies. Reason's Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) combines the SRK 
approach with the distinction of slips (and lapses) and mistakes introduced by 
Norman (1988). Norman (op. cit.) defined that slips result from automatic behaviour, 
mistakes from conscious decisions. Automatic behaviour means cognitive control is 
non-conscious, i.e. it takes place on the skill-based level of performance. Conscious 
decision-making relates to the knowledge-based level of cognitive control, as well as 
to the rule-based level (although to a lesser extent). In this way, Reason takes on 
board SRK performance levels, also associating them with levels of cognitive control 
as Rasmussen did in his model. 
Thus, Reason bases his error classification on the definitions of skill-based slips and 
lapses on the one hand, and rule- and knowledge- based mistakes on the other. He 
defines slips and lapses to result in actions or states that deviate from the current 
intention due to execution and/or storage failures. Mistakes, on the other hand, result 
in actions that may run according to plan, but where the plan is inadequate to achieve 
its desired outcome (see also Norman's Action Theory, 1981, Figure 2-4). 
Reason distinguishes between type and form of an error. Error types are related to the 
perfonnance level (Rasmussen, 1983) at which the error occurs. On the skill-based 
level he lists inattention and overattention as major reasons for slips of action, on the 
rule-based level he indicates misapplication of good rules and application of bad 
rules as main forms of errors. On the knowledge based level he enumerates 10 
different forms of mistakes and failures, namely selectivity. workspace limitations. 
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out oj sight out of mind, confirmation bias, over-confidence, biased reviewing, 
illusory correlation, halo effects, and problems with causality and complexity. 
Error forms are basically dependent on two cognitive primitives, or biases: similarity 
matching and frequency gambling. Reason accumulated varied experimental results 
as evidence that these two processes are 'computational primitives' of the human 
cognitive system. These biases denote automatic retrieval processes, by which 
knowledge structures are located and their products delivered to consciousness or to 
the outside world. Reason postulates as a useful, working approximation of human 
information processing principles, that, when cognitive operations are underspecified, 
they tend to default to contextually appropriate, high-frequency responses. This 
approximation and the two primitives hold across all three levels of performance (see 
also chapter 4 and 5 for a more detailed description of some error types and forms). 
CONCLUSION 
Although Reason's model provides for the analysis of slips to a much greater extent 
than Rasmussen's SRK, GEMS particularly assists the analyst in understanding the 
errors that may occur when the operator moves into the rule-based and knowledge-
based behavioural domains (Kirwan, 1992). GEMS is notably comprehensive in its 
coverage of different types of cognitive failure. 
However, the technique only gives limited guidance on which error shaping factors 
are likely to apply to the identified error forms. The classification of knowledge-
based mistakes is also mainly assisted by heuristic "guidance". Kirwan notes17, that it 
17 Kirwan (1992) reviewed 12 Human Error Identification techniques in a seminal 
"Applied Ergonomics" paper. He measured the techniques against a set of criteria 
qualitatively and also by means of an empirical comparison study. The criteria 
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is very much left up to the analyst's insight and experience to ascribe particular error 
shaping factors to any individual task step, and then to propose measures by which 
these negative factors may be overcome. Furthermore, since guidance on how to 
choose the cognitive mechanisms underlying the categorised errors is ultimately 
relying on the assessor, GEMS is still largely treated as a taxonomy rather than an 
explanatory action and cognition model of human error. 
Both SRK and GEMS are based on insights derived from cognitive theory, but do not 
present these in a systematic, model-oriented manner. They ultimately define static 
error classification systems, along with high level heuristic psychological knowledge. 
Although a classification system is not likely to give insights into the underlying 
causes of error, it offers the first step towards theory by identifying systematic 
patterns in otherwise unordered error data. Also, Freitag (1997) notes that "the 
philosopher's stone which we are all seeking is how to recognise the events we can 
learn from without actually having to analyse them all in detail first". A more 
observational error classification scheme can provide this kind of initial guidance. A 
more thorough, in-depth error analysis approach can then be applied to further 
investigate the c1assification choices and decisions (as proposed in this thesis). 
In conclusion, the error taxonomies described provide for an error analysis that is 
pitched at a very high level in respect to the underlying cognitive error mechanisms. 
Typically, error categories are general, not necessarily discriminative, ambiguous, 
and the cognitive concepts used are partly loosely defined. A structured vocabulary, 
in which the error classes can be expressed as constrained by cognitive theory, will 
help to highlight error properties. 
included comprehensiveness, consistency, and e.g. auditability. A follow-up 
evaluation was conducted in 1998 (Kirwan, 1998), with similar results for GEMS and 
SRK. 
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The possible mappings from category to underlying mechanisms can be examined by 
reasoning about the underlying processing within a cognitive architecture. In cases of 
mapping ambiguity, a systematic approach to the investigation of the relevant 
cognitive aspects will prove helpful. This also points to the issue of documentability, 
i.e. the degree to which the technique lends itself to auditabJe documentation. GEMS 
performed very poorly when rated on a scale for documentability (Kirwan, 1992). 
Complementary cognitive modelling of the error forms identified would provide an 
additional source of modelling decision documentation. 
In this thesis, I detail how this approach of complementing Reason's GEMS 
taxonomy with a cognitive modelling approach can be put into practice. In the 
following chapter J will delineate the field of cognitive modelling and introduce a 
cognitive architecture that lends itself to cognitive error modelling, and was thus used 
in the combined approach. 
One important implication from either accident causation model is that the specific 
analysis of "Human Error" is an essential concept in accident analysis. Furthermore, 
the analysis of the psychological side of Human Error has to be situated in accident 
causation models that take the interplay of all levels of system factors into account, 
ranging from individual 'active' error to team interactions, and the impact of 
governmental regulation policies. Thus far, accident analysis only often takes a 
'common sense' approach to error analysis. 
Reason points to several shortcomings of what he ca1ls error management (EM) 
techniques. Though of proven value, these existing forms of EM have a number of 
limitations, particularly narrowness of focus. In brief, they tend to be "piecemeal 
rather than planned, reactive rather than proactive, fashion-driven rather than theory-
driven" (Reason and Maddox, 1996). They also ignore the substantial developments 
that have occurred in the behavioural sciences over the past 20 years in understanding 
the nature, varieties, and causes of human error. 
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A thorough, grounded, i.e. theory-based, understanding of Human Error, its nature, its 
causes, and its relation to the rest of the 'total system' is needed. In order to fully 
comprehend an accident's causation, the focus cannot only be on the technical aspects 
of system failure, with 'human error' as the label that provides the stopping case for 
the investigation process. This will prohibit us to effectively prevent their re-
occurrence. Human error models, as introduced in this chapter, when embedded in 
broader accident causation frameworks, can provide the tools for this more 
comprehensive accident and incident analysis. However, current methods for 'human 
error' analysis typically are "more of an art than a science" (Kirwan, 1992), and thus 
lack support for the human factors analyst in their application in accident and incident 
investigation. 
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CHAPTER 3 COGNITIVE ERROR 
MODELLING 
INTRODUCTION 
Bainbridge (1987) observed the "ironies of automation" more than a decade ago, and 
described it as a side effect of increasing automation in industry that operators' tasks 
shifted towards control, with cognitive tasks (such as decision-making) 
predominating. A similar trend is noticeable in the corresponding forms of operator 
error. 
These 'cognitive errors' demand a suitable taxonomy and method of analysis in order 
to be understood and explained thoroughly. An error analysis technique that is rooted 
in cognitive theory aJlows the anaJyst to gain an understanding of the processes 
underlying the error - the mechanisms of human cognition. This thesis argues that the 
use of a cognitive architecture as a structural framework for expressing the cognitive 
processing underlying operator error will lead beyond an observational approach to 
error modelling. Further research into cognitive error modelling and simulation is also 
discussed. 
Human error plays a major role in the occurrence of accidents in safety critical 
systems such as those used in aviation, railway systems, or nuclear power plants (e.g. 
HollnageJ, 1991). Identifying human involvement in accidents is, however, not 
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necessarily tantamount to identifying the actual 'cause' of the accident. The design of 
technology, task procedures, or organisational issues might not be well suited to 
human action and cognitive processing (Norman, 1993), and thus present an 'unkind' 
work environment. The understanding of the causes, principles and effects of human 
error is thus essential if we want to further our understanding of major accidents. 
Insights into the causes and course of accidents and incidents will help us to deal with 
them appropriately: avoiding similar events and situations in future, or by being 
prepared for their occurrence (for example through error-tolerant design, or 
emergency procedure based training). To attain this goal it is necessary to perform an 
accident analysis which identifies as many contributing factors as possible and to 
suggest actions for removing or blocking each contributing factor (Svenson and 
Sjostrom, 1997). Human error makes up a substantial portion of the pool of 
contributing factors. Their identification is commonly guided by error taxonomies, 
some of which consider the origins of the classes of human error identified. 
Research into human error has been dominated by work on 'error' classification 
schemes and 'error' models. Domain dependent error models and taxonomies cater 
for the instances of human erroneous behaviour that are typical for, or conditioned 
and postulated, by the domain at hand (e.g. SRK and proceduralised tasks in control 
rooms). 
Domain-independent human error taxonomies can be seen as being based primarily, 
and to different extents, on generic theories of human cognition (such as Reason's 
taxonomy). Even those taxonomies that adhere more closely to cognitive theory in 
their explanation of human fallibility are pitched at a level too high to track the 
underlying cognitive processing undergone by the operator. 
Examination of this processing could provide leads to the causes and 'inner workings' 
of the error. It is therefore useful to provide a framework to model the cognition that 
underlies human error. This will enable error analysts to benefit from error 
taxonomies' abstracting and simplifying effect on the wealth of error data, as well as 
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from the more refined, structured, and detailed information gained by systematic 
cognitive modelling. 
With increasing automation, the operator's role transformed to one of control rather 
than action (Bainbridge, 1987). With the attempt to decrease the user's (physical) 
workload, cognitive load increased inadvertently. Easily performed (physical or 
mental) tasks are transferred to the system's responsibility, while delegation, decision 
making and other general control processes stay within the operator's task space. This 
led to an increase in the demands posed on the mental capabilities of the human 
operator, and thus increases the occurrence of errors that originate in the constraints 
imposed by the human cognitive system. 
Current error models, as noted above (and in later chapters in this thesis), do not 
provide an analysis detailed enough to trace the cognitive processing preceding or 
constituting human error. Our approach suggests utilising the cognitive 'vocabulary' 
that an information processing model offers to express error specifications. 
However, most current cognitive modelling techniques focus on expert, error-free 
behaviour. Assumptions of 'idealised' task performance are built into the technique, 
hindering its adaptation to real-life behaviour of users and operators. Similar 
observations hold for current cognitive simulation architectures. Those cognitive 
architectures that do have the potential to incorporate error classification are typically 
either rather general (e.g. Interacting Cognitive Subsystems, ICS), or bound to a 
specific domain, such as nuclear plant operation (e.g. COSIMa, Cacciabue, 1998). 
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the use of a cognitive architecture as a 
framework for expressing error classes using a cognitive vocabulary. The vocabulary 
of a cognitive architecture, like the syntax of a language, can help to constrain and 
guide the modelling process. The framework is structural in as much as it represents 
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the constraints imposed by the structure inherent in the underlying cognitive theory 
(such as the stages in an information processing model). 
Modelling erroneous behaviour within a cognitive architecture can thus provide a 
more in-depth description of the course the error took, and complement higher level 
description given by error categories. Non-executable cognitive models can present a 
medium for communicating the causes of error, and the processes and mechanisms 
underlying its production. This is demonstrated in this report by modelling user and 
operator error within the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems architecture (lCS, 
Barnard, 1993). 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Several, quite different, research areas refer to the term "user modelling" when not 
necessarily referring to the same activity or product of that activity. 
Newman and Lamming (1995) described various defmitions of 'User Model' as 
follows: 
• A user's conceptual (or mental) model of a system (a mental picture a user has of 
a system and how it works). 
• A model of the user held within the system software (a representation of the 
user's abilities, limitations, beliefs and goals. May form the basis for automatic 
adaptation). 
• A model or definition of the typical user referenced by the interface designer to 
aid hisiher formulation of the system being built. 
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With the various theories of mental models, a whole range of terms has been 
introduced. The lack of a unified terminology is confusing, especially when different 
authors use different terms to describe the same type of model, and the same term is 
sometimes used for very different types of models (Nielsen, 1990). 
In an attempt to bring some order into the great user model confusion, Nielsen (op. 
cit.) proposed a meta-model to classify models of user-system interaction. This meta-
model encompasses a wider range of models than those mentioned here. His notation 
describes 'models' in terms of the relationships between 7 elements or participants of 
models: 
• U - the user; 
• D - the designer; 
• C - the computer system; 
• M - manuals and other documentation of C; 
• T - the task performed by the user; 
• W - the surrounding world in which U performs; 
• R - the researcher looking at any of the above. 
These elements can be combined, using a simple notation, to denote who holds a 
representation of what. For example, a user's model of a computer system is DC, the 
designer's model of a user's model is D(UC), and so on. This notation offers a 
parsimonious way of distinguishing between different models. The notation will be 
employed to clarify the exact nature of models involved in the theoretical and 
empirical work reviewed in this section. 
The cognitive modelling approaches relevant to my work are the ones characterised 
by Newman and Lamming (1995) as defining "models or definitions of the typical 
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user referenced by the interface designer to aid hislher formulation of the system 
being built". Thus, the term 'cognitive user modelling' will in this report refer to the 
user model as characterised by the relationships of RU, and also of R(OU). It 
describes the activity of capturing and communicating (diagrammatically or text-
based) users' cognitive processes when performing some task, or what the designer 
perceives those processes to be. These can then be used to complement the analysis of 
error as provided by the describe taxonomies. 
User Modelling 
Tognazzini (1991) suggests that designers should construct simple design models 
which: 
• reflect users' tasks, rather than the underlying hardware and software of the 
system; 
• correspond to users' experiences and expectations. 
Similarly, Norman points out that "ideaJly, the model is based on the user's task, 
requirements and capabilities ... (AAIB, 1989) must also consider the user's 
background, experience and the powers and limitations of the user's information 
processing mechanisms." (Norman, 1986). 
To follow these recommendations, we need to include three sets of representations to 
the model-building process: users' tasks, general knowledge and experience, and 
information processing mechanisms. 
Three types of methods that fulfil some or all of these requirements are briefly 
described and discussed below. 
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Behavioural Task Analysis 
The goal of behavioural task analysis is to study the capabilities and perfonnance of 
human operators versus task demands necessary to achieve system goal( s) (Kirwan 
and Ainsworth, 1992). Task description techniques include charting and network 
techniques (including timelines, input-output diagrams, process charts, functional 
flow diagrams, infonnation flow charts), decomposition methods, and operational 
sequence diagrams. 
An almost universal part of this process is hierarchical decomposition, for example by 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HT A). HT A is a broad framework originally articulated 
in Annett et al. (197 I) and e.g. Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992). 
Kirwan and his co]]eague (1992) investigated several diagrammatic task description 
methods. They stress how charting and network techniques (such as Petri Nets, or 
Functional Flow Diagrams) can present an integrative method, displaying the human 
embedded within the system context. However, they note in conclusion, that, as the 
cognitive task content increases, the mentioned chart representations become less 
satisfactory. Concurrency of mental operations, as we]] as processing complexity is 
difficult to capture by these techniques. 
Thus, complex cognitive aspects of human perfonnance are typically not addressed 
by this approach. It concerns itself exclusively with nonnative task sequences, in 
order to provide a system interface that meets the functional requirements of the user 
or operator. Behavioural task analysis, however, often represents the initial stage, or 
the prerequisite, for Cognitive Task Analysis, Cognitive User Modelling, and also 
Human Error Identification techniques. 
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Cognitive Task Analysis 
One typical, well-established model of calculational task analysis is Card, Moran and 
Newell's GOMS technique (Card et aI., 1983). 
GOMS stands for Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection Rules. As many other 
cognitive task analysis models, it makes use of a model of mental processing in which 
the user achieves goals by solving subgoals in a divide-and-conquer fashion. 
A goal is something the user wants to do; goals are often related hierarchically. 
Operators are actions that the user does, which may be external (perceptual or motor) 
or mental (e.g., make decision, store an item in working memory). Methods are a 
sequence of steps (operators) used to accomplish a goal. Methods can call 
submethods to accomplish subgoals. When multiple methods are possible to 
accomplish a goal, selection rules are used to choose an appropriate method. GOMS 
has been used as the basis for constructing production-rule simulations of users and 
for redesigning help systems. 
Analysis of the GOMS goal structures can yield measures of performance. The 
stacking of a goal structure can be used to estimate short-term memory requirements. 
The model of the users' mental processes implied by this is highly idealised. 
However, GOMS was not intended for anything else but describing how experts 
perform a routine tasks. Furthermore, the GOMS (and associated Keystroke-level) 
model had been criticised (see for instance Sasse (1992» by designers as being: 
• too low-level; 
• too limited in scope; 
• focused on outdated technology; 
• too difficult to apply. 
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A further cognitive task analysis technique is presented by the Cognitive Complexity 
Theory (CCT) approach introduced by Kieras and Polson (Kieras and Polson, 1985). 
It begins with the basic premises of goal decomposition from GOMS and enriches the 
model to provide more predictive power. CCT has two parallel descriptions: one of 
the user's goals and the other of the computer system (caJled a device in CCT). The 
description of the user's goals is based on a GOMS-Iike hierarchy, but is expressed 
primarily in production rules. CCT can represent more complex plans than the simple 
sequential hierarchies of GOMS. Concurrent plans can be expressed. CCT attempts to 
measure interface complexity by relating the number of production rules in the CCT 
description to the degree of complexity ofthe interface. 
Knowles (1997) dealt with the CCT approach in her thesis on interface complexity. 
She identified m::yor shortcomings: 
• No underlying theory of knowledge sources and their interaction 
• Restricted in application, by virtue of its reliance on GOMS to tasks involving no 
problem solving 
• No empirical validation of proposed theory 
• Over-reliance on quantitative components at the expense of qualitative aspects. 
Especially the last point addresses a weakness most of the calculational CT A 
approaches share. 
Carroll & Campbell (1989) suggest that, rather than reducing the psychological 
contribution to HC} to quantitative measurements and calculations, psychologists 
should ensure that the value of explanatory and conceptual HCl research is 
recognised and applied. 
Application of quantitative methods to behavioural and cognitive phenomena which 
have not been sufficiently well described and understood can lead to the garbage in, 
garbage out problem well known in computer science. Carroll & Campbell (1989) are 
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right to point out that the imposition of methodological strictures alone will not make 
HC} more creditable or applicable. It could have the opposite effect: a discipline can 
be strangled by methodology strictures that become more important than the theories 
they are supposed to serve (Sasse, 1997). 
Theories of the user should ideally not restrict themselves to collecting observable 
quantitative data for mechanistic models, without trying to explain the underlying 
cognitive concepts. The trade-off between applicability and generality often causes 
explanatory and conceptual models to fall behind. The next section will discuss two 
approaches to the analysis of the cognition underlying more overt, observable 
phenomena: cognitive simulation, and approximate cognitive modelling. The latter is 
a more qualitatively oriented cognitive modelling approach, which nevertheless 
strives at achieving applicability. 
Cognitive Simulation 
Human error models thus cannot convincingly model, classifY, or predict knowledge-
based mistakes, in spite of ongoing and well-developed research into problem solving 
within cognitive psychology. Bringing the insights gained in this field to bear on 
human error modelling would appear to be an appropriate contribution to the field. 
Cognitive modelling techniques that do concern themselves with decision-making 
and problem-solving are to be found in the field of cognitive simulation. 
Roth et al. (1992) define cognitive simulations as "runnable computer programs that 
represent models of human cognitive activities". They maintain that their approach to 
cognitive simulation can be used to uncover the cognitive demands of a task, to 
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identifY where intention errors are likely to occur, and to point to improvements in the 
person-machine system. 
Cognitive architectures employed in cognitive simulation tend to concentrate on 
higher order cognition - knowledge-based reasoning, problem-solving, or decision 
making (see for instance SOAR's reasoning by analogy mechanisms, (Newell, 
1990». Thus, executable cognitive models, or cognitive simulations, offer further 
means for exploring human error, beyond the approach taken in this report. Further 
research is suggested to the effect of exploring the potential of computationally 
implementing operator high-level thought processes in an error-oriented, domain-
independent cognitive architecture. 
As a first step, suitable architecture candidates need to be identified. Some cognitive 
architectures, as we have seen in earlier sections of this chapter, may lend themselves 
more easily to error modelling than others. 
In order to choose an architecture, selection criteria need to be defined and explicitly 
stated. Current models can then be examined in the light of these criteria. 
Grant (1996) investigated the range of cognitive theories, architectures, models, and 
simulations. He set about to find in how many significant ways works about cognition 
could differ. He discovered six dimensions along which to differentiate the 
approaches: 
• Domain dependency 
• Level of specification 
• Coverage 
• Correspondence with experimental or practical findings 
• Parsimony 
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These dimensions will influence the choice of selection criteria that need to be 
adopted. Grant (op. cit.) classified Reason's GEMS (see Chapter 2) as "domain~ 
independent but still cognitive", and as low level specified. He indicates its 'direction 
for possible future developments' as moving towards a coded, or executable, level of 
specification. This relates to my proposal for further research into linking an 
executable cognitive model with GEMS in order to investigate knowledge~based 
mistakes. 
Approximate Cognitive Modelling 
As we have seen above, Cognitive Task Analysis looks at a system from the point of 
view of the user, and identifies aspects of the (interface or task) design that place 
heavy demands on the user's cognitive resources· their memory, attention, and so on. 
This information allows the designer to focus upon the features that users will find 
hardest to learn, and where they are most likely to make errors. May and Barnard 
(1995b) state that "by highlighting the sources of ambiguity, eTA helps designers to 
iterate towards design specifications that are cognitively straightforward, leaving 
users freer to concentrate on performing the tasks that the system supports rather 
than on using the interface itself. .. 
This section concerns a rather qualitative, though systematic analysis of the mental 
processes in the light of cognitive theory. 
For instance, Barnard's diagrammatic ICS framework examines users' mental load in 
terms of the resource demand and allocation issues that arise through parallel 
functioning. At its best, the linkage between the input and output of the black box 
cognitive processor with the environment is also described: reception of information 
as much as acting on the world. 
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Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) noted in relation to task description methods, that 
graphic descriptions in this context can offer substantial benefits over purely textual 
approaches. The principal aim, so they state, of these techniques is to use a formal 
graphical representation of the task which is either easier to understand or 
significantly more concise than a textual description, or else to emphasise particular 
aspects of the task. 
les 
ICS offers a diagrammatic approach to task description that focuses on complex 
cognitive processing of a human in interaction with his or her environment. It 
presents a distributed, parallel cognitive architecture approach, and is therefore well 
suited to represent concurrent, and overlapping mental tasks. 
ICS is a technique reflecting a resource-based view of the mUltiple subsystems 
involved in cognition (Barnard, 1987). ICS provides a model of perception, cognition, 
and action. But unlike other cognitive user models, it is not intended to produce a 
description of the user in terms of sequences of actions. Rather, IeS provides a more 
holistic view of the user as an information processing system. The emphasis is on 
determining how easy particular sequences of actions become as they are made more 
automatic and proceduralised within the user (Young and Abowd, 1994, and see also 
a more detailed description in Chapters 4 and 5). 
Barnard (1987) maintains that a CTA based on ICS framework can give qualitative 
information on users' mental processing involved in task performance. It does not 
force the complexity of the human mind into a calculational straightjacket. The 
representation constructed includes a specification of mental processes; procedural 
knowledge; the contents of episodic memory; and a characterisation of the way in 
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which the cognitive mechanism is controlled during task execution. Pre-specified 
mappings from the contents of Task Models then predict aspects of user behaviour. 
We conducted a feasibility study concerning the error modelling potential in ICS. 
This study can be found in the appendix in full detail. It was shown that ICS provides 
a good vocabulary to reason about error in interactive system users, and it also opens 
avenues for design implications dependent on the undertaken error analysis. 
EPIC 
The second approximate cognitive architecture we investigated is EPIC - an 
engineering model of cognitive task performance. A comparison study of ICS and 
EPIC and their potential to contribute constructively to accident investigation was 
conducted. The results of this study will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
In conclusion it can be said that the EPIC architecture and its focus on performance 
and timing in an idealised task setting proved less suited to human error analysis in 
the context of accident investigation in complex, safety-critical systems, than ICS. 
COGNITIVE MODEL COMPARISON 
The investigation of pilots' cognitive processing plays an important role in the 
analysis of aviation accidents. Increasing cockpit automation led to an increase in the 
demands posed on the mental capabilities of the pilot, and thus increases the 
occurrence of errors that originate in the constraints imposed by the human cognitive 
system (Woods, ]987). Cognitive user modelling can capture and communicate an 
analytic view of pilots' cognitive processes when performing some task. Cognitive 
modelling can then also be used to enhance the analysis of pilot error by relating it to 
the constraints of the human cognitive system. 
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Cognitive modelling is employed by organisations such as NASA and the CAA to 
further their understanding of the cognitive processes that underlie pilot perfonnance. 
One "classic" approach to cognitive modelling uses knowledge-based cognitive 
architectures, such as Soar (Laird et aI., 1986) or ACT (Anderson, 1993). Such 
models focus on higher-level cognitive processes, such as reasoning and decision-
making. However, sensory and physiological data often contribute to aviation 
accidents, but still are widely neglected in cognitive modelling approaches. In this 
chapter we will look into two cognitive modelling approaches that can also represent 
sensory and physiological data, EPIC (Executive ProcesslInteractive Control) (Kieras 
and Meyer, 1995) and ICS (Interacting Cognitive Subsystems, (Barnard, 1993). 
EPIC is a knowledge-based simulation architecture. In other words, analysts can use 
it to simulate pilots' cognitive processes and draw conclusions about the complexity 
and time demands of the cognitive processing required to carry out a task. EPIC also 
provides features that aim at integrating perceptual and motor processes in a holistic 
approach to cognition. 
However, we argue that the investigator also needs a cognitive model which accounts 
for built-in constraints in the human cognitive system, such as memory limitations or 
problems with translating from one mental code to another (Bainbridge, 1993). These 
are central to making de~iled recommendations based on cognitive analysis. Barnard 
(1987) provides a modular approach that does focus on these aspects of cognition, the 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystem (ICS) architecture. ICS offers a diagrammatic 
approach focusing on humans in interaction with their environment. Sensory as well 
as internal knowledge input into the cognitive system is integrated in the ICS 
approach. 
The foJlowing sections demonstrate that pilots' perception, cognition and action can 
be modelled within these two cognitive architectures. We argue that a holistic 
approach offers a deeper understanding of the pilot's cognitive and physiological 
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processes in aviation accidents. We conclude that EPIC lacks provision for 
retrospective modelling or non-expert behaviour, unless simple cognitive-behavioural 
processes are to be analysed. ICS offers these possibilities, but requires an analyst to 
be highly skilled in the complex psychological theory of the model. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we first introduce the case study, an attempted night 
visual approach to a runway at Gatwick Airport. Then we review alternative cognitive 
modelling approaches for the representation and investigation of the pilots' cognitive 
processes. We look at EPIC, an executable human cognitive performance model. 
Then, we review Barnard's (1987) ICS technique, which combines a domain-
independent view on human's cognitive processing capabilities. For each of the 
modelling approaches presented, a task model is constructed to show their scope. 
Also, their applicability to 'human error' modelling is tested by detailing 'real life' 
pilot error within each approach. 
THE CASE STUDY 
The modelling of pilots' cognitive processes in this chapter will be illustrated by the 
events recorded in an Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) incident report. This 
report is appropriate as a case study because it represents a relatively frequent 
occurrence (AAIB, 1989, p. 22). It also shows a variety of causal factors. These 
include higher cognitive mistakes as well as perceptual slips. The incident involved a 
Boeing 737 and a British Aerospace One-Eleven (BAC 1-11) at Gatwick Airport. The 
BAC 1-11 landed on taxiway 2 after making a night visual approach to runway 08L. 
A Boeing 737 had been ordered onto taxiway 2 just previously by the air traffic 
controller. The Boeing's commander attempted to tum off to the side after observing 
the landing lights of the BAC approaching. The manoeuvre immediately led to the 
aircraft's port main wheels leaving the paved surface. It bogged down in the soft 
ground partially blocking the taxiway with its left wing and rear fuselage. The BAC 
stopped only 190 metres short of the Boeing 737. There were no injuries. 
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The AAIB report lists as one causal factor that the BAC commander inaccurately 
interpreted the cues provided to him by the visual scene on the approach to runway 
08L. He consequently landed on taxiway 2 believing it to be runway 08L. The other 
'causes' describe various factors believed to have facilitated the cue 
misinterpretation. This includes the use of runway edge lighting as well as the 
taxiway green centreline. Communication between the BAC commander and the first 
officer, which might have facilitated the 'misjudgement', are also mentioned (see 
(Johnson, 1995) for a systems analysis approach to the incident that draws together 
the contributing factors). 
EPIC 
Cognitive modelling techniques give us the opportunity to reason in more detail about 
the potential causes, or (cognitive) precedents, of the commander's misinterpretation. 
However, there exist a variety of modelling approaches to choose from. We will now 
investigate two techniques that each represent different traditions in cognitive 
modelling. By using the AAIB report as illustration, we will show how the two 
traditions serve different needs, and can delineate complementary perspectives on the 
data provided. 
The two approaches we will assess in this chapter are based on diagrammatic 
cognitive modelling and on computational cognitive simulation. 
As mentioned above, (Roth et aI., 1992) define cognitive simulations as "runnable 
computer programs that represent models of human cognitive activities". Cognitive 
simulation approaches can potentially uncover the cognitive demands of a task, to 
identifY where intention errors are likely to occur, and to point to improvements in the 
person-machine system. Cognitive processes are coded typically in production rules 
in the IF <CONDITION> THEN <ACTION> format. 
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EPIC is a computational performance simulation model. The "primary goal" in the 
development of EPIC has been ''to account for human multiple-task performance in 
situations such as aircraft cockpit tasks" (Kieras et aI., 1997). EPIC was designed to 
explicitly couple perceptual-motor and basic information processing mechanisms like 
those in the MHP (Card et aI., 1983), ACT-R (Anderson, 1993), and SOAR (Laird et 
aI., 1986). Although it is mainly demonstrated as a predictive performance model, it 
is also stated to achieve insights as an explanatory model of human behaviour and its 
underlying cognitive processes (Kieras and Meyer, 1995). 
Figure 3-1 shows the overall architecture of an EPIC model interacting with a 
simulated system. 
Human performance in a task is simulated in EPIC by programming the cognitive 
processor with production rules organised as methods for accomplishing task goals. 
The EPIC model is then run in interaction with a simulation of the external system 
and performs the same task as the human operator would. The model generates events 
(e.g. eye movements, keystrokes, vocal utterances) and the timing of these events is 
predictive of human performance. 
These predictors also include various aspects of mental workload, such as how much 
information must be maintained in short-term memory. If the predicted performance 
is unsatisfactory, either in terms of overall system performance, or in comparison to 
another design, further examination of the simulated performance will reveal the 
cause of the performance limitation. For example, humans can perform many 
activities concurrently, but a poor interface design will limit the amount of 
overlapping that can be done. For example, requiring that the eyes be kept mostly on 
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one location, thereby preventing a second, otherwise compatible task from being 
executed concurrently. 
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Figure 3-1 - The EPIC Cognitive Architecture 
EPIC models are based on prior task analysis, using some established behavioural 
technique, such as Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA, Kirwan and Ainsworth, ]992). 
This is then translated into production rules using cognitive task analysis. Note that 
the tasks mentioned in an HT A model derive from a nonnative task model, and thus 
presume the successful completion of each task, in other words, they assume error 
free goal achievement. 
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Since the accident arguably occurred due to non-successful completion of the "Locate 
Runway" task, this is the task we will concentrate on in our cognitive analysis. 
EPIC MODEL "LOCATING TARGET" 
Figure 3-2 shows an EPIC model that, given parameters specifying the details of the 
visual situation, will result in runway identification. 
The code shows the current state of the EPIC production system database, showing 
the various items present in the simulated human operator's working memory. 
The 'pilot error' from the Gatwick incident will thus be located in the matching 
process of the working memory (WM) target pattern and the pattern received in the 
visual field. This will show how, for example, underspecification of visual clues can 
lead to confusion between the taxiway and runway 08L. 
The rule-based approach of EPIC forces the analyst to precisely specify the task 
parameters. Thus, the specification of the pilot's mental model of the runway (WM 
TARGET-PATTERN) will be an assumed pattern of visual cues necessary for runway 
identification. This can then be run against the environmental input, namely the actual 
visual cues available to the pilot. Therefore, a mismatch can be identified, and a fine-
grained analysis of the pilot's visual perception is possible. 
However, the pilot's communication with the tower and his co-pilot are not included 
in the model. EPIC does not prompt the analyst to consider these environmental 
aspects. Visual perception is seen as a pure pattern matching process with no other 
modalities or task aspects interfering. Thus, important contributory factors to the 
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(IF-NOT-TARGET-THEN-SHIFT-VISUAL-FIELD 
IF 
«GOAL LAND PLANE 
(STEP LOCATE RUNWAy) 
0NM CURRENT-PATTERN IS ?OBJECT) 
(MOTOR OCULAR PROCESSOR FREE) 
(VISUAL ?OBJECT FEATURES ?NOTIARGET) 
(NOT0NM TARGET-PATTERN IS ?VAR))) 
THEN 
«DELDB0NM CURRENT-PATTERN IS ?OBJECT) 
(ADDDB(WM CURRENT-PATTERN IS ?NEXT-OBJECT» 
(SEND-TO-MOTOR OCULAR MOVE ?NEXT-OBJECT») 
(TARGET -IS-LOCATED-BEGIN-HOMING-IN 
IF 
«GOAL LAND PLANE 
(STEP LOCATE RUNWAy) 
CNM TARGET-PATTERN IS ?TARGET) 
(VISUAL ?TARGET-FIELD FEATURES ?TARGET) 
(WM PLANE IS ?PLANE-OBJECT) 
(MOTOR MANUAL PROCESSOR FREE) 
THEN 
«DELDB0NM STEP LOCATE RUNWAy) 
(ADDDB(WM STEP HOME-IN» 
(SEND-TO-MOTOR MANUAL PERFORM POINT ?PLANE-OBJECT ?TARGET-
PATTERN))) 
Figure 3-2 - EPIC Rules: Locating the Target 
visual misperception are ignored. 
The above two production rules show a high level representation of two steps in the 
goal hierarchy. both relating to the sub-task "Locate Runway". Although presented 
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here in the form of production rules as used in EPIC models, these two rules only 
present a high level view. To enable their implementation in a computational EPIC 
model, every line in the rules' body has to be a fine-grain (atomic), low-level, 
perceptual or motor activity, This means, for an EPIC model, each line will need to be 
further decomposed into its component parts, down to specification of the angle of the 
current visual field (perceptual), and the current position of the pilot's hand when 
preparing to move (motor). This is difficult, if not impossible, to determine in the 
aftermath of an accident. 
This low-level specification of units of behaviour and the provision of experimentally 
derived fixed timing parameters enables EPIC to provide the analyst with 
performance time predictions (Kieras et aI., 1997) as well as real-time simulated pilot 
performance. However, the data necessary for this grain of analysis can typically not 
be derived from an accident report. EPIC modelling thus lends itself more to a priori 
modelling as part of a normative cognitive task analysis than to explanatory 
modelling of a specific, erroneously performed task instance. 
Table 3-1 overleaf briefly summarises strengths and weaknesses of the application of 
EPIC modelling in Human Error analysis. 
ICS 
Cognitive simulations, as most other cognitive modelling techniques, are typically 
intended to represent expert, error-free behaviour. ICS, however, is a general 
architecture, in which the cognitive basis of erroneous behaviour can be expressed 
without violating or changing architectural principles. Instead of aiming at simulating 
the human, ICS is a diagrammatic cognitive process-model, which enables the analyst 
to inspect information flow and resource demands in the human cognitive system. 
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Strengths 
• Detailed, forces precision 
• Grounded in cognitive theory (albeit not very 
complex) 
• Takes perceptual and motor processes into account 
• Can generate timing of task performance 
Weaknesses 
• Requires expertise and time 
• Does not model for interaction between central and 
peripheral cognitive processing 
• Does only incorporate routine expert performance 
• Very low level tasks only to be specified 
• Focus is only on timing aspect, cognitive resource 
allocation is not covered 
• Precise low-level data is post hoc not available 
Table 3-1- The EPIC cognitive architecture reviewed 
ICS represents a comprehensive account of human cognition, which has proved 
powerful in explaining cognitive phenomena such as the stability of users' mental 
models during dual task interference effects (Duke et aI., 1995). It has been applied to 
real-life systems and tasks, such as cinematography (May and Barnard, 1995a). ICS 
provides a great level of detail in the representation of cognitive processes and also 
the inherent constraints these have to satisfy. ICS was designed to provide a 
theoretical framework in which to place user cognition. It attempts to "satisty the 
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need for applicable theory" (Barnard, 1987). ICS, therefore, bridges the gap between 
theory-oriented cognitive architectures and task-oriented cognitive user models 
«Grant and Mayes, 1991); (Simon, 1988). 
Sensory subsystems: 
VIS visual: hue, contour etc. from the eyes 
AC acoustic: pitch, rhythm etc. from the ears 
BS body-state: proprioceptive feedback 
Effector subsystems: 
ART articulatory: subvocal rehearsal & speech 
LIM limb: motion of limbs, eyes etc. 
Structural subsystems: 
OBJ object: mental imagery, shapes etc. 
MPL morphonolexical: words, lexical forms 
Meaning subsystems: 
PROP propositional: semantic relationships 
IMPLIC implicational: holistic meaning 
Table 3-2 - The ICS Cognitive Subsystems 
Cognition is represented in ICS as the flow of information between a number of 
different subsystems (see Table 3-2), and as the processing performed on this data. 
The nine subsystems cover both high level cognitive and low level perceptual and 
motor processors. Each of these can act in parallel. Each of the subsystems has 
associated with it a unique mental code in which it represents the information it 
receives and processes. It will transform its data output into the corresponding mental 
code of the subsequently receiving subsystems. Each subsystem can receive several 
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input streams and achieve a blending of these data streams under certain 
circumstances as described below (May and Barnard, 1995a) (see also Appendix A 
for more details). Each subsystem also has at its disposal a local image store. This 
serves as an episodic memory buffer of infinite size. A copy of any input the 
subsystem receives will automatically be copied to the local image store, before being 
further processed. 
ICS MODEL OF ERROR-FREE VISUAL RUNWAY 
IDENTIFICATION 
Figure 3-3 illustrates the error-free performance of a task of locating an object in the 
visual field (such as a runway). 
This is modelled in ICS in terms of information flow between the subsystems, and 
thus the different resources that are employed. Visual information concerning the 
target arrives at the visual subsystem and is copied into the local store. It is 
transformed into object code (1). The propositional subsystem has generated a 
representation of the target of the location task (by conferring with its local buffer) 
and transforms this into object code (3). This is sent to the object subsystem, and can 
there be blended with the incoming structurally encoded visual information (2). The 
matching representation can be sent back to the propositional subsystem - the target 
has been located. During unsuccessful attempts to locate the target, visual information 
other than that concerning the target will not be able to blend with the object code 
data sent by the propositional subsystem. A loop between the two subsystems will be 
maintained until the representations match and the target, in this case the runway, is 
located. 
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Visual Record: 
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Fiaure 3-3 - Error Free Visual rdentification of Runway 
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FAULTY VISUAL IDENTIFICATION IN ICS 
In a high-level, non-normative, task model, pilot's communication with the tower and 
his co-pilot can now be included. The inclusion of task contributing factors such as 
tower communication, which in itself does not form an explicit 'goal' of the pilot's 
task is specific to the subsequent ICS modelling. A conventional task analysis 
approach would not have considered this factor. ICS encourages the analyst not to 
treat perceptual and motor processes as peripheral, but as equal to cognitive 
processes. A task analysis prior to ICS modelling will therefore select the tasks to be 
included in the model prompted by the holistic process (rather than task) approach of 
ICS. 
Thus, Figure 3-4 not only illustrates the visual perception configuration (1), but also 
how communication impinged on the higher-level processors (2). The consequence of 
the conflicting statements is increased central processor activity (3). The subsystems 
responsible for extracting the propositional and implicational meaning from the 
information presented to them by the peripheral processors form a loop between them 
in order to arrive at definite conclusions as to the further course of action to be taken. 
This loop takes up the processing resources from the peripheral subsystems, and also 
leads to reduced processing of novel information extracted from the environment. 
Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 briefly summarise the strengths and weaknesses of the ICS 
approach to modelling the cognitive basis of erroneous action. 
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Figure 3-4 - Faulty Visual Identification of Runway 
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Strengths 
• OptionalIy supports low-level precision 
• Clear link to (complex) cognitive theory 
• Comprehensive in cognitive coverage 
• Perceptual and motor processes are not only taken into 
account, but put on equal standing with cognition 
(holistic view) 
• Interaction between all processors is made explicit 
• Could be used to look at timing aspect, though not 
intended 
• High explanatory power 
• Easily incorporates non-expert, erroneous behaviour 
• Assesses cognitive resource demand and alJocation 
Table 3-3 - The ICS cognitive architecture reviewed (I) 
Weaknesses 
• Weak on generating recommendations for error 
avoidance (though can act as a means to contextualise 
the effects) 
• Requires expertise and time 
• Understanding of underlying low level cognition is 
necessary. The analysis process has not much 
methodology support. 
Table 3-4 - The ICS cognitive architecture reviewed (II) 
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RESULTS OF THE COGNITIVE MODEL COMPARISON 
Cognitive models may help us to understand the causes of major accidents. Both 
EPIC and ICS highlight the perceptual and motor aspects of pilot performance. 
EPIC's fine-grain analysis enables the analyst to identify mismatches in the required 
and actual visual cues. ICS explicitly shows the concurrency in cognitive processing. 
It also details the cognitive resources necessary for task completion. Thus, 'pilot 
error' can be examined in the light of the cognitive precursors of the actions that have 
taken place. 
ICS is a rich and expressive modelling approach. Still, compared to EPIC, the grain 
of analysis is not predetermined by the architecture. Importantly, no assumptions 
regarding a certain level of performance (such as novice/expert) are made in rcs. 
Therefore, there are no obstacles to modelling erroneous behaviour directly. EPIC 
models are based on normative tasks and performance and have to be iteratively 
altered to pinpoint the trace when erroneous performance simulation has been 
induced. Only then can hypotheses about the cognitive precursor of the 'error' be 
formed and validated. EPIC architectural constraints also do not invite wide-scope 
inclusion of contributing factors, as does ICS. However, rcs as it stands now does 
not provide a clear modelling strategy and the outcome depends to a great part on the 
expertise of the analyst. Neither of the models provides an easy link between 
modelling outcome and action recommendations for future error prevention. 
It has been suggested that the problem of the gap between research and application in 
the case of user models lies in the fact that much research has been based on the 
wrong type of psychology, an information processing view of psychology that is 
reductionist and context-free. An alternative, richer view of human behaviour that is 
holistic and contextualized is needed. ICS is a step towards this more holistic view of 
human cognition. Further research will need to concern itself with the integration of 
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analysis approaches and explanation frameworks that look beyond the individual's 
cognition. 
CONCLUSION 
Behavioural task analysis, as the tenn suggest, deals only with the behavioural 
analysis of users' tasks. The modified task analysis approach embodied in Cognitive 
Task Analysis (eTA) methods also attempts to capture the psychological task - goal 
hierarchy, and associated attributes such as infonnation needs, interface complexity, 
or timing infonnation. Typically, CTA approaches embody infonnation on human 
infonnation processing mechanisms implicitly, as a basis of the respective approach 
(see for instance GOMS). However, these cognitive principles are biased towards 
expert, error-free behaviour (Simon, 1988; Booth, 1991; Grant and Mayes, 1991). 
These assumptions are ingrained in the structure of those approaches, and thus major 
changes to the methods themselves would be necessary (if at all possible) in order to 
represent erroneous action. Finally, cognitive processing models, or cognitive 
architectures, such as ICS, present a framework in which both error-free as well as 
erroneous behaviour can be expressed. It embodies descriptions of the users' tasks, as 
well as user knowledge and general human information processing mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the consideration of time is important for the analysis and description of 
human error (and human action more generally). Surprisingly, few of the existing 
action and error taxonomies include the aspect of time, but rather describe and 
classifY human error on an atemporal (static) basis, i.e. a classification of past and 
observed events. Time may enter only in a few cases as one of the possible causes 
(i.e. incorrect timing of actions) (HollnageJ, 1991). Cognitive modelling based on the 
ICS framework can complement the identified error categories by providing temporal 
information. 
84 
ICS seems to be a potential candidate for the combined approach to error analysis 
proposed in this thesis. Most importantly, it lends itself to modelling the cognition 
underlying erroneous action, and is not dependent on cognitive models assuming 
ideal users in ideal situations. The cognitive error modelling approach was piloted in 
a study on how Barnard's ICS framework can be used to model human error in the 
context of interface design (see Appendix A). 
In the remainder of this dissertation, the extent to which an ICS based cognitive 
modelling approach can complement a conceptual error taxonomy (such as Reason's) 
is examined, and its application to incident and accident analysis will be 
demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER 4 SUPPORTING THE 
UNDERSTANDING AND 
CATEGORISATION OF HUMAN 
ERROR THROUGH COGNITIVE 
ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis argues that error analysis and categorisation techniques in accident 
analysis will benefit from representing a cognition-based error model within a 
cognitive architecture, such as ICS. Using a cognitive framework to analyze the 
'erroneous' instance of human behaviour can underpin any error categorization and 
support the reasoning process about alternative interpretations. It can also help 
document and communicate the analysis results and its rationale to the parties 
involved in the accident investigation as well as to feHow experts. Lastly, it can be 
used as a means to ground the error analysis in a theory of human thought. 
Throughout this chapter the above described critique on current human error analysis 
models in the context of accident analysis will be elucidated by further examples. The 
goal is to demonstrate how the cognitive error modelJing approach suggested here can 
complement current error analysis models and support the meaningful analysis of 
human error. The suggested cognitive error analysis approach is shown to aid the 
analysis of and reasoning about human error and its potential causes. Thus a more 
complete understanding of human error in accidents can be achieved. 
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As described in Chapter 2 of this thesis, current human error analysis approaches in 
accident investigation leave a lot to be desired. The main shortcomings in accident 
investigation that were identified in this thesis concerned the use of "common sense" 
theories of human thought and action (i.e. not grounded in psychological action 
theories and empirical data)18. Thus, there might be an implicit use of personal 
theories on human error mechanism and accident causations being used, that might 
lead to the questionable, one-sided labelling of instances of human behaviour through 
subjective classification into "human error" categories. Furthermore, analysts (as 
humans prone to biasesJ9) might jump to conclusions and link human error analysis 
and safety recommendations without referring to a grounded, theoretical 
understanding which can be communicated and validated in more than just a 
subjective, verbal, manner. 
The nature and causes of failures due to human error remain relatively poor 
lyunderstood (O'Hare et aI., 1994). Reason et al (Reason, 1990) maintained that 'one 
18 "Common sense" reasoning is typicalJy characterized by its seemingly 
unproblematic and self-evident explanation of observed phenomena, explanations 
which often harbour contradictions and are often applied either randomly or they may 
fall prey of psychological biases (such as the confirmation bias) themselves (see e.g. 
Mills, 1970; Porter, 1981). "Scientific thought or method" tries to counteract these 
biases by grounding theories in empirical data or placing it within the scientific 
discourse. One critical distinction between the scientific method and 'common sense' 
is that scientific discourse highlights the necessity to unearth the assumptions upon 
which any explanations of an observed phenomenon are based. Thus, it aims at an 
'explicit' reasoning process, i.e. transparent and open to criticism and further 
discourse. 
19 See also Johnson (2000) for analysts' biases, and, as mentioned previously, 
Lekberg (1997), and of course, Reason (1990). 
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ofthe applied psychologist's more pressing tasks is to provide accident investigators 
with a better classification of the possible varieties of human failure'. O'Hare and his 
colleagues analysed a database of aircraft accidents and incidents by applying two 
different error classification schemes. They stress that they only attempted to 
investigate what failed in each of these events, and not the 'mechanism of 
malfunction', meaning how it failed (Rasmussen, 1982). This, however, needs to be 
determined 'to trace the information processing failures associated with each event'. 
This chapter illustrates an approach with which a catalogue of theory-based error 
classifications can be translated into the framework of a cognitive architecture, thus 
bridging the gap experienced by O'Hare between mere categorisation of error and 
'probing (Johnson, 1999) more deeply by means of theoretically based models of 
human information processing'. 
As O'Hare also pointed out more recently in his review of the first 5 years of the 
International Journal of Aviation Psychology (O'Hare and Lawrence, 2000), the focus 
in the community of aviation researchers and practitioners could still be shown to be 
on a "blame and train" approach, rather than to focus on a meaningful, contextual 
analysis of "human error" with associated safety recommendations targeting the 
system on the whole, rather than e.g. an individual's memory (an approach that is not 
sufficient for the systematic prevention of accidents (e.g. see Busse and Wright, 2000; 
Westrum, 2001; or Johnson, 2002). Thus, the cognitive error analysis approach that is 
put forward here also aims at the generation and evaluation of safety 
recommendations, next to the initial analysis and categorization of the accident. The 
benefit of this approach will be demonstrated in this chapter, and in the case studies 
reported in the remainder of this thesis. 
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CASE STUDY: THE TWIN SQUIRREL HELICOPTER 
ACCIDENT 
On October 22 1996, five people were killed in an accident involving a helicopter AS 
355Fl Twin Squirrel. The accident occurred when the helicopter was returning to 
London from a private landing site in Lancashire with one pilot and four passengers 
on board. The aircraft was being flown at night in visual contact with the ground 
when the pilot decided to climb to a higher altitude. During the climb he was deprived 
of external visual references and the aircraft adopted a steep nose-up attitude during 
which the air speed reduced below a minimum recommended speed for instrumental 
flight. This unintentional manoeuvre then developed into a fast, spiral descent. The 
helicopter did not recover from the dive and it crashed into a field on the outskirts of 
Middlewich, broke up and caught fire. The accident was not survivable (Air Accident 
Investigation Branch (AAIB), 1997). 
The investigation identified six causal factors, one of which concerned the 
commander's workload in marginal weather conditions. Another one suggested that 
the commander may have been distracted at a critical time by the opening of a cabin 
door. Furthermore, the entire situation is underpinned by the pilot's disorientation and 
the inability to recover from it. 
Examining the pilot's behaviour in the light of these causal factors can give rise to 
several interpretations. Two of the possible viewpoints are discussed in detail as the 
section progresses. They refer to Reason's taxonomy of human error, and identify two 
rule-based failure modes underlying the pilot's inabiJity to perform the appropriate 
recovery manoeuvres. On the one hand, as shown below, this could be put down to a 
rule-based mistake such as the 'First Exception' class of errors (described above). 
Alternatively, Reason identifies 'Information Overload' as a possible failure mode at 
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rule-based level of perfonnance. This could be seen as being a major contributing 
factor in the given accident sequence. 
As can be seen, these two categorisations of pilot error are general in nature. We will 
show below how they can be complemented by an anlysis of the underlying cognition 
within the ICS framework. The more precise and detailed vocabulary offered by the 
ICS architecture can accommodate modelling to reach beyond surface 
characterisation of human error. We will illustrate this in the following section. 
ANALYSIS OF ERRORS IN TERMS OF THEIR 
UNDERLYING COGNITION 
In the following section we show how errors leading up to the Middlewich accident 
can be categorised according to Reason's classification scheme and subsequently 
modelled in the ICS architecture. Thus, the relationship of these errors to the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms as proposed by Reason can be established. 
At a crucial point in the run up to the accident, the pilot became disoriented after he 
lost external visual attitude reference, and in spite of several observed coping 
manoeuvres, he never recovered. 
Attitude information was available through the main attitude indicator, and should 
have been confinned by the standby attitude indicator. The latter, however, had most 
probably not been switched on at the beginning of the flight, and therefore showed 
erroneous indications. Furthermore, the pitch rate was sufficiently slow and steady for 
the commander not to be aware of the attitude change. He thus was faced with a 
mismatch of his expectations and two diverging indications on the standby and main 
attitude indicators. If both instruments had been giving much the same attitude 
information, the pilot may safely have assumed that he is suffering from an illusion. 
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Figure 4-1- Rule-based Mistake: First Exception 
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According to Reason's taxonomy, the pilot's cognition and resulting behaviour in this 
chain of events could be classed as a misapplication of a good rule (see above). 
Reason stresses the role of 'first exceptions' to a general rule, which are most likely 
to be overridden by 'strong-but-wrong' rules. The pilot's instrument flying skilIs had 
not been formally examined since April 1992, and he had not been required to 
rehearse recoveries from unusual positions. His loss of orientation combined with 
facing a mismatch of sensory perception and instrument indication can be seen as the 
'first exception' to the general rule when not experiencing a mismatch. 
The underlying cognition can be modelled in ICS as shown in Figure 4-1. 
The visual data is received at the visual subsystem (I), sent to the object subsystem 
for the recovery of a structural description (2), and finally interpreted by the 
propositional subsystem (3). The information is fed forward into the implicational 
subsystem, which interprets the data in the light of the current context. In the 
meantime, the implicational subsystem receives contradictory information from the 
body-sensory subsystem (4), which claims to sense no change in attitude. If, however, 
the propositional subsystem receives ambiguous structural information, and it proves 
unable to blend the incoming data streams, a selection process will take place, based 
on the rules available to it and their respective strengths. The feedback information 
received from the implicational subsystem also plays a guiding role in input and thus 
rule selection. 
The choice of input stream taken by the propositional subsystem might fit in with the 
implicational interpretation of what is perceived, and thus stabilise in the cognitive 
system. If the assumption underlying the choice of what data is used to eliminate the 
ambiguity is wrong, however, the representation of what is thought to be perceived 
will also be incorrect. The wrong data will be favoured. 
The modelling of the resulting rule-based mistake (as defined by Reason) in terms of 
a cognitive architecture sheds light on the underlying cognitive processes and hence 
the underlying causes of user error. 
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REASONING ABOUT ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF 
ERROR CAUSES 
Modelling this scenario in ICS showed how an instance of Reason's class of rule-
based mistakes could be investigated at a more detailed level. This complements the 
more general categorisation of human error by Reason's taxonomy alone. 
The above interpretation of causal factors represents one possible underlying cause of 
the described error. However, the same manifestation of user behaviour might also 
point towards a second, different underlying cognitive mechanism. Employing 
Reason's taxonomy, the commander not being aware of the attitude change can be 
classed as a rule-based mistake as modelled above. On the other hand, it could also be 
classed as a rule-based mistake as mediated by information overload. 
Reason cites the abundance of information confronting the problem-solver in most 
real-life situations as one basis for rule-based mistakes. He states that this almost 
invariably exceeds the cognitive system's ability to apprehend all the signs present in 
a situation. Applied to our case study, the interplay of contradictory attitude 
information on the one hand, and the opening of the cabin door on the other can be 
seen as leading to cognitive information overload. 
This scenario particularly lends itself to being expressed in the 'cognitive language' 
provided by ICS. The limitations of human cognition in the face of information 
overload, or cognitive strain. is built into ICS as the architectural constraint of 
subsystems not to processing simultaneous inputs which belong to distinct 
configurations. Using ICS can help to express the details of Reason's 'information 
overload' more precisely. 
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The problem-solving configuration described above remains, but now is 
supplemented b a econd configuration, which describes the cognitive resources 
required when processing the opening of the cabin door (see Figure 4-2). 
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Figure 4-2 - Information Overload - Competing Configurations 
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The second configuration (2) originates from the input at the acoustic subsystem by 
the noise of the opening cabin door. This information demands access to the meaning 
subsystems, currently utilised by the first configuration (1). Since Principle 1 in ICS 
does not allow access to a process by more than one configuration at a time, the two 
configurations compete for the available cognitive processing resources. Thus, on the 
on the grounds of ICS Principle 1, cognitive overload is established. 
Using ICS to model the underlying cognition of the error provides a means of further 
investigating the behaviour trace leading to an accident. Expressing the rationale for 
different interpretations within a cognitive framework facilitates their more precise 
communication and more detailed analysis. In that way, not only what failed in 
accidents, but also how and why it failed is examined and thus included in the 
investigation of human error. 
LINKING THE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN ERROR AND 
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
The human error analysis process as part of accident and incident investigation often 
entails erroneous behaviour being classified according to error taxonomies. However, 
the error data to be classified is often under-specified and conflicting. Also, error 
categories can be ambiguous, vague, and overlapping. Error analysis that is rooted in 
cognitive theory allows the analyst to gain an understanding of the generic processes 
underlying the 'error', the mechanisms of human cognition. This thesis argues that 
the use of a cognitive architecture supports error analysis when used as a structural 
framework for expressing hypotheses about the cognitive origin of human error. By 
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doing this, the rationale behind error classification can be explicated and documented. 
Cognitive frameworks can provide a vocabulary for reasoning about different 
possible explanations of the 'error', and a vocabulary for validating resulting safety 
recommendations. In the following sections of this chapter the link between the 
analysis of human error and safety recommendations is explored. 
Examination of the cognitive processing underlying those classification instances 
could provide leads to the causes and 'inner workings' of the error mechanisms. We 
have, therefore, employed an analysis framework to model the cognition that 
underlies human error. This enables analysts to benefit from error taxonomies' 
abstracting and simplifying effect on the wealth of error data, as well as from the 
more refined, structured, and detailed information gained by systematic cognitive 
modelling. Thus, the mappings from category to underlying mechanisms can be 
examined by reasoning about the underlying processing within a structural 
framework. This also supports the documentation of the error modelling process. 
Furthermore, safety recommendations that result from the error analysis can be 
validated by embedding reasoning about their impact in the existing cognitive error 
model. 
Case Study: The Gatwick BAC 1-11 Incident 
The Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) incident report on the Gatwick BAC 
1-11 incident is used to illustrate the link between error analysis and safety 
recommendations. This incident report, as mentioned in the previous chapter, shows a 
variety of causal factors. These include higher cognitive mistakes as well as 
perceptual slips. The incident will be described in more detail in the following, and 
the cognitive description of human involvement in the incident (as modelled 
previously) will be shown to act as a backdrop against which possible safety 
recommendations can be contextualised and evaluated as to their effectiveness. 
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The incident involved a near-miss ground collision of a Boeing 737 and a British 
Aerospace One-Eleven (BAC 1-11) at Gatwick Airport. To remind the reader, the 
BAC 1-11 landed on taxiway 2 at 2123 hours after making a night visual approach to 
runway 08L. A Boeing 737 had been ordered onto taxiway 2 just previously by the air 
traffic controller. The Boeing's commander attempted to turn off to the side after 
observing the landing lights of the BAC approaching. This manoeuvre led to the 
aircraft's port main wheels leaving the paved surface. It bogged down in the soft 
ground partially blocking the taxiway with its left wing and rear fuselage. The BAC 
stopped only 190 metres short ofthe Boeing 737. There were no injuries. 
The AAIB report lists as one causal factor that the BAC commander inaccurately 
interpreted the cues provided to him by the visual scene on the approach to runway 
08L. He consequently landed on taxiway 2 believing it to be runway 08L. The other 
'causes' describe various factors believed to have facilitated the cue 
misinterpretation. This includes the use of both white runway edge lighting as well as 
bi-directional green taxiway centreline lighting for runway 08L. Communication 
between the BAC commander and the first officer, which might have facilitated the 
'misjudgement', are also mentioned. 
From March 1988 to November 1988, there were major night-time reconstructions of 
runway 08R under way, the main runway at Gatwick. As a result, runway 08R was 
closed routinely at 2100 hours and runway 08L, which had been serving as taxiway 
during the day, took over as the main runway. 08L was also known as the 'emergency 
runway', and featured visual ground (lighting) aids that could signal both its status as 
a runway or a taxiway. 
Taxiway 2 is situated parallel and next to 08L. In order to speed up traffic flow, 
National Air Traffic Services (NATS) lifted the prohibition of the use of taxiway 2 
while aircraft were taking-off or landing on runway 08L during the time of runway 
08R reconstruction. This made it possible for the BAC to approach runway 08L for 
landing while the nearby taxiway 2 was being utilised by the Boeing 737. 
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The crew of the Boeing saw the plane approaching and attempted to leave the 
runway, whereas it was not possible for the crew of the BAC to identify obstruction 
of the runway by another aircraft. Maximum Braking and/or maximum reverse thrust 
were not used for the whole of the landing run by the BAC, which suggests that the 
crew was unaware that they had landed on the (obstructed) taxiway until well into the 
landing roll (AAIB, 1989, p.18). 
The prime 'cause' of the incident was identified by the AAIB report to be the 
"fundamental error by the crew" when they "convinced themselves that taxiway 2, 
with standard green taxiway centreline lighting, was runway 08L and landed on it" 
(AAIB, 1989, p.17). The report's conclusion focuses primarily on the ambiguity of 
the visual ground aids as the main contributing factor for the 'pilot error' . 
Accordingly, the safety recommendations Jist changes to the ground lighting system 
and updating of the Aeronautical Information Publication (AlP) manual that detailed 
the visual ground aids provided at Gatwick's main runway. In the following sections 
we will demonstrate how the ICS cognitive architecture can be employed to reason 
about the underlying mechanisms of the cited 'pilot error', and also how resulting 
safety recommendations can be embedded in the resulting cognitive analysis. 
Contextualising Safety Recommendations within the ICS 
Model 
The Gatwick incident report focuses primarily on the inadequacy of the visual ground 
aids in its treatment of the incident's causes and of the given safety recommendations. 
This view of the priorities in the investigation's findings can be illustrated and 
weighed up in an ICS model as shown in Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-3 below details the cognitive processing relevant to the runway 
identification specific to this case. In the diagram, (1) depicts the conflict between 
incoming visual infonnation and the pilot's expectation as derived from his mental 
model of the situation (2). Thus, there is an unsuccessful attempt at matching the 
propositional and the visual input. Again, visual information other than that 
concerning the target will not be able to blend with the data originating in the 
propositional subsystem. A loop between the two subsystems will be maintained until 
the representations match. Such a match is possible only if either the correct runway 
is in the field of vision and provides sufficient discriminatory visual cues, or, if this is 
not the case, then only if the propositional infonnation is underspecified or incorrect. 
According to the investigator's judgement on the relevant processes, the faulty 
identification was caused predominantly by insufficiently discriminatory visual input 
by means of ambiguous visual ground aids. Thus, the focal point in the ICS model 
lies in this case at (1), with the visual input wrongly blending with the propositional 
specification. However, given the ICS architectural constraints, the model also shows 
how the propositional subsystem, conferring with the implicational processor, has 
generated a representation of the target (2) and passes this expectation to the object 
subsystem. This explicates the importance of anticipation and top-down infonnation 
in human visual processing, and in the pilot's processing ofthe infonnation available 
to him. Mirroring the report's interpretation, the 'cause' of the 'pilot error' is to be 
found in the visual infonnation provided to the pilot. However, the ICS architecture 
draws attention to the fact that the pilot's expectation also played a significant role. 
The incident report emphasises that the BAC crew were aware of the use of 08L as 
emergency runway while not being certain as to which of the light patterns 
constituted runway 08L as opposed to taxiway 2. Crucially, also the crew's 
uncertainty about whether the switch to the emergency runway had already taken 
place can be viewed as a major factor influencing the interpretation of the visual cues 
available. For instance, one factor dismissed by the report was the radio infonnation 
transmitted up to 2109 hours to crew stating runway 08R as the current runway 
without warning the crew of the impending change of runway. 
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Figure 4-3 - The safety recommendations contextualised 
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The broadcast message at 2109 infonned the crew that the runway in use was OSL, 
but did not explicitly draw attention to the change. This fact was dismissed by the 
investigation as unimportant since the pilot had responded to subsequent pilot-tower 
communication, repeating clearance to runway 08L. In Figure 4-2, the propositional 
expectation is shown as being infonned by auditory/morphonolexical as well as 
implicational input (3). Thus, different hypotheses as to the cognitive processing 
underlying 'human error' can be reasoned about and documented by utilising a 
cognitive architecture such as ICS. 
The effects of safety recommendations that result from the error analysis process can 
now be embedded and thus evaluated within the cognitive model. The above 
described approach to error analysis therefore also provides a 'field' (or backdrop) on 
which proposed safety recommendations and their effect on cognitive processing 
capabilities can be validated. In the given case study, safety recommendations that 
target visual ground aids only rely on an undisturbed propositional specification. 
However, there is ample evidence in the AAIB report that points to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION 
Human error has been recognised as a predominant factor in aviation mishaps. 
O'Hare and colleagues (O'Hare et aI., 1994) cite estimates of the proportion of 
mishaps due to human error as ranging between 60% and 80%. 
Describing human cognitive errors occurring in the run-up to accidents in detail, or 
analysing in tenns of underlying psychological factors is difficult, since typicalIy, 
error taxonomies do not provide the necessary depth of analysis. Expressing such 
error classes within the framework of a cognitive model will allow us to investigate 
and reason about their underlying psychological causes. A conceptual, systematic 
technique for categorisation of errors is a prerequisite. 
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It has been argued that cognitive modelling may help us to understand the causes of 
accidents and incidents. Furthermore, architectures such as ICS can provide a 'tool 
for thought' and for reasoning about competing explanatory hypotheses on the causes 
and underlying cognitive mechanisms of 'human error'. They can provide theoretical 
grounding and a documentation facility for such speculations, and a backdrop against 
which effects of safety recommendations can be validated. 
ICS explicitly shows the concurrency in cognitive processing. It also details the 
cognitive resources necessary for task completion. Thus, 'pilot error' can be 
examined in the light of the cognitive precursors of the actions that have taken place. 
Although ICS is a rich and expressive modelling approach, the grain of analysis is not 
predetermined by the architecture. Importantly, no assumptions regarding a certain 
level of performance (such as novice/expert) are made in ICS. Therefore, there are no 
obstacles to modelling erroneous behaviour directly. ICS architectural and structural 
constraints invite the wide-scope inclusion of contributing factors, such as interacting 
with the environment through auditory, visual or other sensory channels. However, 
ICS in its current form does only partly provide a modelling strategy, and the analysis 
outcome depends ultimately still on the expertise and modelling skill of the analyst. 
Although the potential impact of safety recommendations can be assessed, ICS 
models do not provide an easy link between modelling outcome and action 
recommendations for future error prevention. However, as was shown in this chap, an 
ICS analysis can provide the theoretical framework in which the effect of potential 
safety recommendations can be evaluated. 
Thus, this chapter showed the adoption of Reason's error taxonomy and Barnard's 
ICS for the systematic representation of operator error within a theoretical cognitive 
framework. Operator error in accidents can be described more precisely by linking it 
to its underlying cognition. Analysis can reach beyond surface categorisation, and it is 
made possible to reason about the actual causes of error. As a consequence, this 
approach paves the way for ergonomic design that takes full advantage of the insights 
expressed in cognitive theory. 
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Embedding human error modelling into a cognitive theoretical framework helps to 
express analysts' understanding of the error sources. Communication of their 
reasoning, based on expertise and experience, has been i1Justrated in this chapter by 
using Reason's taxonomy and ICS, as well as by the error analysis provided by 
existing aviation incident reports. Although the potential impact of safety 
recommendations can be assessed, ICS models do not provide an easy link between 
modelling outcome and action recommendations for future error prevention. 
However, as was shown in this chapter, an ICS analysis can provide the theoretical 
framework in which the effect of potential safety recommendations can be evaluated. 
The table below summarizes the key points of critique on current error analysis 
approaches in accident investigation and provides an overview whether the suggested 
cognitive error modelling approach would contribute to the solution of the problem. 
Critique of existing error How the proposed cognitive error analysis 
analysis approaches approach addresses these criticisms 
The cognitive error analysis approach 
Analysis of human behaviour embodies erroneous as well as error-free 
only in terms of "error" (no behaviour and thought processes. Error is 
room for non-erroneous seen as the other side of the coin of an 
behaviour) otherwise efficient thought, emotion, and 
action apparatus. 
Table 4-1 - Benefits of the proposed approach (I) 
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Critique of existing error How the proposed cognitive error analysis 
analysis approaches approach addresses these criticisms 
Analysis of 'human error' only Human behaviour is analyzed in its interaction 
in terms of isolated behaviour with external situation and events. 
There is a gap between 
Cognitive error analysis models the 
behavioural description and its underlying 
describing human behaviour as 
cognition in a theoretical framework. The 
implicated in the accident's 
framework can be used to reason about 
causal chain, to assigning a 
competing categorizations. This justification 
label to it through 
process, the rationale, is thus traceable and 
categorization 
documented. 
The framework supports diagrammatic 
reasoning, which has been shown to aid 
understanding and communication of the 
Verbal description of human analysis results (Moran and Carroll, 1996). 
behaviour as implicated in an 
accident's causation. The symbolic implementation of the model 
(May et aI., 1993; Barnard, 1988) will aid 
precision, flexibility, standardization, and 
predictive power. 
Table 4-2 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (II) 
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Critique of existing error analysis 
How the proposed cognitive error 
analysis approach addresses these 
approaches 
criticisms 
The cognitive architecture allows 'what-if 
scenarios to be executed, and presents a 
Human error predictions based on framework to reason about potential mental 
implicit assumptions and behavioural consequences of cognitive 
precursors. 
Modelling the cognition underlying the 
Taxonomical labels alone often lack error's categorization contextualizes its 
explanatory power causal processes, and thus adds explanatory 
power grounded in a theoretical framework 
The cognitive error model can help to 
identify intervention points for future 
Taxonomical labels do not support 
safety measures in the causation processes. 
the generation of safety 
It can also be used to validate (or reject) 
recommendations, and might even 
suggested safety recommendations, by 
mislead the analyst (such as in the 
grounding both (the error analysis and the 
case of "reminder statements") 
simulation of safety measures' impacts) in 
a common theoretical framework. 
Table 4-3 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (III) 
105 
Critique of existing error analysis 
How the proposed cognitive error 
analysis approach addresses these 
approaches 
criticisms 
The cognitive error model can be used to 
Taxonomic labels do not provide compare competing recommendations, help 
any support for evaluating safety predict their outcomes, and test the 
recommendations. compatibility of recommendations with 
analysis evidence and results. 
It is possible to model interactions between 
Error categorizations do not 
several individuals in the proposed 
cognitive error framework, and also the 
sufficiently take team factors into 
interplay of team members' commun-
account. 
ication and their knowledge and mental 
processes. 
Since the proposed cognitive error analysis 
approach is grounded in a generic 
Taxonomies are finite, they cannot 
psychological theory, the range of 
be exhaustive, and typically cover 
behaviour and cognition that can be 
only a limited range of errors. 
described is much wider than a restricted 
enumerations of categories 
Table 4-4 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (IV) 
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Critique of existing error analysis How the proposed cognitive error 
approacbes analysis approach addresses these 
criticisms 
Taxonomies often list mental and 
emotional states (such as stress, The cognitive error framework can 
fatigue) as causal categories, but model emotions (Teasdale and Barnard, 
fail in contextualizing the human's 1993) and can thus contextualise the 
mental state in terms of its impact human actor's mental state in terms of 
on cognitive processes or action in a their interactions with their environment. 
situated work activity. 
Seemingly 'conclusive' labelling of Encourages in-depth analysis of the 
instances of human behaviour, contextualized cognitive precursors 
rather than starting point for human defining the human involvement in the 
error analysis. accident's causation. 
Common sense analysis, based on 
Encourages use of appropriate expertise 
on human thought, decision-making, and 
implicit assumption on theories of 
action processes. 
accident causation as well as of the 
human psyche. 
Varying levels of "Goodness of Fit" 
The next two chapters in this thesis will 
evaluate the feasibility of the cognitive 
to the accident investigation process 
error analysis approach in two real-life 
and overall safety-management 
clinical safety management strategies. 
strategy. 
Table 4-5 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (V) 
107 
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, the suggested cognitive error analysis 
approach will be validated in real-life case studies in the medical domain: one 
retrospective analysis of an incident reporting scheme, and its associated analysis of 
"human error", that had been run in an adult Intensive Care Unit for over 10 years, 
and one case study in which a full incident reporting system, including the suggested 
error analysis approach, was implemented and evaluated from scratch as part of 
existing safety management in a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. 
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CHAPTER 5 RETROSPECTIVE 
COGNITIVE ERROR ANALYSIS IN 
AN INCIDENT REPORTING 
SCHEME IN ADULT INTENSIVE 
CARE 
INTRODUCTION 
As noted in Chapter 2, accident investigation is only one part of a safety management 
strategy that aims at preventing loss through system failure of any kind. One other 
prominent method is incident reporting. Incidents are typically defined as near-miss 
(or minor) accidents. The concepts of accidents and incidents are thus closely related. 
Vander Schaaf summarized their relationship in a diagram as shown in Figure 5-1. 
This diagram (Figure 5-]) ilJustrates the core concepts in safety management - the 
factors that might influence an accident's causation, and the role that system defences 
and recovery (typically accomplished by a human) play in preventing an accident 
from occurring. 
Heinrich (1936) studied the relationship of accidents and incidents in further detail in 
the early half of the last century, and noted the overwhelming rarity of actual 
accidents (with associated major loss). He identified a ratio of 300: 1 of accidents and 
incidents, coining what is now known as the "Heinrich ratio". The diagram shown in 
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Figure 5-2 illustrates this ratio - The Heinrich ratio has also become known as the 
"iceberg model". 
Technical F Fwl~ ~ 
Organisational I j ...--Dan-gero----.us 
Failure Situation 
I~=/ 
Developing 
incident 
Figure 5-1 - The Relationship of Incidents and Accidents 
(Vander Schaaf et aI., 1991) 
One assumption that is conveyed by the iceberg diagram is that accidents and 
incidents share the same root causes. It is also an accepted assumption that incidents 
are much more frequent than accidents, and that they thus lend themselves much 
more readily to large-scale statistics analysis. There is just not enough data on 
accidents to make this worthwhile, especially given that accidents themselves are 
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often assumed to be a one-off occurrence, whose causation is rooted in an 
unrepeatable web of unique causation. Whereas incidents are assumed to cluster 
around failure potential in safety-critical systems, and they are assumed to give clues 
to "accidents waiting to happen" (Reason, 1990). 
Collecting incident data in a database provides a much bigger sample size that 
enables the drawing of conclusions and generalizations based on statistical analysis 
that would not be possible with one-off accident occurrences. The need for causal 
classifications becomes even stronger in the context of incident analysis, since its 
statistical analysis is dependent on quantitative measures (rather than qualitative 
descriptions). This need overlaps e.g. with Probabilistic Risk and Safety Analysis 
(PSA, see e.g. Apostolakis, 1991) and the related Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), 
which also rely on quantifications for their results - and thus on distinct 
classifications of 'human error'. However, as is argued in this thesis, a human error 
classification approach that does not explicate its analysis process and assumptions 
bears the risk of leading to meaningless, subjective and untraceable classifications, 
with error categories functioning as empty labels of instances of human behaviour 
rather than carrying any real semantics. Furthermore, incident classifications may also 
help in prioritizing future analysis efforts. Thus, an efficient, but grounded, method 
for error analysis and categorization is needed. 
I-____ ....;;;;:a~-... Minor Injuries 
} Incidents 
Figure 5-2 - Heinrich Ratio: Incidents and Accidents 
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This chapter will further demonstrate the suggested cognitive error analysis approach 
by means of a retrospective analysis of an incident reporting scheme and its collected 
data. Since standardized reporting forms were used in the incident reporting scheme, 
the data obtained adhered to a certain format. The incident data used had been 
collected (and pre-analyzed) over the last 10 years. I will first introduce the field of 
incident reporting and human error analysis as it pertains specifically to the medical 
domain, before I describe how the cognitive error analysis approach was applied to 
the incident data in order to shed light on underlying causes, and possibly remedies. A 
detailed overview of medical incident reporting and an analysis of the Edinburgh 
Incident Scheme are available in Appendix B. 
IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS IN 
COMPLEX, MEDICAL ENVIRONMENTS 
Medical risk management is often seen as lagging behind other safety-critical 
industries, where there has been considerable research into safety and accident 
causation models. Accident analysis models used in, for instance, aviation and 
process control recognise the importance of formalised root cause analysis, and the 
multi-level nature of incident causation. Latent factors, such as management and 
organisational issues, are stressed as underlying structural precursors for incident 
occurrence. Also, the constraints ofthe human cognitive system and their relationship 
to task performance are taken into account. These considerations are reflected in the 
use of incident reporting schemes, the analysis of the collected incident data, and the 
generation of remedial action recommendations. In this chapter, we will illustrate 
how these concepts can be applied in a clinical setting. An incident reporting scheme 
implemented at an Edinburgh Intensive Care Unit will serve as a case study. 
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Clinical Adverse Events 
In 1990, the Harvard Medical Practice Study (Harvard University, 1990) investigated 
the occurrence of patient injury caused by treatment - so-called adverse events. It 
found that nearly 4% of patients suffered an injury that prolonged their hospital stay 
or resulted in measurable disability. Leape (1994) pointed out that, if these rates are 
typical of the US, then 180000 people die each year partly as a result of iatrogenic 
('doctor-caused') injury. Since most of the precursors to iatrogenic injuries are per-
ceived to be 'Human Error' (Runciman et aI., 1993), the possibility of negligence 
causes great concern. This is mirrored in the litigious climate in the US (Leape et al., 
1991), and led to a considerable increase in interest in the causes of adverse events 
(Bogner, 1994). The cost of adverse events is high; not only in human suffering, but 
also in compensation claims and the need for prolonged treatment of afflicted 
patients. 
Learning from Adverse Events 
In the UK, the drive towards clinical effectiveness (Dawson et aI., 1998) has led 
investigators to concentrate on increasing the quality of care while lowering the costs 
associated with our current health care system. In the course of the clinical 
effectiveness program, the idea of clinical audits has gained in strength - a 
"professionally led initiative which seeks to improve the outcome of patient care as a 
result of clinicians examining their practice and modifying it appropriately" 
(Wedderburn, 1998). However, the data collected for audits concerns itself only with 
factors peripheral to adverse events - cost effectiveness being the focus of the 
investigation (see e.g. Van der Schaaf, 1996). Formal analysis of the causes of 
adverse events does not take place. Rather, a variety of committees and commissions 
are typically set up locally, meeting regularly to review any cases of iatrogenic injury 
that had occurred and had been brought to attention by the staff involved (Leape, 
1994). The reporting as well as the analysis of these events, however, are subject to 
local convention, and thus express the self-regulating policy of the health care 
community. 
In some cases, incident reporting schemes are in place. This concerns "near miss" 
adverse events, i.e. cases in which iatrogenic injury was likely to have occurred, but 
the hazardous situation could be recovered from successfully. However, it was noted 
that even under the clinical reporting schemes, in-depth analysis and search for root 
causes of adverse events does not take place (Leape, 1994). 
Human Error Analysis in Aviation and Process Control 
Revisited 
In safety-critical domains other than health care, accidents (i.e., like clinical adverse 
events, non-intended events which lead to negative outcomes and loss) have received 
a great deal of attention. Research into their causes and prevention has made 
considerable advances. Accident causes formerly described solely as 'Human Error' 
have come under close scrutiny, notably with the work of Rasmussen (e.g. 
Rasmussen et aI., 1987), Reason (Reason, 1990), Hollnagel (1991), and Hale (Hale et 
aI., 1997), as also described in Chapter 2. They have systematically analysed 
cognitive mechanisms underlying the various phenotypes of human error. Also, latent 
contributing factors are taken into account. These concern organisational as well as 
managerial influences on the course of the accident. Thus, there was a shift from 
'blaming the human' (such as the oft-cited 'pilot error') to the insight that error 
invariably occurs in complex systems. The aim now is to create error-tolerant systems 
that absorb errors through 'system defences' and provide redundancy and possibilities 
for error recovery. The move away from the blame culture also made possible the 
introduction of institutionalised, anonymous, and non-punitive incident reporting 
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schemes. Subsequent detailed comparison and analysis of the identified root causes is 
carried out by organisations such as the US National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB), or the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NASA. In the clinical 
domain the argument has also been put forward for the use of incident reporting to 
complement post-hoc accident investigation with the inherent problems for scant 
information, altered perception and outcome bias (Runciman et aI., 1993). Further-
more, analysis of the reported events should extend beyond the investigation of 
proximal causes to include latent system failures. Thus, the use of incident reporting 
schemes and theories on accident causation are the two main contributions so far to 
safety applications in the medical domain. 
This chapter looks at incident management practices in a clinical setting, as compared 
to the approaches in other safety-critical domains. The main issues we will investigate 
in this chapter concern the problems associated with incident reporting, categorisation 
and subsequent analysis. We will illustrate existing risk management in medicine by 
an incident reporting scheme employed in an Edinburgh Intensive Care Unit (lCU). 
First, we will introduce current applications of the Critical Incident Technique 
(Flanagan, 1954) in medicine and give an outline of the Edinburgh implementation. 
Then incident reporting, categorisation, and analysis with reference to the Edinburgh 
scheme will be described in tum, mirroring the stages of the incident investigation 
process. A later section will then investigate the generation of action 
recommendations from the prior analyses. In each section, we will compare and 
contrast theory and methodology 'lessons' from safety-critical domains such as 
aviation with the implementation of the Edinburgh incident reporting scheme. 
The Edinburgh leu Incident Reporting Scheme 
The Edinburgh incident reporting scheme was set up in an adult intensive care unit in 
1989. It has been maintained by Dr David Wright, who is an anaesthetist and one of 
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the ICU consultants. The unit has 8 beds at its disposal, and there are roughly 3 
medical staff, one consultant, and up to 8 nurses per shift on the ward. Equipment in 
an ICU ranges from monitors displaying life sign data, such as heart rate and intra-
cranial pressure (ICP), to drug administration equipment, automatic breathing 
machines, and oxygen humidifier masks. Patient management involves tracking and 
transcribing monitored vital data, laying and maintaining lines such as endotracheal 
tubes, and chest drains, and handling equipment, such as three-way taps for drug 
administration, ventilators and defibrillators. 
Incidents reported over ten years (see Wright, 1999) fell mainly in four task domains: 
relating to ventilation, vascular lines, drug administration, and a miscellaneous group. 
The incident scheme employed reporting forms that encouraged staff to describe the 
event in narrative form, as well as noting contributing factors, detection factors, grade 
of staff involved in the event and that of the reporting staff. 
One crucial factor in the implementation ofthe scheme was its anonymity. Dr Wright, 
in his role of the scheme manager, was the only person who had access to the 
completed forms. The collected data was coded into categories and summarised. It 
was then collated into frequency tables. Information that may identify staff was 
removed, and action recommendations were proposed. The results of this initial 
analysis were then iterated over by Dr Wright and the Senior Nurse of the unit. 
Together, the data was again inspected and final revisions of action recommendations 
were carried out. The findings and recommendations were disseminated regularly 
among the staff of the unit, and thus an effective feedback loop was created. 
For a more detailed description of the implementation and findings of the incident 
reporting scheme, see Wright et a1. (1991), Wright (1999), Busse and Johnson, 
(1999), and Appendix B. 
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There are several definitions of what constitutes an 'incident'. Incidents might be 
considered adverse events only. near miss events only, or both. In the Edinburgh 
study, staff are asked to report 'critical incidents', which are defined as any 
occurrence that might have led (if not discovered in time) or did lead, to an 
undesirable outcome. In consequence, each recorded incident: 
I. was caused by an error made by a member of staff, or by a failure of equipment 
2. can be described in detail by a person who was involved in or who observed the 
incident 
3. occurred while the patient was under our care, though ( ... J it could be patients in 
transit 
4. was clearly preventable 
The Edinburgh Categorisation Scheme 
In the Edinburgh study, information drawn from the incident reports were categorised 
into 'causes', 'contributory factors', and 'detection factors' (see Wright, 1999). The 
categories were arrived at through informal coding of the narrative incident data. This 
bottom-up approach led to a domain-specific, behavioural categorisation scheme. 
'Causes' offers the subcategories of Human Error and Equipment Failure. Any 
incident that has some degree of human involvement is considered a Human Error. 
Furthermore, the human error incidents are classified as to the various task and 
equipment domains these refer to, such as "vascular lines related", "drugs-
administration-related", or "ventilator-related". Thus, the categorisation mainly labels 
the incidents without providing a step towards causal analysis. Rather, it points to 
where in the patient management task sequence the incident occurred. 'Cause' here 
refers to the task domain of the proximal causal factor. Mostly, the actual proximal 
'cause' of the incident cannot be inferred from this categorisation per se. A summary 
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of the narrative description of the occurrence is referred to in order to reconstruct the 
proximal cause. 
However, the categorisation of the contributing factors sheds some light on more 
distal, and less domain-dependent, 'causes'. Both, the task/equipment domain and the 
contributory factors together can be seen as representing pointers as to in which task 
sequence, and where in the task sequence, the underlying problems that led to the 
incident might be found. Thus, they can focus further enquiry. 
The initial categories (Wright et aI., 1991) were: 
• Inexperience with equipment 
• Shortage of trained staff 
• Night time 
• Fatigue 
• Poor Equipment Design 
• Unit Busy 
• Agency nurse 
• Lack of Suitable equipment 
• Failure to check equipment 
• Failure to perform hourly check 
• Poor Communication 
• Thoughtlessness 
The 'contributing factors' categorisation scheme evolved since the time of creation, 
and nearly doubled from 12 categories to 23. This was the result of the ongoing 
iterative coding of the collected incident data, and of experience with the reporting 
scheme. The added categories are: 
• Presence of students/teaching 
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• Too many people present 
• Poor visibility/position of equipment 
• Grossly obese patient 
• Turning the patient 
• Patient inadequately sedated 
• Lines not properly sutured into place 
• Intracranial Pressure Monitor not properly secured 
• Endotracheal tube not properly secured 
• Chest drain tube not properly secured 
• Nasogastric tube not properly secured 
In the initial version of the taxonomy, mainly so-called Performance Shaping Factors 
(see also Rasmussen, (1982» are listed as contributing causes, such as Fatigue, Unit 
Busy, and Night Time. Poor Communication can also be considered a performance 
shaping factor. The one factor notably not a PSF is 'Thoughtlessness'. The only 
factor that clearly denotes a latent failure is 'Poor Equipment Design'. 
Thus, the initial categorisation scheme concerned itself mostly with factors that 
created the situation precipitating the incident. However, the refined categories are 
increasingly task and domain specific, and do not denote generic Performance 
Shaping Factors. Instead, a behavioural and task domain dependent taxonomy is 
introduced, see especially the last seven factors above. These categories can provide 
the basis for descriptive statistics on the relative frequency of occurrences and for 
denoting trends in the distribution and combination of incidents. However, analysis 
of the underlying causes of the incident is not facilitated. 
The evolution of the categorisation scheme itself provides valuable information. The 
novel factors were created by filtering them out of the incident data reported and 
analysed over the years. Such a bottom-up approach establishes and clarifies problem 
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areas within both the task domain and the handling of the provided equipment. Thus, 
insights into task characteristics and performance can be gained. 
This can be put to use, for instance, for providing training focus, while offering strong 
empirical support. For instance, action recommendations in the period form August 
1995 to August 1998 pay heed to the recurring problem of dislodged endotracheal 
tubes. Initially, reminders are repeatedly publicised about this common problem. 
Reasons for dislodgement are given. Then, a list is devised that summarises "reasons 
for endotracheal tubes coming out". This is disseminated, and later 'suggested 
actions' recommend to revise this list and publicise it further. 
In comparison of the revised categorisation scheme with the categorisation 
approaches discussed above it can be noted that a linear causal chain can still be 
constructed by dividing the data according to, for instance, Rasmussen's Taxonomy 
for Description and Analysis of Events involving Human Malfunction (see Figure 
2-6). For instance, contributing factors on the AIMS-leU form are divided into 
'system-based factors', which detail work condition factors as well as latent failures, 
and 'human factors', which note factors that impact on the human cognitive 
processing levels. There is a trade-off, however, since the provision of fixed 
categories lessens the flexibility of the data reported, and might stifle creativity for 
staff attempting to explain how and why the incident occurred. 
Multi-causal Classification 
In the classification of data into the contributing causes categories, combinations of 
factors are allowed, and are noted frequently in the data sample. The data analysis 
might thus also be based on noting the frequency or likelihood of certain factors 
correlating. Trends could be established, and conclusions drawn that are justified by a 
richer data set than only noting the occurrence of single factors. To illustrate this, we 
took two data samples (see Table 5-1 and Table 5-2), one sample covering the first 
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categorisation interval, January and February 1989 (sample89), and the other 
covering a more recent interval from May to November 1998 (sample98). Both 
samples cover 25 incident reports. 
'Cause' Occurrence 'Contributing Factors' Occurrence 'Detection' Occurrence 
'89 '89 '89 
'Ventilator' : 10 Poor Communication: 14 Dl Regular Checking: 
'Vascular line': 6 Poor Equip. Design: 11 D2 Alarms: 
'Miscellaneous' : 5 Inexperience with Equipment: 5 D3 Experienced 
'Disposable Equip- Lack of Suitable Equipment: 4 Staff: 
ment': 4 Night Time: 3 D5 Patient Noticed: 
'Drug-administration': 3 Fatigue: 3 
'Non-disp. Unit Busy: 2 
Equipment': 2 Failure to Perform Hourly 
Check: 2 
Thoughtlessness: 2 
Table 5-1 - Causal Categorisation Sample '89 
In sample98, the predominant factors are 'Thoughtlessness' (lO occurrences), 'Poor 
Communication' (9 occurrences), and 'Inexperience with Equipment' (5 
occurrences). In contrast, in sarnple89, factors 'Poor Communication' (14 
occurrences), 'Poor Equipment Design' (11 occurrences), 'Inexperience with 
equipment' (6 occurrences), and 'Lack of suitable Equipment' (4 occurrences) were 
most implicated in incidents. 
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'Cause' Occurrence 'Contributing Factors' Occurrence 'Detection' Occurrence 
'98 '98 '98 
'Drug-administration' : Thoughtlessness: 11 D 1 Regular Checking: 
10 Poor Communication: 8 D3 Experienced Staff: 
'Ventilator' : 8 Inexperience with Equipment: 4 D2 Alarms: 
'Vascular line': 4 Night Time: 3 D4 Unfamiliar Noise: 
'Miscellaneous': 4 Failure to Check Equipment: 3 D5 Patient Noticed: 
'Non-disp. Failure to Perform Hourly D7 Handover Check: 
Equipment' : 1 Check: 2 
Endotrach. Tube Not Properly 
Sutured: 2 
Poor Equipment Design: 1 
Patient Inadequately Sedated: 1 
Turning the Patient: 1 
Table 5-2 - Causal Categorisation Sample '98 
A closer look at the data reveals that in the 1989 interval, half of aU 'Poor Equipment 
Design' incidents and one third of 'Poor Communication' are not single factor 
categorisations, but are placed in combinations. 'Poor Equipment Design' is 
predominantly (four out of five incidents) paired with 'Lack of Suitable Equipment'. 
'Poor Communication' is combined with a variety of factors, such as 'Fatigue', 
'Thoughtlessness', and 'Unit Busy'. This use of combinatorial categorisation embeds 
behavioural and person factors (e.g. Failure to Check Equipment, Thoughtlessness) 
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within latent system and work condition factors such as Poor Equipment Design, 
Fatigue, and Poor Communication. 
Also, in sample 98, 'Poor Communication' is paired with other factors in 6 out of 9 
incidents. 'Thoughtlessness' is shown in combination with other factors (such as 
Inexperience with Equipment) in 4 out of 10 incidents. 'Inexperience with 
Equipment' is only ever mentioned in combination. In sample 89, 'Inexperience with 
Equipment' is left as sole contributory factor only twice out of a total of six incidents. 
Three times it is mentioned in combination with 'Poor Equipment Design' and 'Lack 
of Suitable Equipment', respectively. Again, this shows how factors that warrant 
further explanation can be placed in context by considering the multi-combinatorial 
categorisation. It also shows, however, that descriptive statistics neglecting this facet 
of analysis shed a slightly misleading light on the collected incident data. 
Incident Detection 
The crucial role of detection factors is being recognised in the Edinburgh scheme. 
This is reflected on the incident fonn, as well as in the conclusions that are drawn 
form the data (see Table 5-1 and Table 5-2). 
Not only needs to be observed that although humans cause incidents, it is also 
humans who detect it and either remedy the consequences or prohibit the course of 
the incident to proceed. Staff is encouraged specifically to note which factors are 
believed to have aided detection. This is not only the data that can with significant 
confidence be assumed to be the reporter's own experience, but also that what 
ultimately can assist in finding ways of reducing the number of incidents and 
consequently, accidents. 
The detection factor taxonomy evolved alongside the iterative development of the 
contributory factors taxonomy. Initially it consisted of the categories 'Repeated 
Regular Checking', 'Presence of Alarms on Equipment', 'Presence of Experienced 
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Staff', 'Hearing Unfamiliar Noise', 'Patient Noticed', and 'Relative Noticed'. A task 
specific factor 'Having Lines or Three Way Tap Visible' was added, as well as the 
factor 'Handover Check'. These added factors point to possible system improvements 
to facilitate detection. They can be actively influenced by system factors such as work 
procedures, design, training, and staffing levels. 
This is pointed out in the initial presentation of the incident scheme (Wright et al., 
1991). It states that "regular checking by experienced staff is critical in detecting 
errors, but this may be adversely affected by nurse staffing policies where agency 
staff are commonly used or where little time is available for handovers". 
The iteration over the collected incident data thus clarified two more detection 
facilitating conditions. The importance of handover checks to make up for 
contributing causes 'Failure to Check Equipment' and 'Failure to Perform Hourly 
Check' is pointed out. Without iterative revision and coding of the data 
categorisation, these factors might have gone neglected. A formalised framework of 
analysis, such as those used in the aviation domain, can aid the recognition of 
detection factors and the generation of suggested actions (see also later sections in 
this chapter). 
THE EDINBURGH STUDY: INCIDENT ANALYSIS 
The narrative given by the reporting staff on the incident report form provides the 
first level of interpretation of what happened. In the case of the person reporting the 
incident not being the same as the one having 'caused' it, the reporter provides a 
second-level interpretation of the events. 
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The narrative, together with the contributory and detection factors mentioned, 
typically lays out a timeline of the events. Otherwise, this is inferred when analysing 
the data. One method of establishing a task-related timeline is to embed the erroneous 
task event into a sequential, high-level task model. This is partly carried out by 
classifying occurrences according to task aspects, as shown in the examples below. 
The classification of events involves informal (and non-documented) analysis 
followed by the above noted categorisation into 'causes', contributory, and detection 
factors. This can be seen as representing an informal root cause analysis process (see 
below). However, to repeat, the categorised data often seems to present behavioural 
descriptions or proximal 'causes'. 
Following Reason's accident causation and analysis model (see Figure 2-3), Table 
5-3 shows a tentative classification of the provided 'contributing factors' categories 
into latent failure types (distal causal factor), work conditions failure types (distal 
causal factor), and active failures (proximal causal factor). The latter constitute in our 
case task and behaviour oriented categories, rather than the error types based on 
cognitive theory as suggested by Reason. This classification can be compared to 
Rasmussen's event description scheme (see Figure 2-6), where latent factors and 
work conditions are mirrored in 'Personnel Task', and the 'Causes of Human 
Malfunction', 'Situation Factors', and 'Factors Affecting Performance' respectively. 
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Contributing Factor Categories Failure Type 
1. Inexperience with equipment 1. Distal: Training, Protocol 
2. Shortage of trained staff 2. Distal: Management, shift arrangement 
3. Night time 3. Distal: e.g. Fatigue/Staffing level 
4. Fatigue 4. Distal: Shift 
5. Poor Equipment Design 5. Distal: System Design 
6. Unit Busy 6. Distal - refined by # I 3 and # 14 
7. Agency nurse 7. Distal: Contract work, training 
8. Lack of Suitable equipment 8. Distal: management of equipment 
9. Failure to check equipment maintenance 
10. Failure to perform hourly check 9. Proximal, behavioural 
11. Poor Communication 10. " 
12. Thoughtlessness 11. Distal - Team Communication or 
13. Presence of students/teaching Training 
14. Too many people present 12. Proximal 
IS. Poor visibility/position of equipment 13. Distal (refining #14) 
16. Grossly obese patient 14. Distal (refining #6) 
17. Turning the patient 15. Distal - detection facilitating factor 
18. Patient inadequately sedated 16. Patient characteristic 
19. Lines not properly sutured into place 17. Proximal - Tasklbehavioural 
20. ICP monitor not properly secured 18. Proximal " 
21. Endotracheal tube not properly secured 19. Proximal " 
22. Chest drain tube not properly secured 20. Proximal " 
23. Nasogastric tube not properly secured 21. Proximal " 
22. Proximal " 
23. Proximal " 
Table 5-3 - Failure Type Categorisation 
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In order to be able to categorise the proximal failure types into Reason's cognitive 
Error Types, more detailed incident data is required than could be accessed from the 
samples. There is no one to one relationship between contributing factors and their 
underlying cognitive mechanisms (see for instance Busse and Johnson (1998), and a 
more in-depth analysis of the error types is required. 
Despite informal causal analysis during the categorization process, the Edinburgh 
study does currently not proceed much beyond the "what" phase within the above 
mentioned analysis model. However, given the contributing factors classification 
above, root cause analysis can be used to reflect the variety of levels in the incident 
causation tree. The consideration of latent and work condition factors draws attention 
to the deficiency of single-cause categorisation. Multi-causal categorisation can be 
used to reconstruct a possible root cause analysis as an example. 
For instance, the above-mentioned combination of factors 'inexperience with 
equipment', 'poor equipment design', and 'lack of suitable equipment' can be 
illustrated in a causal tree as shown in Figure 5-3. The incident (e.g. ventilator 
related) was 'caused' by staff 'inexperience with equipment'. This is then 
hypothesised to be mediated by 'lack of suitable equipment', which in turn pointed to 
'poor equipment design'. Thus, a causal chain is established, formalised, and 
documented. 
It could also be argued that 'lack of suitable equipment' contributed directly to the 
occurrence of the incident. This hypothesis, again, has different implication for 
potential system redesign. Thus, this kind of analysis, taking several levels of 
causation into account, can aid precise and structured reasoning about the incident 
occurrence. Factors to be considered in lower levels of causation are work conditions 
and latent system failure types, for instance Training, and alternative contributing 
factors why a failure to check equipment occurred. 
A structured, fonnalised analysis framework is also necessary to prevent hindsight 
from biasing error analysis. Attribution of error is a social and psychological 
judgement process rather than a matter of objective fact. Hindsight view is 
fundamentally flawed because it does not reflect the situation confronting the 
practitioners at the scene. Thus, rather than being a causal category, human error 
should be seen as representing a symptom, and a starting point for investigation 
(Woods et aI., 1994). 
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Figure 5-3 - Example of Incident Root Cause Analysis 
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ACTION RECOMMENDATION 
In order to arrive at sound and relevant action recommendations, a systematic and 
structured way of bridging the result of the analysis process to remedial measures is 
needed. The documentation of this process plays an important role, for instance to 
aIJow monitoring of the effect of the measure. 
In industry domains such as aviation and process control, cognitive analysis of error 
occurrences is often used to point towards remedial actions. For instance, Reece et al. 
(Reece and Hill, 1995) investigated human error in radiation exposure events. The 
proximal cause to the incident was situated in the task sequence and, additionally, 
cognitive failure analysis was carried out. Then the relationship between them was 
analysed, and thus it could be identified: 
• where training might be most effective 
• where equipment interface enhancements may be most appropriate 
• where job aids might help performance (e.g. checklists). 
In a similar vein, van der Schaaf (1996) proposed the Eindhoven Classification 
Scheme for classifying events and identifying incident causes in process control. The 
main categories represent Technical Factors, Organisational Factors, and Human 
Error categorised according to Rasmussen's Skills Rules and Knowledge (SRK) 
framework. The translation into proposals for effective, preventive, and corrective 
action can then be guided by means of a proposed Classification! Action Matrix. Thus, 
the action categories relate back to the SRK error types, and include Equipment, 
Procedures, Information & Communication, Training, and Motivation. 
This shows how error categorisation, when done according to cognitive level of 
performance and latent factors, can provide the basis for sound, structured, and 
theory-based remedial recommendations. Without error categories being based on 
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sound psychological theory, systematic and relevant action recommendation 
generation is not possible. 
'Cause' Contributing Factors Detection Factors Action 
Recommendations 
Ventilator 10 Thoughtlessness: 14 Reg. Checking: 11 4 Ventilator 
Vasco Line 6 Poor Equip. Alanns: 11 3 Vascular Line 
Misc. 5 Design: 11 Exp. Staff: 8 2 Drugs 
Disp. Equip. 4 Inexperience with Pat. Noticed: 1 1 Miscellaneous 
Drug-admin. 3 Equipment: 5 1 Equipment 
Non-disp. Lack of Suitable 
Equip. 2 Equipment: 4 
Night Time: 3 
Fatigue: 3 
Unit Busy: 2 
Failure to Perform 
Hourly Check: 2 
Thoughtlessness 2 
Table 5-4 - Action Recommendations for the reporting period JanlFeb 1989 
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Incident 'Cause' Contributing Detection Action 
98 Factors 98 Factors 98 Recommendations 
98 
Drug-admin. 10 Thoughtlessness 11 Reg. Checking: 9 3 Ventilator 
Ventilator 8 Poor Communication 8 Exp. Staff: 8 2 Vascular line 
Vasco Line 4 Inexperience with Alarms: 2 1 Drugs 
Misc. 4 Equipment: 4 Unfamiliar 2 Miscellaneous 
Non-disp. Equipl NightTime: 3 Noise: 1 
Failure to Check Patient 
Equipment: 3 Noticed: 1 
Failure to Perform Handover 
Hourly Check: 2 Check: 1 
End. Tube not 
Properly Secured: 2 
Poor Equip. Design: 1 
Patient Inadequately 
Sedated: 1 
Turning the patient: 1 
Table 5-5 _ Action Recommendations for the reporting period MaylNov 1998 
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The Edinburgh Study: Action Recommendations 
In the Edinburgh study, the incident data was categorised and summarised by the 
scheme manager. Action recommendations were arrived at in an iterative process, 
whereby the scheme manager suggested remedial actions and presented those 
together with the summary data to the senior nurse of the leu. Together, the data was 
discussed and the rationale for the action recommendations reviewed. This led to a 
final version of suggested actions for each incident analysis period. Table 5-4 and 
Table 5-5 show a categorisation of the suggested actions for our two samples 
(sampJe89 and sampJe98). The revised action recommendations are listed below. 
Revised classification (Sample 89): 
• 3 "Remind Staff ... " 
• 2 change equipment 
• 2 create protocol for equipment use 
• 2 review protocol for equipment use 
• 1 create protocol for equipment maintenance 
• 1 review equipment 
Revised Classification (Sample 98): 
• 4 "Remind Staff ... " 
• 1 Training viz new equipment 
• 1 Equipment maintenance (management) 
• 1 Create protocol for equipment use 
• 1 Review procedure viz home patients'safety 
First, we related the recommendations back to the initial 'cause' categories, with the 
scheme manager's assistance. Then we re-interpreted the suggested actions in the 
Jight of system safety design concepts, such as presented by van der Schaaf or 
Reason. In sample89, Thoughtlessness and Poor Equipment Design featured most 
often as contributing factors. This is mirrored in the action recommendations falling 
in the 'remind staff ... ', 'change equipment' and 'create protocol for equipment use'. 
Entries under 'remind staff ... ' typically are in the form of a reminder statement, 
drawing attention to problematic task or equipment characteristics, for instance 
"Remind all staff of the importance of careful, correct use of 3-way taps on central 
venous and arterial lines" (February 1989). 'Change equipment' is represented by 
recommendations such as "Particular sort of disposable ventilator tubing used on trial 
should no longer be used". 'Create protocol for equipment use' mentioned for 
instance "Consider use of small Graseby syringe drivers with smaller volumes of 
solution". 
In the period of May to November 1998, a marked increase in reminder statements 
can be noted. Following inspection of recommendation data, the dissemination of 
reminder statements were noted to be the single most often suggested action. In the 
period August 1995 to August November 1998, 82 "Remind Staff ... " statements out 
of a total number of I I I recommendations could be noted. The 29 other 
recommendations concerned procedure creation or change suggestions (e.g. "produce 
guidelines for care of arterial lines ~ particularly for femoral artery lines post coiling" 
), or were equipment related (e.g. "Obtain spare helium cylinder for aortic pump to be 
kept in ICU"). 
Reminder statements as potential error prevention mechanism have come into 
disrepute in domains such as aviation (Reason, 1990). Rather than further burdening 
operators' and pilots' memory capacity, indirect safety methods such as reduced 
complexity, standardisation, proceduralisation, and work aids such as checklists have 
been introduced. 
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However, on closer inspection, the nature of the Edinburgh reminder statements 
proves to be interesting. Reminders seem to target either very common, but still error-
prone, details of tasks and practices, or problem points that occur very infrequently, 
or otherwise problematic parts or uses of procedures. 
Distinguishing thus between types of recommendation, a link to Rasmussen's SRK 
framework can be created. Skill (S) level performance concerns automatic behaviour 
routines, such as the common but still error prone details of tasks. Rule (R) level 
performance concerns the conscious but practiced following of procedures and 
protocols, and Knowledge-based (K) performance relates to potentially effortful, fully 
conscious problem solving and decision making. In aviation and process control, it 
has been realised that performance on the rule-based level is the least error-prone. 
Therefore, design methodologies such as Ecological Interface Design (EID, 
Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989) emphasise proceduralised tasks, and ensure that task 
features that relate to S or K level performance are assisted accordingly. For instance, 
K based performance can be supported by careful information design. 
The Eindhoven classification/action matrix (Van der Schaaf, 1996) is also based on a 
SRK style cognitive classification of error. It details, as described above, that R-based 
error is best targeted with Training measures, K-based error with improvements in the 
Information & Communication domain, and S-based error with change in equipment. 
Thus, this is at odds with the Edinburgh results of the recommendation generation. 
Instead of reacting with reminder statements indiscriminately of cognitive 
performance level, these could be taken into account when suggesting remedial 
actions. The categorisation of error according to cognitive mechanisms will also 
further the understanding of performance problems. 
We have illustrated how methods and insights from safety-critical domains other than 
medicine can be applied in a clinical setting. This concerns the use of incident 
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schemes, as well as the application of accident causation models in the analysis of 
incidents, and in the generation of action recommendations. These recognise the 
importance of latent failure as part of the causal chain of an incident, which is 
reflected in the incident analysis process. 
Incident investigation schemes often neglect formalised, in-depth analysis of single 
incidents in favour of a quantitative surface analysis. Also, the crucial role of 
detection factors and the need to support those is often underestimated. The 
Edinburgh incident scheme caters for those in the data collection process as well as in 
the generation of action recommendations. Thus, the analysis process and its results 
of the Edinburgh study showed how not only theoretical 'top-down' approaches can 
inform incident analysis, but also how practical incident avoidance can be supported 
by a 'bottom-up', detailed (albeit non-formalised) analysis process. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will demonstrate the benefit of the suggested 
cognitive error analysis approach for further in-depth analysis of incidents' human 
factors, as well as for the evaluation of safety recommendations. 
COGNITIVE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN ERROR IN ICU 
INCIDENT REPORTS 
As described above, 'human error' is often assumed to be the prime 'cause' of 
incidents and accidents in clinical systems. This chapter investigates incidents in an 
adult intensive care unit (JeU). Our human error analysis approach stresses the 
importance of taking cognitive factors into account. The case study presents data 
drawn from an incident reporting scheme that has been running for over ten years. An 
in-depth analysis of example cases is carried out which considers human cognitive 
constraints during task performance. The genesis of erroneous action can thus be 
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considered in relation to the underlying cognition. We embed work practice and the 
problems encountered in a holistic cognitive perspective that recognizes the 
importance of physical and visual input into human cognitive processing. Also, the 
cognitive analysis can provide pointers to constraints of humans' performance in 
context. It does not suffice to only consider the behavioural aspect of 'Human Error'. 
We argue that understanding of 'Human Error' is limited unless full credit is given to 
the impact that the characteristics of the human cognitive system has on task 
performance. 
Instead of only investigating what happened in each incident, much can be gained 
from understanding the underlying why of the event. The cognitive 'mechanism of 
malfunction' (O'Hare et aI., 1994) can be traced by using cognitive architectures. 
These provide the basis for cognitive models, which strive to represent some aspects 
of people's understanding, knowledge, or cognitive processing when performing 
some task. These models can, therefore, contribute to our understanding of the 
cognitive limitations interacting with task perfonnance, for example the effects of 
cognitive load on perfonnance (Barnard, 1993). 
The distinction between varieties of human error according to their cognitive origin 
plays a significant role in accident analysis because they require different methods of 
error management and remediation (Maddox and Reason, 1996). In this thesis a 
cognitive architecture is used as a vehicle for expressing not only expert task 
perfonnance but also the more realistic error-prone thought and action sequences 
processed by the human operator. By doing this, the error modelling capability 
implicit in the cognitive architecture is made the focus of inquiry into the underlying 
cognition of user perfonnance. Such explicit modelling of erroneous perfonnance can 
thus help to communicate user cognition analyses, and to ground incident analysis 
and subsequent action recommendation in a cognitive theoretical framework. 
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Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS; Barnard, 1993) is used to illustrate the 
modelling of human error within a cognitive architecture. Errors resulting in medical 
incidents are rarely described in such detail, or even analysed in terms of underlying 
psychological factors (Busse and Johnson, 1999). Expressing human error within a 
cognitive model will allow us to investigate and reason about their underlying 
psychological causes. The model is thus used as a tool for reasoning about human 
error on a further, more detailed level. 
As stated above, in the Edinburgh scheme, analysis of the underlying cognition of 
those proximal causal factors of the incident was not facilitated. In analysing the 
scheme, we took two data samples (Table 5-1 and Table 5-2), one sample covering 
the first categorisation interval, January and February 1989 (sampJe89), and the other 
covering a more recent interval from May to November 1998 (sample98). Both 
samples cover 25 incident reports. 
In the classification of data into the contributing cause categories, combinations of 
factors are allowed, and are noted frequently in the data sample. For instance, in 
sample98, one of the predominant factors is 'Thoughtlessness' (10 occurrences). 
Looking at the combinations, however, shows that 'Thoughtlessness' is paired with 
other factors (such as Inexperience with Equipment) in 4 out of 10 incidents. 
One common problem identified in the Edinburgh study is the endotracheal tube 
coming back out through the larynx. Over time, incident analysis resulted in a list of 
factors that led the tube to come out. Some of those now constitute 'contributory 
factors' in the incident data categorisation. One factor is that the tube was not 
properly secured. Another is that the patient was inadequately sedated, which led to 
the patient being able to pull out the tube. Judging the appropriate level of sedation is 
difficult, since oversedating the patient can lead to vital signs being disrupted, while 
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under-sedation increases the possibility of the endotracheal tube being pulled out, 
which can itself be life threatening. 
The tube can also be dislodged when turning the patient. Care must be taken to ensure 
the tube is long enough to be securely located in the larynx, while being short enough 
to prohibit it being caught in, for instance, the near-by intra-cranial pressure monitor 
during the turning manoeuvre. Often, several lines need to be monitored while turning 
the patient. Thus, dislodging the tube during turning can be exacerbated by not per-
ceiving the relationship of the patient's position and the various tubes connecting 
measurement and drug administration equipment to the patient. 
Thus, the scenario described above can be modelled in ICS as shown in Figure 5-4. 
The visual data., the patient and the position of the lines in relation to the surrounding 
environment, is received at the visual subsystem (1), sent to the object subsystem for 
the recovery of a structural description (2), and finally interpreted by the 
propositional subsystem (3). A loop is entered in order to maintain a stable cognition. 
The resulting interpretation on the propositional level of the success of the turning 
strategy influences the further view of the object. If the visual infonnation perceived 
is inadequate, for instance, the position of the endotracheal tube is neglected, an 
inappropriate turning strategy will be chosen, and this inappropriate infonnation is 
sent to limb subsystem (4) to initiate the motor movements. 
This details a perspective on the cause of a dislodged endotracheal tube that 
emphasises the perception and interpretation of visual information. By modelling the 
underlying mechanisms of the causes of the incident during turning the patient within 
ICS, we can shed some light on the processes that are fundamental to the production 
of the incident as mediated by human error. 
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Contrasted to the categorisation scheme (table J) this analysis high lights the 
relationship between two separate ' contributory factors': ' Poor Visibility of 
Equipment' and 'Turning the Patient'. It is worth noting that these factors are not 
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placed in multi-factor categorisation, but appear as single contributory factors to 
endotracheal tube incidents in the sample data. 
REASONING ABOUT ALTERNATIVE ERROR CAUSES 
The third factor listed as a contributory factor for dislodged endotracheal tube 
incidents is listed as 'Endotracheal Tube Not Properly Secured'. Endotracheal tubes 
are typically secured in the patient's larynx by means of a cuff (situated on the lower 
end ofthe tube) being pumped with air until it sits firmly in the larynx. The failure to 
secure the tube suggests a 'human error' based on skill-level performance. Attentional 
resources are only minimally required and the action can be at least partly automated. 
Figure 5-5 presents an ICS model that details skill-based error leading to a dislodged 
endotracheal tube. 
As can be seen in Figure 5-5, minimal resources are required to perform the task of 
placing the tube. The fixing of the tube in the larynx by pumping air into the cuff is 
carried out on a skill-based level, not requiring knowledge-based processing as would 
be provided by the implicational subsystem. Instead, body state information from the 
proprioceptive subsystem (I) is sufficient to enable the propositional subsystem (2) to 
interpret the state of the tube and to send motor movement information to the limb 
subsystem (3). 
However, the task problem might not be based on failures on the skill-base level of 
performance, but alternatively on failures on a higher level of human cognition. Using 
ICS, alternative hypotheses as the underlying cognition of the dislodged endotracheal 
tube class of incidents can be investigated. 
For instance, securing the endotracheal tube via the air cuffwas taken as a skill-based 
task, with the procedural skill readily available. However, this is not always the case. 
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Not only does the level of staff experience playa significant role, but so do possible 
exceptions to the rule. For instance, in certain cases, the air cuff on the endotracheal 
tube is of a different make. Usually, when staff noted that the tube is not properly 
secured, the first measure is to re-secure the tube by pumping air into the cuff. With 
the different make of cuff, however, this has a counterproductive effect. In this 
specific case, pumping air into the cuff will force the cuff, and therefore the 
endotracheal tube, even further out of the larynx. This special case needs to be 
considered by staff when re-securing the tube . 
. Since it is an exception, a mistake on the rule-based level of performance is likely. It 
is one of the predispositions of the human cognitive system to opt for a well-known 
and practised rule even when faced with the exceptional situations. Reason (1990) 
calls this a misapplication of a 'Strong but Wrong' rule. This cognitive mechanisms 
comes into play especially in emergencies, since knowledge-level performance tends 
to be attenuated during high attentional requirements (Rasmussen et aI., 1987). The 
human cognitive system then tends to fall back on well-practised strategies and 
procedures. Thus, in an environment such as an ICU, where emergencies are part of 
prototypical work situations, remembering the precise demands associated with rare, 
exceptional tasks is a resource intensive requirement. This can be modelled in ICS as 
shown in Figure 5-6. 
Figure 5-6 demonstrates that the processing of an exceptional case involves more 
cognitive complexity, and requires increased cognitive resources. The body state 
information (I), being passed on to the propositional subsystem (via a PIP loop 
passed the implicational subsystem) (2), now only presents a small aspect of the 
cognitive demands posed upon the human. The decision to be taken as to what make 
of tube is involved, and how the body state information can be interpreted needs to 
draw on implicational input (3). This hypothesis, again, has different implications for 
potential system redesign. Thus, this kind of analysis, taking the impact of cognitive 
constraints into account, can aid precise and structured reasoning about the incident 
occurrence. 
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The examples elaborated above show clearly how different cognitive mechanisms 
might be implicated in the same overt task performance problem. This multi-way 
relationship between cause and error might go undetected if systematic error 
modelling within a cognitive architecture does not take place, this helps analysts to 
explicitly consider the detailed causes of task performance problems. 
Human Error leading to a dislodged endotracheal tube might be grounded in varying 
cognitive processes, and not stem from one kind of cognitive mechanism alone. 
Unless these two different causes are considered, an analysis might misdiagnose an 
important problem in the task. Using a cognitive architecture to reason about the 
potential underlying cognitive error production processes allows work system and 
equipment designers to investigate the detected task problem in a systematic way. 
Often, error categorization systems do not proceed much beyond the "what" phase 
within the above mentioned analysis model. A structured, formalised analysis 
framework also helps prevent 'hindsight' from biasing error analysis. Attribution of 
error is a social and psychological judgement process rather than a matter of objective 
fact. Hindsight view is fundamentally flawed because it does not reflect the situation 
confronting the practitioners at the scene. Thus, rather than being a causal category, 
human error should be seen as representing a symptom, and a starting point for 
investigation (Woods et aI., 1994). 
Often, especially in the case of clinical staff trained for taking on responsibility for 
their actions (Berwick, 1998), error analysis can be tainted by human cognitive 
mechanisms such as the 'Fundamental Attribution Error'. According to this, humans 
are significantly more likely to attribute error occurrence to situational aspects when 
the error was 'committed' by themselves. However, when looking for reasons why 
others were involved in 'error', one is most likely to blame the person rather than the 
situational aspects. This is another reason why an analysis framework is needed that 
aids objectivity in interpreting the actions of others. 
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ACTION RECOMMENDATION 
In order to arrive at sound and relevant action recommendations, a systematic and 
structured way of bridging the result of the analysis process to remedial measures is 
needed. The documentation of this process also plays an important role, for instance, 
to allow monitoring of the effect of the measure. 
In industry domains such as aviation and process control, cognitive analysis of error 
occurrences is often used to point towards remedial actions. For instance, Reece et al. 
(Reece and Hill, 1995) investigated human error in radiation exposure events. The 
proximal cause of the incident was situated in the task sequence and, additionally, 
cognitive failure analysis was carried out. Then the relationship between them was 
analysed, and thus it could be identified: where training might be most effective; 
where equipment interface enhancements may be most appropriate; and where job 
aids (e.g. checklists) might help performance. 
This shows how error categorisation, when done according to cognitive level of 
performance and latent factors, can provide the basis for structured remedial recom-
mendations, rooted in theory. Without error categories being based on sound 
psychological theory, systematic and relevant action recommendation generation is 
often not possible. 
In the Edinburgh study, the incident data was categorised and summarised by the 
scheme manager. Action recommendations were arrived at in an iterative process, 
whereby the scheme manager suggested remedial actions and presented those along 
with the summary data to the senior nurse of the ICU. The data was discussed and the 
rationale for the action recommendations reviewed. This led to a final version of 
suggested actions for each incident analysis period. Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 show a 
categorisation of the suggested actions for our two samples (sample89 and sample98). 
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We categorised the suggested actions in the light of system safety design concepts, 
such as those presented by Reason (1997). Entries under 'remind staff' typically are 
in the fonn of a reminder statement, drawing attention to problematic task or 
equipment characteristics, for instance "Remind all staff of the importance of careful, 
correct use of 3-way taps on central venous and arterial lines" (February 1989). 
'Change equipment' is represented by recommendations such as "Particular sort of 
disposable ventilator tubing used on trial should no longer be used". 'Create protocol 
for equipment use' mentioned for instance "Consider use of small Graseby syringe 
drivers with smaller volumes of solution". 
In the period of May to November 1998, a marked increase in reminder statements 
can be noted. Following inspection of recommendation data, the dissemination of 
reminder statements was noted to be the single most often suggested action. In the 
period August 1995 to November 1998, there were 82 "Remind Staff ... " statements 
out of a total number of III recommendations. 
Instead of reacting with reminder statements indiscriminately of cognitive 
performance level, these could be taken into account when suggesting remedial 
actions. The categorisation of error according to cognitive mechanisms can also 
further the understanding of performance problems. 
Using ICS to detail risk situations and arrive at action 
recommendations 
The Edinburgh Study also notes incident detection factors, which is often neglected in 
other reporting systems. It has been suggested that provisions for incident detection 
and recovery provide more effective safety measures than an approach solely 
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targeting accident prevention or avoidance (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989; Reason, 
1990). 
However, even if detection factors are noted, they are typically not being analysed in 
depth. The analysis should include system factors as well as cognitive aspects of the 
task and work environment. Unless we can monitor those adverse situations which 
are, and those which are not, reported, we can have little confidence in the accuracy 
of the system. 
The detection factor taxonomy evolved alongside the iterative development of the 
contributory factors taxonomy. The factors added over time are 'Having Lines or 
Three Way Tap Visible', and 'Handover Check'. The iteration over the collected 
incident data thus clarified the importance of handover checks to make up for 
contributing causes 'Failure to Check Equipment' and 'Failure to Perform Hourly 
Check'. Without iterative revision and coding of the data categorisation, these factors 
might have gone neglected. A formalised, cognitive analysis of the incidents can aid 
the recognition of detection factors and the generation of suggested actions. 
For instance, one recurring incident concerned the use of three-way taps. These are 
used to feed, for instance, two different drugs to the patient via one intravenous line. 
On changing one of the drug syringe drivers, the corresponding line connecting to the 
three-way tap is turned off. After the drug change, staff must remember to return the 
tap settings back to allow both drugs to run. 
Currently, this procedure is being supported by the memory aid T.A.P. - an acronym 
for Tap Aligned Properly. Thus, this problem initially prompted 'Reminder' 
statements in the recommended actions summaries. It was then modified, through an 
iterative analysis process, to recommend keeping the three-way tap visible, to 
facilitate staff recognition that the tap was still left in the turned off position. The 
suggestion to counteract three-way taps being left in the incorrect setting evolved 
over time. An analysis framework, such as ICS, can point towards weak points in 
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human cognitive task performance such as this. The problem of three-way tap 
(in)visibility is detailed in ICS in Figure 5-7. 
The ICS model illustrates how the process of changing the drug takes over the 
implicational and propositional subsystem processes. Higher-level, semantic 
cognition is involved. since active problem-solving is required for the task. The 
procedure to be followed prescribes the returning of the tap to the correct setting. 
However, relying solely on the semantic subsystems in remembering all steps in the 
procedure is insufficient, especially when inexperienced staff are involved (one of the 
main contributing factors of incidents, see Table 5-2). 
By providing prompts for the next step in the procedure, task performance can be 
pulled onto the rule-based level of performance, rather than requiring knowledge-
based problem-solving (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989). Thus, cueing information can 
be fed into the system via the peripheral subsystems. This principle is often realised, 
for instance, by providing alarms on equipment. In ICS tenns, the peripheral cueing 
information is in this case being fed in via the acoustic subsystem, for instance by 
using alarms. Alternatively, and often overlooked, information can also be provided 
via the visual subsystem. 
In the task at hand, the visual subsystem has been focused on observing the status of 
the syringe driver task. After completion of the task, the resources of the visual 
subsystem are freed to take in additional status information. The Visibility of the 
three-way tap comes to take a crucial cueing role. After processing the goal hierarchy 
for selecting a link, the cognitive system can shift its focus back onto the visible 
three-way tap. Only if the procedural step is remembered, wiIJ the propositional 
subsystem signal anticipation of the three-way tap via internal input into the object 
subsystem. Thus, the visibility of the tap is crucial to change the propositional 
representation. 
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Using ICS to model the underlying cognition of the error provides means of 
investigating the behaviour trace leading to an incident. Expressing the rationale for 
different interpretations within a cognitive framework facilitates more precise 
communication and more detailed analysis. In that way, not only what failed in incid-
ents, but also how and why it failed is examined in an investigation of human error. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is a need in medicine to recognise the inevitability of error and adverse events 
(Leape, 1994). Safety culture that takes this into account in clinical system design is 
still lacking (Leape et aI., 1998). There have been some notable exceptions in the 
recent past where incident reporting schemes were implemented and the identified 
incidents analysed, such as Runciman et al. (Runciman et aI., 1993) and (Battles et 
aI., 1998). However, these focus on the data collection process and somewhat neglect 
the in-depth analysis, with which valuable insight into incident causation and remedy 
can be achieved. 
Incident investigation schemes often neglect formalised, in-depth analysis of single 
incidents in favour of a quantitative surface analysis. Also, the crucial role of 
detection factors is often underestimated. The Edinburgh incident scheme represents 
those factors in the data collection process, as well as in the generation of action 
recommendations. However, this process has not been formalised, and is not based 
on insights gained from cognitive theory. 
We have illustrated in this chapter how cognitive modelling can be applied to focus 
more narrowly on the psychological precursors of the human actions leading to 
incidents, by means of retrospective analysis of incidents that had occurred in an adult 
intensive care unit during the last decade. In the following chapter, we address the 
weaknesses identified here by implementing and evaluating an incident reporting 
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scheme from scratch in a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU), to which we will 
further demonstrated the benefit of the suggested cognitive error analysis approach, as 
situated in ongoing clinical safety management. 
lSI 
CHAPTER 6 IMPLEMENTATION OF 
CRITICAL INCIDENT REPORTING 
IN A NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE 
UNIT 
INTRODUCTION 
The occurrence of medical adverse events is a growing cause for concern worldwide. 
Critical incident reporting schemes have recently been suggested as an effective 
means to tackle the problem of medical adverse events. There are few comprehensive 
frameworks that accommodate the specific requirements of local settings as well as 
generic issues in incident reporting. The local setting radically influences a scheme' s 
successful implementation and maintenance. Issues that impact the overall success of 
incident reporting schemes concern the format of data collection, and especially. a 
meaningful data analysis. This chapter reports on the introduction of a critical 
incident reporting scheme to a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Issues concerning 
the implementation and maintenance of the reporting scheme are discussed. Incident 
analysis is described in terms of the process and the results of incident categorization. 
The implications of such a viewpoint are considered. 
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Critical incident reporting schemes have been cited as a major safety tool to combat 
human error and adverse events in medicine. Typically, a distinction can be drawn 
between standardized, national schemes of broad scope but less depth, and smaller, 
local schemes. Local schemes permit close scrutiny of in situ adverse events. Their 
implementation can also be fine-tuned to the local culture and conditions, a 
prerequisite for successful delivery of the scheme. This is at the expense of the 
benefits of statistical evaluation of the collected data that a more extensive, 
standardized data set offers. Both types of scheme operate by presenting employees 
with a data collection form, which prompts for a number of characteristics of the 
problem description. The nature of the fonn varies, but there are some fundamentals 
common to most schemes: general circumstances of the adverse events need first to 
be established (e.g. at what time did the incident occur?), as well as general facts 
about the reporters themselves (e.g. how experienced they are). Typically, this is 
followed by asking for a narrative description of the incident, and includes questions 
about the presumed 'causes' and contributing factors, and how the incident was 
detected. The question on detection factors is not typically included, but is clearly 
valuable for future incident avoidance. This data can then be used to instigate further, 
more in-depth investigation of the incident. It can also be categorized and archived 
for statistical purposes, if the data set permits. Major national safety schemes are 
NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), and its UK equivalent CHIRP 
(Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme). An example for a local 
incident reporting scheme that has been implemented in healthcare and maintained 
for over] 0 years is described in (Busse and Wright, 2000). 
This chapter offers a report on the prerequisites to successfully running an incident 
reporting scheme. The implementation that is described here attempted to localize an 
incident reporting scheme by taking contextual factors such as safety culture into 
account. It had staff actively participate in the conception of the scheme and the 
design of the reporting form. This is argued to be crucial in achieving long-term staff 
participation, and is argued to optimize the scheme's efficiency. The scheme that is 
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described here also attempted to incorporate standardization issues that are posed by 
schemes implemented on a grander, e.g. national, scale. The experiences with this 
standardization approach will be discussed. This chapter thus presents a matrix of 
issues that still need to be addressed in any safety-critical domain that employs 
critical incident reporting schemes as part of ongoing safety management. 
INCIDENT REPORTING 
In the UK, a Department of Health report (2000) revealed that as many as 850,000 
adverse incidents are happening in UK hospitals each year. This, in tenns of litigation 
and the extra care needed by victims, added up to a £2bn bill. (BBC News, 200 I). 
There is an urgent need to make patient safety one of the highest priorities. The BBC 
also cites fears that the medical community is "complacent" about the toll of 
accidents, and notes that to date the National Health Service "did not even collect 
figures on the number of medical accidents". 
Until recently, evidence of medical incidents (or near-misses) was mostly anecdotal. 
In the case their existence was acknowledged, the data typically did not leave a 
hospital's boundaries. This lack of distribution of incident data can lead to the 
replication of similar, preventable incidents across hospitals. This not only concerns, 
e.g. faulty or badly designed equipment which might lead to deadly consequences, it 
also concerns badly designed work procedures that might be in place in hospitals 
across the country, the safety threat of which might only be recognized locally and 
SPOradically. Similarly, it concerns drugs that might have similar sounding names, but 
that have very different effects on a patient's condition. In order to prevent incidents 
needlessly repeating themselves, incident data must be recorded, analyzed, and then 
made available for distribution. In industries such as process control for chemical 
plants and power stations, incident reporting schemes have often been used as 'early 
warning schemes'. This has yet to translate fully to the medical domain. 
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Obstacles to the implementation of safety measures in medicine as established in 
aviation also lie in the differences between the two work domains. Accidents in 
aviation are comparatively infrequent but very visible, receiving high media attention, 
and often involve massive loss of life (Helmreich, 2000). In contrast, accidents in 
medicine typically only involve not more than one patient (or member of staff), with 
less or no media coverage, with news about adverse events often not leaving a 
hospital's boundaries. 
Also, the type of standardized, unified safety management measures implemented in 
aviation often cannot translate to the less standardized, less regulated, and thus less 
clear-cut work environment that medicine presents. Doctors and clinical staff often 
learn 'on the job' to a large extent, in contrast to aviation or nuclear power plant 
operation (a domain that also has a long-term history of use of safety management 
measures such as incident reporting). Medicine, described recently again as a 
"humbling art and a complex team activity" (Berger, 2001), deals with humans, 
whose conditions and responses are typically less predictable than an aircrafts' 
(Helmreich, 2000). 
Errors may be particularly difficult to recognize in health care because variations in 
an individual's response to treatment is expected. In addition, medical professionals 
may not recognize that a particular product or procedure may have contributed to or 
caused the problem because the patient is already ill, the product is not expected to 
work perfectly at all times, or the event appears unrelated to the product or procedure 
(QuIC, 2000). 
Studies suggest, for instance, that uncertainty about the most effective diagnostic and 
therapeutic approaches is pervasive (Macias-Chapula, 1997). One area in medicine 
that resembles more closely the more proceduralized and well-defined and thus more 
predictable task space of aviation is often cited to be anaesthesia. Correspondingly, 
safety measures such as in-depth error analysis (e.g. Gaba et aI., 1987) and incident 
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reporting (e.g. Runciman et aI., 1993) have been applied to anaesthesia prior to a 
more wide-spread adoption in other areas in medicine. The work of Runciman and his 
colleagues forms the basis of the incident analysis method described in this chapter as 
applied to neonatal intensive care. 
The tendency to lay blame on staff involved in the incident rather than e.g. error-
prone equipment design (Busse and Johnson, 1999) further prohibits the use of 
incident reporting as a constructive safety measure in medicine. Thus, incidents might 
not necessarily be perceived by staff to be 'accidents waiting to happen' (Reason, 
1990). Incidents might be seen as mere task characteristics, with mistakes seen as 
human fallibility, and with incident detection and recovery taken for granted. Incident 
reporters might also not be aware of 'upstream precursors' to the incident, such as 
underlying system faults ('upstream' since in systemic incident analysis, mUltiple 
layers of incident causation are assumed, with systems factors being the lowest layer). 
Staff might not acknowledge the significance of local workplace factors. For instance, 
if staff have been accustomed to working with substandard equipment, they may not 
report this as a contributing factor since they see it as the 'normal' work context; if 
they habitually perform a task that should have been supervised but was not, they 
may not recognize the lack of supervision as a problem (Reason, 1997). This 
tendency, and the associated 'work-around' culture in medicine, emphasizes the need 
for explicit scrutiny of potential upstream precursors (i.e. system factors) in incident 
reporting and analysis. 
System factors might be organizational in nature, such as the notorious under-staffing 
in healthcare, with its associated stress on hospital staff, and the known increase in 
error-prone behaviour of individuals under stress. There might also be a lack of end-
user consideration when choosing and procuring equipment, and also, for instance, 
neglect of training requirements on part of the organization purchasing the equipment 
(Jeffcott and Johnson, 200]). Accidents can often be traced back to equipment design 
that induces 'human error'. It is rarely the case that accidents are caused by one single 
156 
point of failure, and failure histories can usually be traced back through several layers 
of causation. While it is important for hospitals to prioritize error-tolerant and usable 
design and functionality in equipment procurement, there is often no empirical or 
analytical data available evaluating the system at hand in those terms. Thus, given 
difficult to use equipment design that seems obvious on scrutiny, accidents often 
seem preventable in retrospect. This seems particularly unforgivable in safety-critical 
work environments such as surgery or intensive care units. 
Introducing incident reporting into hospital wards is the first step towards recording 
information on incidents' nature and frequency. Summary data can then be used for 
trend analysis to identify systematic sources of error, and to prompt more in-depth 
analysis of potential causes. However, in order to base valid and relevant conclusions 
on this frequency counts, the classification of incidents clearly needs to be 
meaningful. 
For instance, in current incident studies, most of the incidents' precursors are 
perceived to be 'human error' (e.g. Runciman et aI., 1993). There are doubts, 
however, how meaningful this category, and its implications, reaJly are. Often, the 
fact that an incident does not fit a category such as 'equipment failure' alone is seen 
as justifying labelling the incident as 'human error' (see also e.g. Rasmussen et aI., 
1981). Such categorization might provide an initial filtering of immediately 
attributable equipment faults, but does not tell us much about how to prevent future 
instances of such 'human error'. 
Furthermore, as soon as poor equipment design is considered as an instance of 
equipment failure, there is no telling as to what constitutes error-inducing design 
(such as similarly named drug containers) and what constitutes human error 
(mistaking the drug containers). Thus, the artificial distinction between equipment 
failure and human error (more meaningfully described by Rasmussen as 'Human-
Machine Mismatch') is cemented and perpetuated by such a classification. 
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Critical Incident Reporting Form 
The incident 
Description of what happened: 
(please also answer the questions overleaf in case of Drug Error) 
\\'hat factor contributed (0 the incident? 
What factors minimi ed the incident? 
The Circumstances 
Date: 
What procedure was being carried out? 
What monitoring was being used? 
Did the equipment alarm? 
Time: 
If equipment failure give detail of equipment: 
Personnel 
Place: 
Grade of relevant responsible staff: Grade of staff discovering the incident: 
Were you involved in the incident? 
Outcome 
What happened to the patient? 
What is the severity of potential outcome for the patient? 
Prevention 
How might such incidents be avoided in the future? 
Figure 6-1 - NlCU Incident Reporting Form (I) 
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Kind of Drug Error 
Was it a Drug Pre cription Error or a Drug Administration Error or other (please explain)? 
Details of Drug Error 
Was it the wrong drug or the wrong dose or the wrong baby or other (please explain)? 
Please give details: 
Critical Incident Study 
This is a study that looks at how and why people make mistakes. Information is collected from inciden1 
reporting form (ee 0 erlea1) and \\ ill be analy ed. The results of the analysis and the les ons leam1 
from the reported incident \\ ill be presen1ed to staff in due course. The reporting forms are anonymou . 
there is no interest in criticism or blame. We would encourage everyone working in the NICU. at 
whatever level of experience. to take part. Every incident reported, no matter how trivial. will give 
information about the wa) people ",or\.. and rna) help to save a life. 
When you have completed the form please place it in the Incident Form Box. 
Definition of a "Critical Incident" 
A critical inciden1 is an occurrence that might have led (or did lead) - if not discovered in time - to an 
undesirable outcome. Complications that occur despite nomlal management are n01 critical incidents. 
But ifin doubt, fill in a form. 
Thank you for your panicipation! 
--Please contact Dr B Holland (QM IC ) or Daniela Busse (3398855 x0917) with any querics--
Figure 6-2 - NICU Incident Reporting Fonn (IT) 
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This clearly poses a very real problem for the validity of incident data and its 
analysis. However, this subjectivity in the incident classification process, and the 
resulting spurious precision of trend analyses based on the data, is not sufficiently 
recognized as would seem necessary for any wider distribution of incident data 
beyond the local setting. 
As we know, an example of notable attempts at creating grounded and relevant 
categorizations schemes is reported in Runciman et al. (1993) who studied 
anaesthesia incidents in Australian hospitals as part of the Australian Incident 
Monitoring Study (AIMS). This study was subsequently extended to also investigate 
intensive care unit (ICU) incidents. The AIMS categorization scheme presents an 
integrated summary of previous categorization schemes, and has had substantial 
impact on future ones. For the study reported in this chapter, the AIMS-leU 
categorization scheme was utilized to analyze incident data that had been collected in 
a neonatal intensive care unit. In the following sections, the outcome of this process is 
reported 
THE NICU INCIDENT REPORTING SCHEME 
In the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) in which the study took place, current 
safety management included informal checks, communication and consultation with 
fellow members of staff. morbidity and mortality meetings, and an adverse events 
reporting scheme, which addresses incidents that in fact resulted in harm to the 
patient or to staff and that legally require investigation. Near-miss adverse events that 
do not require legal investigation, but that could also lead to harm to the patient or 
staff, were dealt with on a local and immediate basis. They were not documented or 
kept track of, and distribution of known sources of error in the system was at best 
infrequent. There was demand to complement the existing safety management 
measures with a critical incident reporting scheme. 
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Critical Incident Definition 
A 'critical incident' was here defined as follows: "A critical incident is an occurrence 
that might have led (or did lead) - if not discovered in time - to an undesirable 
outcome. Complications that occur despite normal management are not critical 
incidents." Staff that participated in the study were also asked to fill in an incident 
reporting form "if in doubt". This reflected the intention to collect rich, qualitative 
data, rather than data that would be fit for exact statistical analysis. 
SetUp 
A 'critical incident' thus includes near-misses as well as actual adverse events. 
Reporting schemes involve staff reporting critical incidents using the provided 
reporting forms on a voluntary and anonymous basis. The incident reports are 
regularly analyzed and categorized. The main aim of the analysis is to identify factors 
contributing to the causation of incidents that may be rectified. Accordingly, similar 
incidents are hoped to be avoided in future. 
Vander Schaaf (Vander Schaaf et aI., 1991) suggested a model of incident data 
collection and analysis which was considered for the NlCU scheme's 
implementation. Vander Schaaf (op. cit.) provided a convenient summary of the 
steps that need to be present in a successful evenfo analysis system, as summarized in 
Figure 6-3. They represent the inputs to the system (1-3), the way these are processed 
(4-6) and the output and monitoring which allows the recommendations (7). 
20 Hale et al. (1997) define an event to be a deviation in an activity or technology 
which leads towards unwanted, negative consequences. 
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1. Detection (recognition and reporting) 
2. Selection of events for deeper analysis 
3. Detailed description and deeper study 
....... _________ ......:;. ____ ---J .----~ Review of design of ERAS 
1 
4. Classification of organisational causes 
5. Computation (where necessary) to 
recognise patterns or priorities 
6. Interpretation, leading to recommendations 
7. Implementations and monitoring 
Figure 6-3 - The Seven Modules of an ERAS - Event Reporting and Analysis System 
(Van der Schaaf et aI., 1991) 
In the NICU scheme, however, it was proposed to use the AIMS causal classification 
taxonomy on every incident that was detected and reported. Only subsequent meta-
analysis of the classified incidents, and any specific observations that were noted 
during this first classification system would then lead to further in-depth analysis of 
the incident. This way it was to be evaluated whether the benefits of both approaches 
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- the quick and efficient surface categorisation approach to classity all data and to 
prepare the data for meta-analysis, as well as the in-depth cognitive error analysis 
applied to individual incidents - could be captured in one methodology. Therefore, 
the scheme's set up was suggested as illustrated in Figure 6-4 below. 
]. Detection (recognition and reporting) 
2. Surface Classification (using AIMS 
3. Identification of urgent safety measures 
4. Meta-analysis for patterns and trends 
Review of design of ERAS 
5. Selection of incidents for deeper analysis 
6. Interpretation, leading to recommendations 
7. Implementation, evaluation and 
monitoring of safety recommendations 
Figure 6-4 - NICU incident analysis process 
This approach aims at maximising the benefit from a short-hand surface classification 
system such as the one used by the AIMS project (as described earlier), as well from 
a further in-depth analysis that reaches beyond surface classification and infonns 
interpretation and safety recommendations. 
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This is the approach taken in the here described case study of incident reporting in 
Neonatal Intensive Care. The aim was to validate the suggested incident reporting 
model, including the cognitive error analysis approach. The implementation and 
evaluation of the approach is described in the remainder of this chapter (with respect 
to previously identified weaknesses in incident reporting), as is the in-depth analysis 
of sample incidents that occurred in the time of the study, using the cognitive error 
analysis approach. 
The Incident Reporting Form 
The incident form was developed iteratively, and evaluated by means of a 
questionnaire survey of the unit staff (Busse, 2000). The current form covers the 
following questions: the first section asked for a "description of what happened"; 
'Drug Confusion Error' is treated as a category distinct from other types of critical 
incident on the form, due to its known frequency (Bogner, 1994). This separate 
treatment allowed for more specific data to be gathered on drug errors. Other 
questions related to what factors contributed to the incident, and which factors 
minimized it. The next section covers details on the circumstances: which procedure 
was being carried out, which monitoring was being used, and which equipment failed 
(if any). A question on the presence of alarms was added to the form, since it was felt 
that incidents discovered through alarm sounding fell in a sufficiently distinct 
category of incident circumstances. This was then validated by the data that was 
collected. One section of questions touched on the personnel that were involved in the 
incident and its detection. The data was collected on an anonymous basis, so the 
reporting staff was not asked to provide contact details. However, experience levels 
and job titles were covered in the personnel section. Another section noted the 
estimated and actual outcome of the incident to the patient (or in terms of other costs). 
The final section provided an open-ended question regarding suggestions for 
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improvements by the reporting staff - future prevention of similar incident being the 
primary goal of the incident reporting scheme. 
3.4. Incident Analysis using AIMS 
The AIMS-ICU analysis scheme was used. AIMS used a reporting form that 
consisted primarily of given categories which were to be ticked off by the reporting 
staff (see Figure 6-5). This way of recording staff reports could potentially lead to 
decreased analysis time (since the reporters essentially did the categorization 
themselves). It could also be argued that this decreased the degree of indirection in 
the analysis process - categorization based on subjective second-hand interpretation 
of gathered data could be replaced by the reporter's own interpretation of the actual 
events. In the NICU study, the form that was used was specifically developed to 
address the local needs. However, the collected data was subsequently analyzed by 
assigning it to categories as listed in the AIMS. The breakdown of the results is 
shown in the following section. 
RESULTS 
As can be seen in Figure 6-5, 14 causes of incidents were classified as system factors, 
whereas only ) ) where classified has human factors. This is in contrast to findings in 
comparable studies, where up to 80% of causal factors were classified as human 
error. The most commonly attributed subgroup of causal factors was 'equipment' 
with 7 occurrences, followed by 'physical environment/infrastructure' (4) and 
'knowledge-based errors' (4). Furthermore, the categories 'rule-based errors', 'skill-
based errors', 'technical errors'. and 'work practices' were also all represented in the 
results. An causa) factors could be categorized, and 'other system factors' and 'other 
human factors' were not assigned in this study. 
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SYSTEM-BASED FACTORS 
Physical environment I infrastructure 
Lack of space I room 
Lack offacility 
Excessive noise 
# 
High unit activity level. ............................... ' .. 4 
Staff mealtime 
Handover I ward round 
Lack of support staff 
Equipment (including monitors) 
Unavailable equipment 
Inadequate equipment 
Poor design. ................. ...... ............ ......... 4 
Poor maintenance 
Equipment failure ..................................... ·· 3 
Inadequate inservice 
Work Practices I Policies I Protocols 
Communication problem ............... ···.··········· 
Inadequate assistance 
Lack of supervision 
Inadequate training 
Inadequate protocol 
InSUfficient staff ................................ ' ...... . 
Unable to contact staff 
Inapprop. staff I patient allocation .................. · 
HUMAN FACTORS 
Knowledge-based error # 
Lack or faulty knowledge .......... , .................... . 
Error of: 
Judgement .............................................. 1 
Problem recognition I anticipation 
Diagnosis 
Treatment decision 
Use of investigation procedures 
Timing of investigation procedures 
Omitting intended treatment ............... " .......... . 
Incorrect charting ........................................ . 
Incorrect prescription 
Incorrect interpretation of information 
Information not sought 
Information not available 
Rule-based error 
Patient assessment inadequate 
Patient preparation inadequate 
Failure to check equipment 
Misuse of equipment 
Unfamiliar equipment 
Unfamiliar environment 
Unfamiliar patient 
Failure to follow protocol................................ 2 
Labelling error 
Calculation error 
Skill-based error 
Distraction I inattention ................................. . 
Fatigue 
Haste 
Stress ...................................................... . 
Technical error 
Fault of technique 
Inexperience .............................................. . 
Uncooperative patient. .................................. . 
Difficult patient body habitus .......................... . 
Patient physiological factors 
Figure 6-5 - Incident Categorization and Analysis with the AIMS Classification 
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System Factors Human Factors 
Figure 6-6 - Distribution of stem vs. Human Factors contributing to NICU 
incidents 
However, it wa found that for most incidents, multiple categorizations were 
necessary. There were mostl several cau al factors per incident, for instance the 
categorizations listed abo e show at least two categorizations of causal factors per 
incident. The combination of factors proved to provide a more meaningful picture of 
the incident's cau ation and it potential future prevention, than single 
categorizations. This confirms previous findings (Busse and Wright, 2000). The mo t 
striking finding in this tud was arguably the difficulty of arriving at a meaningful 
classification of incidents. The nature of a meaningful classification has not yet been 
sufficiently discus ed, let alone been operationa lized, in the current discourse on 
incident reporting. Earl work in the process control domain has covered substantial 
ground in delineating a meaningful analysis of Human Error (Rasmussen, 1982), but 
such work has still be addre sed in incident categorization and analysis. The 
suggested cognitive error analysis approach aims at presenting a step in this direction. 
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COGNITIVE ERROR ANALYSIS IN THE NICU SCHEME 
In this section, some sample NICU incidents are introduced that had been collected 
by the incident reporting scheme, and the analysis process is demonstrated by 
juxtaposing the in-depth cognitive error modelling approach with the AIMS 
classification that was arrived at by a collaboration of the 'human error expert', the 
clinical consultant, and one representative nurse. By doing this, the benefit of the 
cognitive error analysis approach is further illustrated. The remainder of this chapter 
then reports on the evaluation of the incident reporting scheme with a questionnaire 
survey of implicated hospital staff. 
Analysis Case 1: 
Incident Number 2 that was recorded in the incident reporting scheme concerned a 
drug error. The record entries read (in sum): "drug error due to heavy workload, 
negative consequences minimized by vigilance of staff". Measure for "Future 
Avoidance" that were suggested were "Vigilance of Staff" and "Lighter Workload". 
The AIMS categorization of this incident comprised the following causal factors: 
• High unit activity level 
• Omitting intended treatment 
• Distraction/inattention 
• Stress 
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Clearly, the information given in the incident reporting form is not very informative 
as to the "causal context" in which this incident occurred. And clearly, the AIMS 
classification, although being able to reflect all the core points that were raised by the 
incident report, does not aid a meaningful understanding of the incident's causation or 
potentially effective safety recommendations, nor does it promise any meaningful 
(quantitative) meta-analysis of a set of incidents that might share the causal factors as 
listed by the AIMS classification. Interestingly, all but one of the causal factors that 
were "identified" from the incident record using AIMS were 'human factors', and as 
such impacted the distribution of 'human factors' versus 'system factors' (Figure 6-6 
above). 
As a response, and also in the knowledge of the magnitude of drug error occurrences 
reported elsewhere (Webster et aI., 2001), the incident reporting form was thus 
changed to enable future elicitation of decisive situational factors that led to "drug 
error" (see Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2 above, illustrating the revised fonn). 
There is a fundamental contradiction in the classification of the causal and the 
minimizing factors in incidents such as these. On the one hand, stress and distraction 
are assumed to have Jed to crucial staff oversights with respect to their drug 
administration task. On the other hand, however, staff Vigilance, and thus alertness 
(which can be understood as an opposite of distraction), have prevented this incident 
from becoming a full-blown adverse event. Both 'stress' and the state of 'vigilance' 
refer to psychological states. It is assumed that "high workload" led to nurses to go 
into one mental state (i.e. 'stress', with the underlying assumption that stress 'causes' 
oversight), but with the same high workload present, the opposite mental state 
(vigilance) was possible, too. Thus, the classification system is insufficient, since its 
categories do not provide differentiation power to discriminate between two instances 
of two different classes. Neither does the classification system shed any light on the 
"causes" of the incident that might be addressed and remedied by safety 
recommendations. By implication, it does not support bridging the gap between 
169 
analytical classification of incidents and the generation of safety recommendations to 
address these. 
This incident classification thus raises questions as to exactly which external or 
internal factors influenced the nurses' mental state in such a way that it led to a drug 
error (given that unit activity level is high by norm, not by exception), and also as to 
exactly which aspects of the nurses' task performance were impacted by these mental 
states and why? 
Were the nurses overloaded with alarms, for instance? (A common problem in 
intensive care (Stanton, 1994». Or was their mental capacity to pay attention to their 
drug administration maybe taken up by higher-level decision-making that was 
necessitated by the task context? Were there any assumptions or expectations present 
that conflicted with how the situation actually unfolded, and thus slowed down the 
comprehension or mental processing of further relevant data? What was the state of 
the nurses' existing knowledge and expectations, and what 'processing input' did 
these have to compete with? Since these questions concern the psychological 
underpinnings of this incident's causation, it will be necessary to enlist a cognitive 
vocabulary for its further investigation, and the use of a cognitive error framework 
suggests itself. 
Thus, these questions illustrate the kind of information that would shed further light 
on the underlying cognitive causes of nurses' "high workload"-related oversight on 
the one hand, and to their vigilance and prevention behaviour on the other. ICS can 
support the formulation of these questions, since, using the cognitive error analysis 
approach, the actual cause of events is scrutinized within a cognitive framework. 
Figure 6-7 below shows which aspects of the ICS model would be implicated in 
investigating this incident further, relating to the questions posed previously. 
Thus, employing a cognitive architecture such as ICS to further investigate incidents 
such as Case 1 will help scrutinizing the psychological, cognitive, underpinnings of 
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the incident's causation. It will certainly highlight the insufficiencies of categorical 
labels such as the 'human error' classification suggested elsewhere with respect to 
providing a stepping stone to an understanding of the incident that goes beyond 
surface classification. 
Case 1 presents a crucial example for the weakness of existing analysis approaches of 
drug administration approaches. Although their incidence is well-known (Webster et 
aI., 2001), it was observed that "there seems to be no definite strategy for the 
elimination of drug error'" (Merry and Peck, 1995) although it was also observed that 
"error is inherent in drug administration in anaesthesia, as it is in any complex human 
endeavour". 
The New Zealand Green Lane Hospital (Auckland) instead found their own way of 
tackling the Ubiquitous drug administration error by adapting the work environment 
(rather than human fallibility) to the task (Merry et aI., 2001). They noted that 
"conventional methods of injectable drug administration makes little use of 
technology to support manual checking and are idiosyncratic and relatively error-
prone" (op. cit.). They further noted, in line with my previous reasoning, that "most 
anaesthetists, if not all, make drug administration errors at some stage during their 
career (Apostolakis, 199]) no amount of good intent or harsh deterrence will stop 
them" (Merry and Webster, 1996). They therefore proceeded to develop a drug 
administration system to combat the potential for human error that has now been 
successfully used for over 2 years, and that is in daily use in Green Lane hospital. The 
core components of this system were the aspects that tackled the system's support for 
the anaesthetists' cognitive capacities during drug administration. 
Analysis Case 2: 
In another incident that wasn't considered strictly technical failure, an intravenous 
infusion into a neonate's hand became interstitial (dislodged). Contact of the 
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intravenous injection fluid with the baby's skin might have resulted in tissue burns, 
but was discovered in time, and thus dle damage was contained and limited to a 
swollen arm. 
Existing Knowledge and 
Expectalions 
II igher Level Processing 
irem en ts 
--, 
----------------
IImplicationallmage 
o IC=::======:J; 
l C:==:=====:::;l 
Object Image Record 
ArtieulalOI)' lmasc Record 
Body-Sensory Image 
Record 
Limb Image Record 
Fiaure 6-7 - ICS ouidance on incident investi2:ation e I:> ~ 
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The incident report listed as "contributing factors" only that "each nurse had 2 Ie 
babies in her care". There were no minimizing factors listed. Suggestion for future 
avoidance was to have resources available to achieve a "one nurse: one patient" ratio. 
AIMS classifications arrived at in the analysis team were "High unit activity level"; 
"Insufficient staff"; "Inappropriate staff/patient allocation"; "Distraction/inattention"; 
and finally, "stress". 
Once more, it can be seen that the AIMS classifications of this incident are not 
conducive to either further understanding of the incident's causation, nor to the 
identification (or even evaluation) of constructive safety recommendations. 
Meaningful quantitative analysis based on such classifications also seems hard to 
attain. 
However, when the "human error expert" on the investigation team further probed the 
clinical and nursing staff as to possible causes and contexts of this incident, a 
different, more meaningful picture emerged. After lengthy discussion on the nuinber 
of checks nursing staff are obliged to run on each patient, and the inherent high risk 
of missing one, and the importance of "vigilance" for staff to detect and prevent 
potential adverse events, questioning slowly led the investigation team to consider the 
technological component in this incident. It was noted that the intravenous infusion 
pump is built to react to pressure and would start sounding an alarm if the pressure 
limit is reached (which would be the case if the infusion became dislodged out of the 
vein onto the tissue). Thus to investigate this incident is was important to know 
whether an alarm had sounded or not, since if the pressure limit had been reached, 
and the pump properly set, but no alarm sounded, a technical failure could have been 
identified. 
In reaction to this, and to the general literature on the importance of alarms in safety-
critical environments (Stanton, 1994), a specific question regarding the presence of 
alarms was included in the incident reporting form (see earlier this chapter). 
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In the case that there was no technological failure implicated in this incident, a further 
causal option should be investigated: was the pump's pressure limit set appropriately? 
Was the limit set at all (or left at a previous setting)? Was the alarm switched off? 
Was the alarm sounding, but could not be heard? Was the agility state of the baby 
misjudged, which, when too agile, often precipitates these kinds of incidents? 
Again, these questions probe further into the context of the incident's causation, and 
its interaction with the key players' mental state, knowledge, assumptions, and 
available processing capacities, i.e. in short, their cognitive processes. Thus, a 
cognitive framework is called for in order to further elucidate the events, internal or 
external, that led to this incident. 
One further benefit of the suggested cognitive error analysis approach that is 
underlined by this incident case study is the importance and the nature of the 
questions that are brought up by the "human error expert" and that guide the 
discussion in the investigative team. Furthermore, rather than in lengthy verbal 
protocol transcripts, these discussion items could be documented in an appropriate 
modelling framework for future reference. The benefit of e.g. timelines and other 
diagrammatic modelling frameworks (such as fault trees, see the previous chapter) in 
elucidating accident causation (Johnson, 1998) or complex work processes (De 
Keyser and Nyssen, 1997) has been well demonstrated. A diagrammatic modelling 
framework that is based and grounded in cognitive theory, and which can also show 
and model an individual's cognitive processes in interaction with their environment, 
will thus support the elicitation, capture, and documentation of the reasoning 
underlying the identification of the cognitive precursors of incidents. Figure 6-8 
demonstrates this by means of the above described incident case 2. 
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Articulatory Image Record 
Limb Image Record 
Figure 6-8 - Interstitial Intravenous lnfusion 
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The figure illustrates the interplay of auditory input, higher-level mental processing, 
and data flow in the human cognitive system. The model can be used to play through 
"what if' scenarios. for instance concerning the nursing staff's assumptions on pump 
pressure limit settings, and how this would be affected by the presence of alarms. 
This can then be structured and captured in the model, and the reasoning process in 
the investigation can be documented. Furthermore, safety recommendations that arise 
from such modelling are unlikely to focus on staff vigilance as the remedy to such 
incidents. They are more likely to scrutinize the appropriateness of the technology 
and work context for the capacities, boundaries, and idiosyncrasies of the human 
cognitive processing system, including their dealing with alarms in an overly noisy 
and alarm-saturated environment, or with the detailed technical implementation of the 
pump pressure limit setting in terms of providing a user-friendly, safety-oriented 
system design. 
FORM VALIDATION 
As part of the effort to take the local context of the incident reporting scheme into 
account, a questionnaire survey was carried out as an investigation of staff perception 
of the Critical Incident Reporting scheme as part of existing safety management at the 
unit. The study should also present an opportunity for staff to suggest improvements 
of the incident reporting scheme itself, as well as unit safety management in general. 
22 questionnaires were administered to two II person day shifts on the ward. 2 I were 
returned and 19 were included in the analysis. The two outliers that were excluded 
from the analysis were responses from temporary staff. Both medical and nursing 
staff contributed to the study. 
Out of a total of 19 responses, 13 indicated awareness of the scheme, 4 said they had 
participated, and 11 could define "Critical Incident" (see Figure 6-9). Several 
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valuable suggestions (see Table 6-1) on fonn and scheme improvement were given by 
the study participants. Most survey participants responded positively to the overall 
impact of the scheme as part of safety management at the unit. Most participants 
stressed the crucial importance of feedback of incident data and analysis results back 
to unit staff. Raised awareness of existing error potential can be inferred from the 
'shock reaction' that was reported on seeing the (anonymized) incident data and 
analysis results. Understandably, this led to frequent calls for urgent safety 
intervention on the part of the survey respondents. 
Survey Question Staff Suggestions 
Fonn improvement Include question on staff baby ratio 
Include question on workload levels 
Effectiveness of the scheme Good for Awareness (N=4) 
Need Action (N=3) 
Need Feedback (N=2) 
Safety management improvement Need Extra Staff (N=6) 
Need Review (N=5) 
Need Action (N=3) 
Need Training (N=2) 
Table 6-1- Summary of Staff Suggestions for Form Improvement 
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The level of ' afety cu lture"' at the unit seems encouraging with 2/3 of staff aware of 
the scheme and of the nature of critical incidents. Temporary staff, however, are still 
largely unaware. The scheme's intended implications for safety management needs 
better publication. Further mea ures are needed to feed analysis and action resu lts 
back to the staff. Reassurance of staff is needed to let them know that the identified 
safety deficiencies are urgently and thoroughly addressed through safety interventions 
where possible. 
15 +---------------------------------------~ 
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Awareness Participation CI Definition 
Figure 6-9 - Staff Awarene , Participation, and Abi lity to define 'Critical Incident' 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The NICU incident reporting scheme succeeded in achieving staff engagement and 
participatory design of the reporting fonn. Most importantly, it impacted the overall 
safety culture in the unit, by raising awareness of clinical incidents, and raising the 
belief that the occurrence of 'mistakes' can be dealt with in a constructive way by 
higher level management (rather than following a 'punitive perfection model' (Leape, 
1994)). Equipment failures could be followed up by either contacting the 
manufacturer directly, or also, for instance, by being able to refer to the incidents as 
evidence of insufficient design of specific devices. This data provides the basis to 
pass on valuable lessons to other NICUs that e.g. use similar devices. 
The UK Department of Health (2000) stated as their main conclusion to the Chief 
Medical Officer's report: "We believe that, if the NHS is successfully to modernize 
its approach to learning from failure, there are four key areas that must be addressed. 
In summary, the NHS needs to develop: 
• unified mechanisms for reporting and analysis when things go wrong; 
• a more open culture, in which errors or service failures can be reported and 
discussed; 
• mechanisms for ensuring that, where lessons are identified, the necessary 
changes are put into practice; 
• a much wider appreciation of the value of the system approach m 
preventing, analyzing and learning from errors." 
Additional to this, however, it needs to be stressed that the incorporation of the 
specific local conditions and requirements are necessary for the successful 
maintenance of an incident reporting scheme. Furthennore, if a unified mechanism 
for analysis is determined, it needs to take into account that the classification scheme 
should not only aid 'causal factor counting', but also their meaningful analysis. This 
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thesis proposes a cognitive error modelling approach that supports the meaningful 
analysis of incidents and their classification. This chapter worked through real-life 
examples applying this cognitive incident analysis approach. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
THESIS CONTRIBUTION 
It has been established that human involvement often plays a major role in the 
occurrence of accidents in safety critical systems such as in aviation, or medicine. 
Accident reports often resort to naming human error ("pilot error", "operator error") 
as 'the reason' why the accident happened. 
However, identifying human involvement in the accident's causation does not 
necessarily mean that 'human error' is the cause, and the only cause, of that accident. 
Human action (or inaction) never takes place in a vacuum, and is always stimulated 
by either the external context or an internal motivation (such as a set of expectations. 
or a mental goal). Therefore, the identification of human involvement in the events 
that led to an accident that is often misleadingly called 'human error' should be the 
starting point for further investigation, rather than provide a convenient category 
where blame, and thus the 'cause', have apparently been found. 
This thesis scrutinized the current use of error cause taxonomies that is widespread in 
safety-critical domains such as aviation, process control, and clinical safety 
management. Several weaknesses were identified that related either to the taxonomies 
themselves (even if grounded in psychological theory), or to their use, which is often 
characterized by a "common sense" approach to categorization. The link to the 
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generation and evaluation of safety recommendations was also highlighted in this 
thesis. 
This thesis proposed the use of a cognitive error analysis approach that addresses 
critical weaknesses in current taxonomical approaches. The thesis' main contribution 
to the field, next to identifying and illustrating these weaknesses of current 
taxonomical approaches, is the elaboration of the potential benefits of the proposed 
cognitive error analysis approach in addressing these. The thesis presented these 
potential benefits through worked examples covering two safety-critical domains, in 
which accident case studies were analysed retrospectively, and in which the cognitive 
error analysis approach's feasibility was validated in a "live" clinical setting, through 
the implementation of integrated safety management measures. 
It is put forward in this thesis that the proposed approach would stand a better chance 
to successfully address recurring system weaknesses than more traditional accident 
analysis approaches. Future work will also need to validate the effectiveness of the 
proposed approach in actually reducing the number of incidents and accidents (e.g. 
with a longitudinal study following up the implementation of the NICU incident 
reporting scheme), especially in direct comparison with alternative approaches. 
It is reasoned that there are two core benefits of the proposed approach as compared 
to more traditional approaches: the method, involving an expert in "the human factor" 
(most likely a trained psychologist), and giving this expert a tool that will help them 
explore the context of the accident, and specifically the interaction of the human (who 
was involved in the accident's causation) with the system that suffered the accident. 
One of the core concepts in this thesis is that an accident's causation is viewed in this 
thesis as the result of a potential mismatch between the human system component and 
the rest of the system, rather than a system failure that was brought about by "human 
error" in isolation. The method put forward in this thesis (involving the expert and the 
tool) is proposed as an approach to address this viewpoint on accident investigation. 
This thesis presented an elaborate proof of concept for this approach. 
182 
The core points that were the focus of this thesis are: 
• 
• 
Human error analysis, if grounded in a cognitive theoretical framework, 
steers away from a common sense approach to analysis, by exposing implicit 
assumptions on the factors underlying human involvement in an accident's 
causation. 
The cognitive error analysis framework provides the tools and the 
vocabulary to reason about human error. Using the cognitive framework, 
alternative hypotheses about the underlying cognitive mechanisms of human 
error can be compared and substantiated. 
• The modelling approach helps to document and communicate this reasoning 
process by explicating it in the (diagrammatical) cognitive framework 
• Safety recommendations that are based on the analysis of Human Error need 
to be evaluated as to their theoretical validity and their compatibility with 
the findings of the accident/incident investigation. The cognitive error 
analysis approach provides the tools to support both these evaluations. 
Specifically, in Chapter 4 (this thesis), an extensive table listed points of critique of 
existing error analysis approaches, and whether the proposed cognitive error analysis 
approach addresses the criticisms (table 4.1). The folJowing section will summarize 
the key contributions of the proposed cognitive error analysis approach to the 
problem of effectively categorizing and analysing 'human error' data. 
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Critique of existing error How the proposed cognitive error analysis 
analysis approaches approach addresses these criticisms 
The cognitive error analysis approach embodies 
erroneous as well as error-free behaviour and 
Analysis of human behaviour 
thought processes. Error is seen as the other side of 
only in terms of "error" (no 
the coin of an otherwise efficient thought, emotion, 
room for non-erroneous 
behaviour) 
and action apparatus (as illustrated throughout the 
thesis examples, especially in chapter 4, where non-
erroneous behaviour is explicitly modeled) .. 
Human behaviour is analyzed in its interaction with 
Analysis of 'human error' only 
external situation and events (this is shown, for 
instance, in modelling a pilot interacting with the co-
in terms of isolated behaviour 
pilot, situated in a moving plane, as done e.g. in 
chapter 3). 
Table 7-1- Benefits of the Proposed Approach (I) 
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Critique of existing error How the proposed cognitive error analysis approach 
analysis approaches addresses these criticisms 
There is a gap between Cognitive error analysis models the behavioural description 
describing human behaviour and its underlying cognition in a theoretical framework. The 
as implicated in the accident's framework can be used to reason about competing 
causal chain, to assigning a categorizations (as illustrated e.g. in chapter 4,5, and 6), This 
label to it through justification process, the rationale, is thus ~ceable and 
categorization documented. 
The framework supports diagrammatic reasoning, which has 
been shown to to aid understanding and communication of the 
Verbal description of human 
analysis results (Moran and Carroll, 1996). 
behaviour as implicated in an 
The symbolic implementation of the model (lCSpert; May et 
accident's causation. 
aI., 1993; Barnard et aI., 1988) will aid precision, flexibility, 
standardization, and predictive power (see also Burns (2000) 
for the value offormal accident modelling). 
The cognitive architecture allows 'what-if' scenarios to be 
executed, and presents a framework to reason about potential 
Human error predictions 
mental and behavioural consequences of cognitive precursors 
(this is an inherent property of modelling frameworks such as 
based on implicit assumptions 
ICS, and is illustrated in competitive modelling (ie modelling 
of competing hypotheses) throughout the thesis). 
Table 7-2 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (II) 
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Critique of existing 
How the proposed cognitive error analysis approach addresses 
error analysis 
these criticisms 
approaches 
Modelling the cognition underlying the error's categorization 
contextualizes its causal processes, and thus adds explanatory 
power grounded in a theoretical framework (as illustrated in e.g. 
Taxonomical labels the modelling of the Gatwick incident. Explanatory power here 
alone often lack refers not to supporting a layman's understanding of the causal 
explanatory power process, but an explanatory power that rises from a theoreticaJJy 
grounded, guided exploration of the incident's context and causal 
processes). 
Taxonomical labels do The cognitive error model can help to identify intervention points 
not support the for future safety measures in the causation processes. It can also be 
generation of safety used to validate (or reject) suggested safety recommendations, by 
recommendations, and grounding both (the error analysis and the simulation of safety 
might even mislead the measures' impacts) in a common theoretical framework (as 
analyst (such as in the illustrated e.g. in the TAP examples, especially in comparison with 
case of "reminder "reminder statements" as generated by the previously used 
statements") approach to error modelling in the Intensive Care Unit}. 
Taxonomic labels do The cognitive error model can be used to compare competing 
not provide any support recommendations, help predict their outcomes, and test the 
for evaluating safety compatibility of recommendations with analysis evidence and 
recommendations. results (see especially Chapter 4 for an illustration). 
Table 7-3 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (III) 
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Critique of existing error How the proposed cognitive error analysis approach 
analysis approaches addresses these criticisms 
It is possible to model interactions between several 
Error categorizations do not 
individuals in the proposed cognitive error framework, and 
also the interplay ofteam members' communication and 
sufficiently take team factors 
their knowledge and mental processes (this was not the 
into account. 
focus ofthis thesis, but a pilot-copilot communication 
scenario is included for instance in Chapter 4). 
Since the proposed cognitive error analysis approach is 
Taxonomies are finite, they 
grounded in a generic psychological theory, the range of 
cannot be exhaustive, and 
behaviour and cognition that can be described is much 
typically cover only a limited 
wider than a restricted enumerations of categories (by 
range of errors. 
definition). 
Taxonomies often list mental 
and emotional states (such as 
stress, fatigue) as causal 
The cognitive error framework can model emotions 
categories, but fail in (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993) and can thus contextualise 
contextualizing the human's 
the human actor's mental state in terms of their interactions 
mental state in terms of its 
with their environment. 
impact on cognitive processes 
or action in a situated work 
activity. 
Table 7-4 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (IV) 
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Critique of existing error analysis 
How the proposed cognitive error analysis 
approaches 
approach addresses these criticisms 
Encourages in-depth analysis of the 
Seemingly 'conclusive' labelling of contextualized cognitive precursors defining the 
instances of human behaviour, rather human involvement in the accident's causation 
than starting point for human error (the framework provides the analyst in essence 
analysis. with a 'checklist' of subsystems and subsystem 
interactions (configurations) for consideration). 
Common sense analysis, based on 
Encourages use of appropriate expertise on 
human thought, decision-making, and action 
implicit assumption on theories of 
processes (the framework's vocabulary targets 
accident causation as well as of the 
human factor experts). 
human psyche. 
The feasibility of the approach in live hospital 
settings was evaluated in this thesis, and the 
Varying levels of "Goodness of Fit" to 
approach was put to use in collaboration of the 
the accident investigation process and 
human factors experts (using ICS modelling) 
overall safety-management strategy. 
and the hospital staff (the domain experts). 
Table 7-5 - Benefits of the Proposed Approach (V) 
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As detailed in Table 7.1, the proposed cognitive error analysis approach holds 
promise to address a list of weaknesses of current error analysis approaches that are 
utilized in accident and incident investigation. This thesis contributed to identifying 
and exploring these weaknesses (such as the lack of error modelling capabilities of 
existing cognitive models, the potential inadequacy of safety recommendations when 
derived with existing analysis approaches, without guidance by human error analysis 
expertise, and the ambivalence and lack of explanatory power of taxonomic 
approaches), as well as illustrating how a cognitive modelling framework could be 
used to support the analysis of human error in a way that would address these 
weaknesses (e.g. by including error modelling capabilities, by grounding the 
generation and evaluation of safety recommendations in a holistic theoretical model, 
and by adding explanatory power by utilizing the theoretical framework as a 
constraining (and thus structure-giving) vocabulary). This problem space was 
explored, and issues were identified and refined in the process. Future work will need 
to set about conducting a rigorous validation of the suggested benefits of the approach 
(such as using measures of total increase or decrease of numbers of incidents as an 
indicator of the method's merits). 
Thus, this thesis concentrated on demonstrating the broad range of weaknesses of 
current error analysis approaches (summarized in tables 4.1 and 7.1), and the 
corresponding broad value of a systematic error anaJysis approach that is grounded in 
a theoretical framework that can account for error-free as well as erroneous human-
machine interaction (or human-human interaction). It also examined the proposed 
analysis approach in a series of exploratory case studies. In doing this, an analysis of 
the process of the cognitive error analysis approach's application there was not the 
explicit focus of this thesis. However, in the course of the theoretical and practical 
exploration of the issues involved in error analysis in accident and incident 
investigation, several interesting points regarding an analysis process emerged (such 
as the advisory role of the human error analysis expert in conjunction with the domain 
experts' analysis process, and the role of a modelling tools like ICS as an expert's 
tool that is used by the human error analyst to systematically ground their reasoning 
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process and their contextualization of the error analysis process in a cognitive 
theoretical framework). Future work will need to explore and formalize 
considerations on the process of applying the technique, including the role of the 
expert in the analysis process, and a proceduralized way ICS can be used to support 
the analysis process. 
CRITIQUE OF THE SUGGESTED COGNITIVE ERROR 
MODELLING APPROACH 
ICS, compared to other Cognitive Task Analysis methods, is a rich and expressive 
modelling approach. The cognitive primitives are well defined, and no assumptions 
regarding a certain level of performance (such as novice/expert) are made. It also 
presents the possibility to model temporal information (such as concurrency and 
sequentiaIity), the lack of which Hollnagel (1991) pointed out among typical human 
error modelling techniques. 
However, there are a number of shortcomings of the approach presented above. If the 
in-depth error modeIling approach is used (Barnard and May, 1998; Barnard et aI., (in 
press», then the specification of the cognitive processing modelled is required at a 
very low level. It requires, next to modelling time and effort, an amount of equalIy 
well-defined error data, which is typically hard to come by. However, the design of 
the incident reporting scheme could counter-act this by targeting the data elicitation 
accordingly. Also, the incident reporting scheme could be voluntarily confidential 
(rather than anonymous) and include follow-up interviews with the incident reporters 
to clarify their responses. 
Furthermore, cognitive modelling in ICS requires a degree of expertise and modelling 
craft skiH (May and Barnard, 1994), which leads to training requirements for the 
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analyst, and a background in cognitive psychology will be highly desirable. Ideally, a 
human error expert with training in relevant psychological theories will be involved 
in the investigation process, as illustrated in the case studies in this thesis. 
Even if a high degree of expertise and skill is employed in the modelling process, a 
conclusive validation of the obtained modelling results is difficult, since it is not 
based on data derived from an empirical, laboratory·based, experiment, but from 
contextual field data. Thus, inter-judge reliability of the approach is estimated to be 
low. The complexity of human behaviour and cognition outperforms the fine·tuned 
and fine-grained ICS specification (as is typically the case with low· level, predictive 
processing models (Dix, 1997». However, if the framework is utilized to model 
possible error processes and to reason about alternative hypothesis of accident 
causation, it is not the conclusive validity of each individual model that is required, 
but the explanatory power of the models in comparison. 
This presumed low inter-rater reliability is shared with the human error model 
approaches presented in Chapter 2, where more complex causal analyses are 
concerned. As is noted above, the techniques only give guidance on which error 
shaping factors are likely to apply to the identified error forms, but no specific 
guidelines. A methodology that enables the modelling product to be validated is not 
provided either. It is very much left up to the analyst's insight and experience to 
identify human error fQrms. It was argued in this thesis that complementary cognitive 
modelling, even if difficult to validate on an individual model basis, can act as a tool 
to inform the error analysis process. 
Another weakness which both cognitive as well as error modelling approaches share 
is the lack of methodology for translating the modelling product into design 
guidelines, or post-accident recommendations (e.g. Sanderson and Harwood, 1988). 
May et al (1993) attempted to embody this translation process in an expert system. 
This, however, never became fully operational. The generation of safety 
recommendation is, again, left up to the analyst's expertise. However, the cognitive 
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error modelling approach as proposed in this thesis supports the analyst by enabling 
the identification of intervention points through the explicit detailing of the error 
processes. Furthermore, the impact of safety recommendations can be evaluated 
against the original findings and analysis model in the cognitive error analysis 
approach. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Detection Factors and Safety Recommendations 
It is important to note that human involvement in incidents or near-miss accidents is 
not limited to 'human error', but humans also playa major role in detecting an 
'accident waiting to happen', and in its avoidance and recovery. This insight mirrors 
Reason's (1990) metaphor of 'human error' being only one side of the coin of a well-
functioning and efficient cognitive system. These aspects are typically neglected in 
the human error literature, and in human error taxonomies. 
Seeing human error as one side of the 'cognitive coin' also resets the focus on the 
inevitability of erroneous behaviour, especially when interacting with complex 
systems. This leads to the conclusion that not only error detection and recovery 
mechanisms need to be further investigated, but also that systems need the capability 
to 'absorb' error (Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989) and to degrade 'gracefully' in the 
case of an incident or accident. Thus, system design needs to be based on a 
sophisticated understanding of error production as we]] as human error handling 
mechanisms. Future work could scrutinize the relationship between detection factors 
and safety recommendations systematically, thus exploring one further potential 
source for the generation and validation of safety recommendation. 
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Beyond Individual Cognition 
There has been increasing research into the analysis of team errors in safety-critical 
environments. Taxonomies such as these described in this thesis usually do not focus 
on team factors that play into the causation of accidents or incidents. One team factor 
that is usually included in taxonomies is "communication" (though this category 
typically runs the risk of being used as a 'catch all' for a very generic class of error 
fonns - these might range from 'protocol' errors e.g. during shift hand-over, to 
patient records not being updated in time, to describing a 'cranky' surgeon that does 
not communicate appropriately with the anaesthetist). The generic nature of this 
category leads to decreased differentiation and explanatory power when it is used to 
classify human involvement in an accident's causation. However, recent research has 
recognized the need for a whole vocabulary that specifically describes the facets 
found in team interactions, and especially the breakdown of these interactions (Harris 
et aI., 1999; Kostopoulou and Shephard, 1999; Sasou and Reason, 1999). 
This report has focused on the cognitive aspects of an individual's involvement in 
accidents and incidents. The impact of teamwork aspects on the tasks in intensive 
care units (as well as in the cockpit - as illustrated in chapter 4) cannot be 
overemphasised, however. In ICUs, medical staff and nursing staff are continuously 
interacting in the process of carrying out their tasks (Kostopoulou and Shephard, 
1999), and especially when dealing with emergency situations. The impact of this 
team interaction on an individual's perfonnance and on 'human error' thus needs to 
be investigated further. As a prerequisite, it thus needs to be examined whether 'team 
error', pragmatically, fonns a separate entity from individuals' errors, as current error 
taxonomies suggest. Initial research in this direction has already been pursued by the 
thought leaders in this field (Sasou and Reason, 1999). More work is needed to fully 
understand the team processes in these safety-critical environments, and to 
incorporate them successfully into the analysis of incidents and accidents. 
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Towards a 'Total System' Approach 
Reason maintains that active failure is usually associated with the perfonnance of 
'front-line' operators (such as pilots, nurses). Latent failure, however, is most often 
generated by those at the 'blunt end' ofthe system (e.g. designers, high-level decis-
ion-makers, and managers) and may lie donnant for a long time. 
So far in this work we have concentrated on 'human errors' leading to active failure. 
The analysis of these is most likely to benefit from cognitive modelling techniques. 
We suggest that latent failures are best analysed in 'total system' approaches that go 
beyond an individual's cognition and also take organisational aspects into account. 
This infonnation is only implicitly embodied in cognitive models. 
Recent research has suggested that it is valuable to investigate whether knowledge of 
the regulation, organisation, and management of complex systems can be 
incorporated in the analysis process and in safety management (Jeffcott and Johnson, 
2001). The 'external' influences on human cognition and task perfonnance need to be 
clearly demarcated by the analysis method. The scope of current modelling 
techniques can be delineated, and potential extensions or integration with system-
oriented models could be investigated. This means that, ideally, there would be an 
integration of the individual error model and a model of the total system, and their 
interactions. Models of overall work systems usually do not lend themselves to 
modelling error or accidents, and to integrating models of finer grain, such as models 
of individuals' cognition. 
However, two approaches to modelling overall work systems could be identified that 
promise to be appropriate for modelling not only ideal, error-free work environments. 
One, Cognitive Work Analysis (Vicente, 1999), is based on Rasmussen's cognitive 
engineering approach, which itself holds as a premise the inevitability of occurrences 
of human-machine mismatch. 
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Another promising work modelling approach might be based on activity theory 
(Vygotsky, 1978). Activity theory is one psycho-social theory of human action that 
confronts the concept of "conflict" as one of its core concerns. This concept of 
conflict often accompanies descriptions of mismatches, errors and accidents in 
activity theoretical case studies (Nardi, 1995), and it warrants further investigation in 
as much a work model based on activity theory might add value to the process of 
analysing the human involvement in accidents and incidents. 
CONCLUSION 
The case studies detailed in this thesis have shown how human error taxonomies on 
their own, even if rooted in cognitive theory, may not sufficiently contribute to 
human error analysis in accident or incident investigation. They provide limited 
explanatory power, and they also do not provide constructive value in that they do 
little to support the generation of safety recommendations. Although error 
categorisation does provide a basis for labelling analysis results, the resulting 
quantitative categorisation data itself does not aid the understanding of the error or 
the Substantiation of safety recommendations. Labelling of instances of human 
behaviour does provide the basis for larger scale statistical analysis of error data, and 
aids the prioritization of further in-depth analysis and intervention. However, the 
categories can be misleading, and the value of the resulting statistical analysis might 
thus be doubtful. We demonstrated in this thesis how a cognitive error modelling 
approach can be used to address those weaknesses, when applied to human error 
analYSis in accident and incident investigation, across safety-critical domains. The 
cognitive error analysis approach is not a panacea, however, and ideally, analysis of 
team factors and organizational work context factors also need to be taken into 
accOUnt in accident and incident analysis. 
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Modelling Human Error within a Cognitive 
Theoretical Framework 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Current cognitive user models enable interface designers to describe, analyse and 
predict aspects of user cognition. However, none of the major cognitive user models 
such as ICS, or GOMS tackle the human error aspect of cognition explicitly. The 
represented operator performance is constrained to be error~free, expert performance. 
This report argues that human-machine system analysis as well as current error-
modeHing techniques will greatly benefit from representing a cognition~based error 
model within a cognitive architecture, such as ICS. The Netscape Internet browser 
acts as a case study throughout. The resulting approach is shown to aid the analysis of 
human error. Reasoning about potential error causes as well as the generation of 
design recommendations can thus be grounded in cognitive theory. 
1.1. Integrating Error Models and Cognitive Architectures 
Cognitive architectures seek to represent the building blocks of human cognition. 
They provide the basis for cognitive user models, which strive to represent some 
aspects of the user's understanding, knowledge, or cognitive processing. These 
models can then contribute to our understanding of the cognitive limitations of an 
operator performing a task, for example the effects of cognitive load on user 
performance (Barnard and May, 1993; Ashcraft, 1994). 
Erroneous task performance highlights precisely these limitations of human 
cognition. It is surprising, therefore, that the major cognitive user models do not 
explicitly tackle issues associated with erroneous performance based on cognition. 
They strive to represent error-free performance, assuming expert performance in 
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some perfect context (see for instance Simon, 1988; Grant and Mayes, 1991; Booth, 
1991). This idealises real-life conditions of task performance. 
User error can point to problems in human-system interaction that need to be resolved 
in order to enhance the system's usability. Human error taxonomies aid the prediction 
and detection of error classes. They can thus be exploited for error prevention and 
recovery mechanisms (Reason, 1990; Taylor, 1988). Those can then be incorporated 
into the interface design. 
On the other hand, stand-alone human error theories highlight possible sources of 
erroneous performance without providing a language in which to express these error 
tendencies when applied to human cognitive task performance. Section 4 and 5 use a 
cognitive architecture as a vehicle for expressing not only expert task performance 
but also the more realistic error-prone thought and action sequences processed by the 
human operator. By doing this, the error modelling capability implicit in the 
comprehensive ICS cognitive architecture is made the focus of inquiry into the 
underlying cognition of user performance. Such explicit modelling of erroneous per-
formance can thus help to communicate user cognition analyses, and to ground design 
decisions in a cognitive theoretical framework. 
As a running example, error modelling will be applied to tasks concerning the use of 
Netscape Navigator™. This example is appropriate because it represents a mass-
market application where errors frequently lead to high levels of frustration during 
common tasks (Johnson, C., 1997). 
1.2. Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) and GEMS 
We will use Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) (Barnard and May, 1993) to 
illustrate the modeHing of human error within a cognitive architecture. ICS provides a 
comprehensive account of human cognition. It has proved powerful in explaining 
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cognitive phenomena such as the stability of users' mental models during dual task 
interference effects (Duke, et al. 1995). It has been applied to real-life systems and 
tasks, such as cinematography (May and Barnard, 1995a). 
Alternative cognitive user models, such as Task Analysis for Knowledge based 
Descriptions (TAKD) (Johnson, P. et aI., (994), User Action Notation (UAN) 
(Hartson et aI., 1990), or Soar (Newell, 1990) might have been used. However, they 
lack the level of detail in ICS's representation of cognitive processes, or, in the case 
of Soar, the inherent constraints these have to satisl)' (WiJson et aI., 1988; Kjaer-
Hansen, 1995). ICS was designed to provide a theoretical framework within which to 
place user cognition. It attempts to "satisfy the need for applicable theory" (Barnard, 
1987). ICS, therefore, bridges the gap between theory-oriented cognitive architectures 
and task-oriented cognitive user models (Grant and Mayes, 1991; Simon, 1988). 
As noted in Section 2, Reason's taxonomy of human error (Reason, 1990) represents 
a conceptual classification of error, as opposed to a contextual or a behavioural one. 
The latter, exemplified for instance by Hollnagel's (1991) classification of error 
phenotypes, does not lend itself to the in-depth analysis of the underlying cognitive 
sources of error. For instance, a behavioural error category might include errors that 
exhibit the same surface characteristics without sharing the same cognitive basis. 
1.3. The Netscape Navigator Case Study 
According to user population estimates, the Internet is gaining roughly 150,000 new 
users per month, joining 20 million existing Internet users (Pitkow and Recker, 1994). 
Internet browsers facilitate global communication by providing supporting hypertext 
navigation. Familiarity with such browsers, and therefore their usability constitutes a 
prerequisite for taking part in this novel information exchange. Maximising this 
usability therefore represents a continuous concern for designers of successively 
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modified versions of Intemet browsers. The Netscape Interface (see Figure 1) will be 
used for illustration throughout this report. 
Prompt for URL 
Net earch Facility 
Navigation 
A User Provided 
Navigation Button 
Figure 1 - The Netscape Internet Browser 
2 A COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE AND A HUMAN 
ERROR MODEL 
This section reminds the reader Barnard's rcs model and Reason 's human error 
taxonomy introduced earlier. lCS will provide the framework in which the 
representation of erroneous operator interaction can be placed. 
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SeDsory subsystems: 
VIS visual: hue, contour etc. from the eyes 
AC acoustic: pitch, rhythm etc. from the ears 
BS body-state: proprioceptive feedback 
Effector subsystems: 
ART articulatory: subvocal rehearsal & speech 
LIM limb: motion of limbs, eyes etc. 
Structural subsystems: 
OBJ object: mental imagery, shapes etc. 
MPL morphonolexica]; words, lexical forms 
MeaDing subsystems: 
PROP propositional: semantic relationships 
IMPLIC implicational: holistic meaning 
Figure 2 - The Cognitive Subsystems 
2.1. Interactive Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) 
Cognition is represented in ICS as the flow of information between a number of 
different subsystems, and the processing performed on this data. Each of the 
subsystems has associated with it a unique mental code in which it represents the 
information it receives and processes. It will transform its data output into the 
corresponding mental code of the subsequently receiving subsystems. Each 
subsystem can receive severa] input streams and achieve a blending of these data 
streams under certain circumstances as described below (May and Barnard. 1995a). 
Each subsystem also has at its disposal a local image store. This serves as an episodic 
memory buffer of infinite size. A copy of any input the subsystem receives will 
automaticaJly be copied to the local image store, before being further processed. 
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The nine subsystems can be grouped into four categories. Figure 2 above presents an 
overview. 
2.1.1. Modelling a Netscape Task in ICS 
Figure 3 illustrates how the error-free performance of a task of locating an object (an 
up-arrow, such as shown in the visual subsystem) is modelled in ICS in terms of 
information flow between the subsystems, and thus the different resources that are 
employed. Visual information concerning the target arrives at the visual subsystem 
and is copied into the local store. It is then transformed into object code (1). The 
propositional subsystem has generated a representation of the target of the location 
task (by conferring with its local buffer) and transforms this into object code (2). This 
is sent to the object subsystem, and can there be blended with the incoming struc-
turally encoded visual information (3). The matching representation can be sent back 
to the propositional subsystem - the target has been located. 
Thus, Figure 3 i1Justrates how human mental processing underlying error-free 
performance can be represented within ICS. In the case of erroneous performance, 
however, usability designers might resort to an error classification scheme in order to 
analyse this particular instance of user behaviour. The following section will 
introduce the relevant aspects of Reason's taxonomy. We will then go on to show 
how a more detailed, cognitive analysis can be based on initial error classification, 
and thus provide a further perspective on user behaviour. 
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Acoustic Image 
Record 
M honolexical Image Record 
<structure of 
ArticullllOry 
lmage Record 
Limb Image 
Record ] 
Figure 3 - Processing associated with the task of locating an icon on 
Netscape 
2.2. Reason's Error Taxonomy 
Reason (1990) investigated the more general underlying error production mechanisms 
withjn human cognition and produced a conceptual classjfication of error types. He 
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bases his error classification skill-based slips and lapses on the one hand, and rule-
and knowledge- based mistakes on the other (see also Norman, 1981, and Rasmussen, 
1983). 
Reason furthermore asserts that instances of his three basic error types are indirect 
results of what he calls the 'underspecification' of cognitive operations. In case of an 
ambiguity of the situational requirements, the cognitive system defaults to 
contextually appropriate, high frequency responses. This idea of default assignments 
features in most other cognitive theories, such as Bartlett's (1932) theory of schemata, 
and is well backed up by empirical evidence. 
ICS provides for this cognitive principle by referring to the depository role of image 
records attached to the individual subsystems. Thus ambiguous external input is 
complemented by internal input. In this way, ICS can be used to examine Reason's 
elementary concept of cognitive underspecification. 
2.2.1. Skill-based Slips and Lapses 
Slips and lapses are error types that these manifest themselves as actions or states that 
deviate from the current intention due to execution failures (slips) and/or storage 
failures (lapses). Slips and lapses are observed at the skiU-based level of performance, 
and originate from either the omission of attentional checks (inattention) during the 
routine action sequence or making an attentional check at an inappropriate moment 
(overattention ). 
A slip caused by inattention occurs in particular when current intention is to deviate 
from common practice. For instance, entering a well-known URL of a website cons-
titutes a routine task. If the URL is changed and the user, although aware of that 
change, still happens to enter the old URL, then this is a typical example of an action 
slip. 
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A lapse might arise from what Reason calls 'Reduced Intentionality'. For instance, if 
selecting a link on the current site results in a considerable delay for this site to be 
loaded, the users might become distracted, and then experience disorientation upon 
facing the loading site. This can be seen as one of Reason's described reduced 
intentionality states, such as a 'what-am-I-doing-here' experience (see below). 
Skill based errors such as these contribute to the sources of user frustration when 
accessing the World Wide Web (as described in more detail in Johnson, C., 1997). 
These errors need to be taken into account in future design decisions. Applying 
Reason's categorisation of error helps to identifY error classes and presents a step 
towards dealing with the underlying usability problems of the system. 
However, error taxonomies such as Reason's typically confine themselves to broad 
error categories such as slips and lapses. A more detailed, lower level description of 
such classes might aid the further investigation of its instances. Thus, the design 
process might be tuned more finely to the usability needs pointed to by the user error. 
Cognitive modelling techniques such as ICS can provide a more precise vocabulary to 
augment the general descriptions of error taxon,omies. Examples of this lower level 
modelling of classes of human error are given below. 
2.2.2. Rule-based Mistakes 
Mistakes are apparent in actions that may run according to plan, but where the plan is 
inadequate to achieve its desired outcome. For any task, rules must be selected by the 
cognitive system which describes methods to reach a given (sub)goaJ. The selection 
occurs according to certain criteria. These include best match, specificity, and rule 
strength. Rule strength is defined to be the number of times a rule has performed 
successfully in the past. Occasionally, rule strength might override the other factors 
resulting in misapplications of otherwise 'good' rules to inappropriate situations 
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(what Rasmussen calls a 'procedural trap' - m "The Human as a System 
Component", 1980). 
As an example, an animated icon at the bottom of a page, near the contact 
information is quite often the mail-me icon (commonly found are self-folding 
envelopes, self-writing letters, or moving mailboxes). A corresponding rule will be 
formed and strengthened over several successful applications. In the case of a home-
page icon being animated and located at a similar position in the screen layout, this 
rule might be applied and could lead to non-intended actions such as clicking on the 
icon when intending to mail the author of the page. 
Such error classes can be predicted as increasingly adding to usability deficiencies as 
the use of animated icons accelerates in web page design (Nielsen, 1997). By being 
able to predict these errors, preventative measures can be taken and further user 
frustration (Johnson, c., 1997; Ramsay et aI., 1998) can be curbed. 
3 USING ICS TO EXPRESS REASON'S ERROR TYPES 
In this section, we will examine more closely the modelJing of errors as identified by 
Reason's taxonomy within the ICS architecture. 
Commonly occurring errors and usability problems when interacting with Internet 
browsers' interfaces gave rise to numerous design guidelines and principles21 • 
Interface design issues such as the use of counter-intuitive icons and download delays 
are all well known to aggravate usability problems (see for instance Nielsen, 1996; 
Johnson, C., 1997; Ramsay et a!., 1998). Rarely, however, are the errors resulting 
from those usability problems described in detail, or even analysed in terms of 
21 See for instance Yale C/ AIM WWW Style Manual (URL: ''http://info.med.yale.edulcaiml_ 
manuaVindex.html" current at 08.12.1997) or The Ten Commandments ofHTML 
(URL: .. http://www.visdesigns.comidesignlcommandments.htrol .. current at 08.12.1997 
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underlying psychological factors (Johnson, C., 1998). Expressing such errors within a 
cognitive model will allow us to investigate and reason about their underlying 
psychological causes. The model is thus used as a tool for reasoning about user error 
on a further, more detailed level. 
3.1. Analysis of Errors and their Underlying Cognition 
High download latency of web pages was identified as major source of frustration and 
decreased satisfaction with the downloading site and also as attenuating user 
perfonnance (Ramsay, Barabesi and Preece, 1998; Johnson, C., 1997). For instance, 
as introduced above, if selecting a link on the current site results in a considerable 
delay for this site to be loaded, the users might become distracted, and then 
experience disorientation upon facing the loading site. 
This disorientation can be classed as the effect of a phenomenon which Reason 
termed 'Reduced Intentionality'. If a delay occurs between the formulation of an 
intention to do something and the time for this activity to be executed, the intention 
needs to be periodically refreshed. Other cognitive processes such as secondary 
intentions will otherwise claim the workspace resources. This mechanism can lead to 
lapses in the form of reduced intentionality states, the above described surprise and 
disorientation. 
The cognitive processes underlying this scenario can be represented in ICS as shown 
in Figure 4. 
After processing the goal hierarchy for selecting a link, the cognitive system shifts its 
focus back onto the current page (3 and 4). If novel external (I) and the current inter-
nal input are not coherent, and thus cannot be blended (2), a decision must be made as 
to which of those to accept as valid input. The longer the delay, the stronger the influ-
ence of the novel input grows, with it eventually replacing the internal propositionally 
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influenced representation (3). The recognition of this mismatch will lead to a lapse as 
described abo e. 
Acoustic Image Record 
Visual Record : 
Image of 
requested page 
(page 2) 
MoIphonoleXlcal Image Record r ritOfPhonoleXlcallmage Recojd 
., 
LJg~----------~ 
r'----LL---~I _ ---, _______ j
Amcul.,ory Image Record 
Limb Image Record 
Figure 4 - Reduced Intentionality: A Lapse 
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By modelling the underlying mechanisms of manifestations of attenuated 
performance, such as user error, and the causes of decreased satisfaction within IeS 
we can shed some light on the processes fundamental to the production of the user 
error as mediated by the described usability problems. 
Reasoning about Alternative Analyses of Error Causes 
Misinterpreting user interface icons is a common source for user error in interactive 
systems (Norman, 1988, 1993). However, the mistake might be grounded in varying 
cognitive processes, and not stem from one kind of cognitive mechanism alone. 
TypicalJy, user interface design manuals and textbooks stress the importance of 
intuitiveness of the icons chosen (Preece, 1994) and thus identify 'counter-
intuitiveness' as a source of faulty identification of icons. However, further insight 
into the source of such user error can be obtained by investigating it in greater detail. 
As will be shown below, mistaking for instance a mail-me button with a homepage 
icon can be modelled in respect to two differing underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
Unless these two different causes are considered these designs might misdiagnose an 
important problem in user utilisation of icons. Using a cognitive architecture to 
reason about the potential underlying cognitive error production processes allows 
designers to investigate the detected usability problem in a systematic way. 
The above described user error could according to Reason's scheme be classified as a 
slip termed 'Perceptual Confusion'. In perceptual confusion, something that looks 
like the proper object, is in the expected location, or does a similar job is accepted as 
a match for the proper object. These slips could arise because, in a routine set of 
actions, it is unnecessary to invest the same amount of attention in the matching 
process. Thus acceptance criteria concerning the expected input might degrade, and 
result in rough and ready matches. 
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The processing carried out can be modelled in ICS as shown in Figure 5. 
The visual data is received at the visual subsystem (1), sent to the object subsystem 
for the recovery of a structural description (2), and finally interpreted by the 
propositional subsystem (3). A loop is entered in order to maintain a stable cognition. 
The resulting interpretation on the propositional level influences the further view of 
the object. If, however, the object subsystem receives ambiguous visual information, 
it will make use of its local image record and fill in the assumed missing information. 
This principle of ICS resembles closely what Reason describes as the cognitive 
system's reaction to underspecification of a mental operation as described above. 
The data thus acquired from the image record of the object subsystem might also fit 
in with the propositional interpretation of what is perceived, and thus stabilise in the 
cognitive system. If the assumption underlying the choice of what data is used to 
eliminate the underspecification is wrong, however, the representation of what is 
thought to be perceived will also be incorrect. The wrong icon will be chosen, and the 
information necessary for a mouse click sent to limb subsystem (4). 
This represents one possible underlying cause of the described error. However, the 
same manifestation of user behaviour might also point towards a second, different 
underlying cognitive mechanism. Employing Reason's taxonomy, the mistaking of an 
icon can be classed as a perceptual slip as modeIJed above. On the other hand, it could 
also be classed as a rule based mistake. Using ICS to model the underlying cognition 
of the error provides a means to further investigate the behaviour trace and its 
associated usability problem. 
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o Acoustic Image 
Record ~_~;~lIm,g, ~~ 
r~ ____ J 
Articulatory 
Image Record 
Limb Image 
Record 
Figure 5- Perceptual Confusion: A Slip 
Thus the error de cribed abo e could be classed as a rule-based mistake as oppo d 
to a slip. IdentifYing the home-icon might well be based on rules that are utilised b 
the cognitive s stem in order to discriminate different sets of icons. Features which 
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positively discriminate icons fulfilling one function from those fulfilling another 
might be listed in the set of conditions which when matched cause to fire the rule. 
Indiscriminative features in icons might thus lead to a rule wrongly being fired. 
This can be modelled in ICS (see Figure 6) similar to the modelling approach applied 
to the perceptual confusion approach, but this time with the implicational subsystem 
playing the major role in accepting information augmented wrongly by the 
propositional subsystem and its local image store. Thus for the goal 'press home 
button', a subgoal hierarchy can be formulated as 'iflpcate home button, move cursor 
to click on it', and 'if object has X features, it is the home button'. By mistaking the 
icons on a propositional level, the mail-me button might be clicked instead. 
The examples elaborated above show clearly how one overt form of user error can 
stern from several different 'errors' within the cognitive processing taking place. This 
M:N relationship between cause and error might have gone undetected if systematic 
error modelling within a cognitive architecture had not taken place, this helps analysts 
to explicitly consider the detailed causes ofusabiIity problems. 
Generating Design Recommendations 
Since underspecification proved the major source of error in the above example, once 
for perceptually and then for semantically discriminative features of the icon, this 
should be targeted by designers to remedy misidentification of icons. Thus, two 
functionally dissociated sets of icons should not share the same superficial perceptual 
features. 
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Acoustic Image Record 
• .,J 
Morphonolexical Image Record 
( ~Orphonolexicallmage Reco 1;1. 
J 
Limb Image Record 
Figure 6 - Rule Strength: A Mistake 
Features common) used to di criminate one set of icons from another should be 
taken into account hen designing future sets (Moyes, (995). These feature 
considerations should not limit themselves to ambiguity concerning structural 
characteristics of icon , but al 0 to features such as those mentioned in the examples 
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earlier. This included as discriminative features of mail-me buttons not only their 
shape and internal composition, but also for instance the location of the icon on the 
screen, and characteristics commonly unique to mail-me buttons such as animation as 
present in self-folding envelopes, self-writing letters, or moving mailboxes. 
The important point to highlight here is that the modelling approach described does 
present a method for providing a grounded rationale for design decisions, and can 
guide the designer in making informed choices when faced with design alternatives. 
Another example of how this modelling technique can aid the generation of design 
decisions is introduced as this section progresses. 
Johnson (C., 1997) describes how download latency of web pages affects the usability 
of the World Wide Web. The effects range from user dissatisfaction with time 
investment to the psychological devaluation of the anticipated page (Ramsay et aI., 
1998). Consider the following scenario of user error resulting from download latency: 
After having selecting a link on the current site, a delay in downloading might lead to 
attention being focused on reading the current page. An intention to scroll down the 
page just before the new page is downloaded might lead to the scrolling action being 
carried out on the new page instead. 
This scenario fits Reason's description of 'behavioural spoonerisms', namely slips 
based on interference errors. As defined above, a slip is an action that deviates from 
intention due to failure in the execution stage of processing operations. An 
interference error occurs, when two concurrent actions compete for control over 
cognitive processing and a transposition of actions within the same sequence takes 
place. For instance, intending to speak and perform an action at the same time can 
lead to inappropriate blends of speech and action. In our example, waiting for the new 
page to load, and scrolling the old page can be seen as two concurrent actions 
interfering and leading to an execution failure, the scrolling of the new page. 
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This can be modelled in ICS very similarly to the skill-based example of reduced 
intentionality. Only this time the focus is not on the delay but on the shift of focus 
back to the current page. A 'mental model' of the current page will be constructed (or 
reactivated). The unexpected appearance of the new page might lead to a blending of 
representation and the action included in one cognitive configuration carried out as 
part of a secondary one. 
As a consequence, future browser designers should beware of the error-inducing 
character of non-interrupted browser functionality when downloading a site. 
Alternatively, browser functionality should only be available to the current site 
accessed. A clear distinction should be made when transferring functionality to the 
downloading site to alert users to the new context. This design flaw in Internet 
Browsers has not received much attention. We hypothesise that it may become 
increasingly important as the interweaving of the user population of the Internet 
grows and the World Wide Web becomes an increasingly common tool for 
communication and infonnation exchange. Detailed, error-oriented cognitive analysis 
of such design problems can help to predict future generations of interface problems. 
CONCLUSION 
Cognitive user modelling enables engineers to gain a deeper understanding of the 
complexities of human task perfonnance. Current techniques typically constrain this 
performance to be idealised, error-free and often at an expert level. However, human 
error during perfonnance represents a major source of insights into the workings and 
limitations of operator cognition, and therefore into usability problems. 
By being based on cognitive models, the possibility of representing erroneous 
performance is inherent in these techniques. Few modelling techniques to date 
explicitly represent human error precisely, as embedded in cognitive theory. 
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This section showed the adoption of Reason's error taxonomy and Barnard's ICS for 
the systematic representation of user error within a theoretical cognitive framework. 
The utilisation of such a combined approach was illustrated to benefit several areas of 
application. User error can be described more precisely by linking it to its underlying 
cognition. Analysis can reach beyond surface categorisation, and it is made possibJe 
to reason about the actual causes of error. As a consequence, an informed choice 
concerning competing design options is facilitated. This paves the way for usability 
design that takes full advantage ofthe insights expressed in cognitive theory. 
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Classification and Analysis of Incidents in 
Complex, Medical Environments 
ABSTRACT 
Risk management in medicine is often seen as lagging behind other safety-critical 
domains, where there has been considerable research into incident causation models. 
In this paper, incident analysis theory and methodology from outside medicine is 
appJied to an incident reporting scheme in an Edinburgh Intensive Care Unit. The 
incident analysis model used emphasises the importance of latent, organisational 
factors and complex, multi-layered incident causation. It also takes the role of 
cognitive performance shaping factors into account. This provides an analysis frame-
work that supports the identification of distal causal factors and reasoning about alter-
native causal hypotheses. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, the Harvard Medical Practice Study [1] investigated the occurrence of 
patient injury caused by treatment, so-called adverse events. This study found that 
nearly 4% of patients suffered an injury that prolonged their hospital stay or resulted 
in measurable disability. Leape [2] pointed out that, if these rates are typical of the 
US, then 180.000 people die each year partly as a result of iatrogenic ('treatment-
caused') injury. Since most of the precursors to iatrogenic injuries are perceived to be 
'Human Error' [3], there is an increasing interest in human involvement in adverse 
events [4]. The cost of adverse events is high, not only in human suffering, but also in 
compensation claims and the need for prolonged treatment of afflicted patients. 
In order to address this problem, a number of clinical incident reporting schemes have 
been set up in the last decade. These look at 'critical incidents', which are typically 
235 
defmed as near miss adverse events, where iatrogenic injury could have occurred but 
did not. In these schemes, however, in-depth analysis and search for root causes of 
adverse events typically does not take place [2]. 
In safety-critical domains other than health care, research into accident causes and 
prevention has made considerable advances. Accident causes formerly described as 
'Human Error' have come under close scrutiny. Notably Rasmussen [5], Reason [6], 
Hollnagel [7], and Hale [8] have systematically analysed the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying human error as well as organisational influences on the evolution of 
accidents. This has led to a shift from 'blaming the human' to the understanding that 
error invariably occurs in complex systems. This has encouraged the creation of 
error-tolerant systems, which absorb errors through 'system defences', and that can 
allow for error recovery. The design of such systems can be guided and informed by 
in-depth analysis of 'human error' data. This data can be obtained by implementing 
an anonymous and non-punitive incident reporting scheme. 
In aviation, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) established a confidential 
reporting system (the Aviation Safety Reporting System - ASRS) for safety 
infractions as early as 1975. Self-reports of incidents were collected and a closed 
feedback loop was ensured by disseminating the results of data analysis and 
suggested remedial measures. The system's success was found to be based on its 
confidential non-punitive approach. In medicine, there has heen a belief in a punitive 
'perfectibility model', where there will be no mistakes if staff are properly trained and 
motivated [2]. Outside medicine, however, it is now widely accepted that punishment 
of individuals as a means to prevent future adverse events is the wrong approach to 
error management [9]. Thus, there is a need in medicine to recognise the inevitability 
of error and adverse events, and to adapt a more constructive elTOr management 
approach. 
Safety culture that takes this into account in clinical systems is still lacking [10]. 
There have been some notable exceptions in the recent past where incident reporting 
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schemes were implemented and the identified incidents analysed. In this paper, we 
will look at one such example, an incident reporting scheme at the Western General 
Hospital (WGH) in Edinburgh. 
The Edinburgh incident reporting scheme was set up in an adult intensive care unit 
(ICU) in 1989 [11]. The unit has 8 beds, and there are usually 1-3 junior medical 
staff, I consultant, and 8 nurses per shift. Equipment includes monitors that display 
information such as heart rate and blood pressure, life support equipment such as lung 
ventilators, and drug delivery systems such as pumps and drips. Complex tasks 
include recording observations and measurements, altering the settings of equipment 
according to changing situations, and carrying out such procedures as inserting 
intravascular lines, endotracheal tubes, and chest drains. 
This paper reviews and analyses the incident classification and analysis process in the 
Edinburgh scheme as compared to the approaches in other safety-critical domains. 
The paper firstly describes the Edinburgh system. It then reviews the relatively simple 
process of incident classification and analysis that has been used in running it. 
Finally, the data is re-examined using theory and methodology from other safety-
critical disciplines, such as aviation. 
THE EDINBURGH WGH ICU INCIDENT REPORTING 
SCHEME 
By the 1970s, critical incident studies had been used to investigate anaesthetic 
mishaps [12]. Modelled on this work, leu critical incidents have been investigated at 
the WGH since 1989. For data collection, a questionnaire was used that was based on 
one that had been developed by Williamson and colleagues [131 for use in anaesthetic 
practice. 
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A critical incident was defined to be an occurrence that might have led (if not 
discovered in time). or did lead, to an undesirable outcome. The incident must have 
been caused by an error made by a member of staff or by a failure of equipment. It 
had to be described in detail by a person involved in or who had discovered the 
incident. It had to have occurred while a patient was under the care of the ICU staff 
(though not necessarily in ICU). It had to be clearly preventable. 
Such incident reporting schemes need a fonn for describing the incidents; a system 
for coJlection of the forms; classification and analysis of the incidents; a review of the 
incidents by senior staff that includes proposals for strategies to reduce the likelihood 
of future incidents; and feedback to staff that includes summaries of the incidents and 
the proposed preventative strategies. 
The essence of such studies is anonymity and absence of criticism and these points 
should be constantly emphasised. 
The scheme was set up in 1989 and its first year's experience was published in 1991 
[11]. By early 1999. over 700 incident forms had been completed. This paper presents 
an analysis based on 710 reports from the period January 1989 to February 1999. 
Earlier studies confirm how important human error is in the generation of critical 
incidents [12; 13]. Similarly, in the Edinburgh study most incidents were associated 
with errors by staff. only a minority being associated with equipment failure. These 
human errors fell into four groups (see table 1): those related to ventilation, those 
related to vascular lines, those related to drug administration and a miscellaneous 
group. 
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Human Error 
Drug related 204 
Ventilation related 202 
Vascular line related 94 
Miscellaneous 108 
Equipment Related 
Non disposable equipment 44 
Disposable equipment 39 
Miscellaneous 7 
Not a Critical Incident 12 
Total 710 
Table 1 - Edinburgh Classification System 
When the incidents were analysed and classified, a number of contributing factors 
could be coded from the data (table 2 lists the commonest). Factors such as 
inattention/thoughtlessness, inexperience, and failure to check equipment were 
identified. In addition, a number of factors could be noted as contributing to the 
detection of incidents (table 3 lists the commonest). Such factors were the presence of 
experienced staff, repeated regular checking, protocols, and the presence of alanns. 
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Inattentionffhoughtlessness 
Inexperience 
Failure to Check Equipment 
Poor Equipment Design 
Poor Communication 
197 
175 
109 
86 
86 
Table 2 - Commonest Contributing Factors 
Presence of Experienced Staff 212 
Repeated Regular CheckslProtocols 165 
Presence of Alarms 86 
Handover Checks 79 
Hearing an Unusual Noise II 
Table 3 - Incident Detection Factors 
Nurses completed just under 90010 of the forms (table 4) and the vast majority of 
incidents recorded had no serious sequelae for patients (table 5). 
Nursing 
Medical 
621 
77 
Table 4 - Person Reporting the Incident 
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NothingINot Serious 
Serious/F atal 
Table 5 - Outcome of Incident 
688 
10 
The incidents, together with suggestions for preventative strategies, were periodically 
summarised in draft reports. These were then reviewed by a core group of senior staff 
before being issued as formal reports to all staff. This feedback allowed the 
opportunity to change practice and attitudes. 
Preventative strategies which aim at reducing the likelihood of future events have 
included writing new and redrafting existing protocols, emphasising the importance 
of handover checks, changing equipment suppliers and providing photographs of 
correctly assembled equipment as visual aids. 
Notably. while the frequency of the equipment related incidents has reduced 
markedly over the 10 years, the type of incident related to human error has changed 
little over this time (the frequency of the two commonest fields of errors, ventilation 
related and drug related incidents being relatively constant). 
REVIEW OF THE EDINBURGH INCIDENT CLASSIFIC-
ATION 
In accident causation research. the categorisation and analysis of 'human error' has 
received considerable attention. Several taxonomies exist, ranging from behavioural 
classifications [7] to classification of error according to underlying cognitive mechan-
isms [6]. Behavioural analysis is based on the consideration of human error in terms 
of their external manifestation (such as omission, commission, and inappropriate 
timing). It does not provide a link to the cognitive origin of error types, but adopts a 
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purely descriptive approach. Thus, behavioural classifications do not aid the under-
standing of the underlying mechanism of erroneous actions. The distinction between 
varieties of human error according to their cognitive origin, however, plays a signif-
icant role in accident analysis. Different types of error require different methods of 
error management and remediation [14; 15]. 
Rasmussen's error modelling framework [16] has been widely applied in safety-
critical domains. Rasmussen sees the behavioural manifestation of human error as 
'External Mode of Malfunction', which is brought about by a combination of task and 
work environment factors. such as time pressures, mental load, and equipment design. 
These Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) [17] impact on task performance and 
produce erroneous behaviour that, in tum, might lead to an accident. 
The Edinburgh classification in its current form represents a hybrid system, 
combining PSFs and behavioural categories. The initial classification system [11] had 
covered 12 categories (see table 6). Throughout the evolution of the reporting 
scheme, the collected incident data was coded into novel categories to fit the current 
requirements. Thus. II further categories were created through informal coding of the 
narrative incident data. 
In the initial taxonomy. the 'contributing factors' represented mainly Performance 
Shaping Factors (such as Fatigue, Unit Busy, and Night Time). Poor Communication 
could also be considered a PSF. The one factor notably not a PSF was 
Thoughtlessness. The only factor that clearly denoted a latent failure was Poor 
Equipment Design. 
The categories added since the initial scheme (see table 6) are of a notably different 
type. The ongoing coding approach led to a predominantly domain-specific, be-
havioural classification scheme. The revised categories do not reflect potential 
underlying cognitive mechanisms, nor organisational influences. Mostly, they denote 
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where in the task sequence a step had been omitted, or had been executed wrongly 
(e.g. Turning the Patient). 
Initial Categories Added Categories 
• Inexperience with equipment • Presence of students/teaching 
• Shortage of trained staff • Too many people present 
• Night time • Poor visibility/position of equipment 
• Fatigue • Grossly obese patient 
• Poor Equipment Design • Turning the patient 
• Unit Busy • Patient inadequately sedated 
• Agency nurse • Lines not properly sutured 
• Lack of Suitable equipment • Intracranial Pressure Monitor not 
• Failure to check equipment properly secured 
• Failure to perform hourly check • Endotracheal tube not properly secured 
• Poor Communication • Chest drain tube not properly secured 
• Thoughtlessness • Nasogastric tube not properly secured 
Table 6 - Edinburgh Classification of Contributing Factors 
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These categories can provide the basis for descriptive statistics on reported incidents. 
They do not help in the analysis of the underlying causes of incidents, since only a 
superficial, descriptive account of the incident is given. In the next section we will 
demonstrate an approach to a more in-depth analysis of 'human error' and incidents. 
INCIDENT ANALYSIS 
Incident analysis ought to uncover what happened in an incident occurrence (e.g. 
wrong drug administered), how it happened (e.g. drug confusion), and, most 
importantly, why it happened (e.g. illegible handwriting on drug container; unusual 
storage location; similarity of appearance). Current incident analysis approaches often 
only record the 'what' and 'how' of an incident occurrence [18; 19; 20]. In the 
Edinburgh system, this is exemplified by the classification of incidents focussing on 
'proximal causes' rather than on possible 'root causes', and by employing a 
behavioural classification. 
Furthermore, research in other disciplines has shown that incidents are typically not 
caused by a single, unique factor, but by a concatenation of conditions and events 
[21]. 
Multiple Levels of Causation 
According to Rasmussen, incidents and accidents are occurrences of a human-system 
mismatch, which can only be characterised by a multi-faceted description. Thus, 
faults and errors cannot be sufficiently defined by considering only a single 'cause'. 
Any incident occurrence is precipitated by a number of factors that can be organised 
in a 'causal tree' [17; 9; 22]. 
In such a causal tree, the incident is preceded by several levels of causal factors 
organised in a hierarchy. The factors immediately preceding the incident are seen as 
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'proximal', whereas those further removed from the actual incident occurrence are 
seen as 'distal causal factors'. 
Reason [6] introduced the related concepts of 'active failure' and 'latent failure' to 
express the multi-level nature of incident causation. Reason maintains that active 
failure is usually associated with the performance of 'front-line' operators (such as 
pilots, or nurses) and has an immediate impact upon the system. Latent failure is most 
often generated by those at the 'blunt end' of the system (equipment designers, 
decision-makers, managers, etc.) and may lie dormant for a long time. 
In the Edinburgh study, the classification of events involves a non-formalised 
classification and analysis process. Classification takes place according to what was 
identified as the main contributing factor to the incident occurrence. However, as 
noted above, the categorised data often seems to present behavioural descriptions of 
proximal 'causes'. 
Following Reason's accident causation and analysis model (see figure 1), we 
classified the 'contributing factors' into latent failure types and work conditions 
failure types (intermediate/distal causal factors), and active failures (proximal causal 
factors), as shown below in table 7. 
Multiple Contributing Factors 
It is argued that the categorisation of 'causes', or precursors, of the incident needs to 
reflect the hierarchical nature of the presumed causal chain. This chain involves latent 
system failures that influence work conditions, which in turn provide the context for 
the proximal incident cause to occur. 
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Figure 1 - Reason's Organisational Accident Model 
Defences 
(adapted with kind pennission from Reason J., Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, 1997, © 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd.) 
Rasmu sen's model also reflects this hierarchy of incident causation. Most of his PSF 
can be seen in relationship to Reason's latent failures. This perspective on accident 
causation is mirrored in most accident causation and analysis models. 
For instance, the National Transport and Safety Board (NTSB) accident/incident 
database uses a multiple-cause classification system, and allows for a causal tree, or 
hierarchy, being constructed. In this classification system, 'causal factors', 
'conditions facilitating the occurrence, and 'suggested root causes' can all be 
di tingui hed. Still, the classification still often stops short of an assessment of why 
the error was made. Even the probable cause statements are largely descriptive in 
nature. without reference to latent failures, or how the 'error' is related to human 
information processing constraints. Without such information, it is difficult to 
de elop pre enti e strategies [23]. 
Proximal Causal Factors Intermediate and Distal Causal Factors 
I. Failure to check equipment 1. Inexperience with equipment 
2. Failure to perform hourly check 2. Shortage of trained staff 
3. Thoughtlessness 3. Night time 
4. Turning the patient 4. Fatigue 
5. Patient inadequately sedated 5. Poor Equipment Design 
6. Lines not properly sutured 6. Unit Busy - refined by #9, 10 
7. ICP monitor not properly secured 7. Agency nurse 
8. En. tube not properly secured 8. Lack of Suitable equipment 
9. Chest drain tube not properly 9. Presence of students/teaching 
secured 10. Too many people present 
10. Nasogastric tube not properly 11. Poor visibility of equipment 
secured 12. Poor Communication 
I O. Grossly Obese Patient I 
I 
Table 7 - Failure Type Categorisation 
In the Edinburgh system, multiple factors may be combined in the classification of 
the contributing factors, and combinations of factors frequently occur in the data 
sample. The data analysis might thus also be based on noting the frequency or 
likelihood of certain factors being correlated with one another, rather than on one 
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factor's occurrence only. In that way, conclusions can be drawn that are justified by a 
richer data set. To date, however, this has not been the focus of the Edinburgh 
categorisation, and such benefits of multi-causal categorisation go as yet unheeded. 
Associating multiple contributing factors with one incident occurrence embeds 
behavioural factors within latent system and work condition factors. Thus, factors that 
warrant further explanation (such as Thoughtlessness) can be placed in context by 
considering the more diverse, multiple categorisation. A single factor classification 
neglects this facet of analysis and therefore sheds a misleading light on the collected 
incident data. 
For instance, a closer look at the data reveals that a significant proportion of 
Thoughtlessness incidents are not single factor categorisations, but are placed in 
combinations with Fatigue, Inexperience With Equipment, Poor Communication, and 
Unit Busy. 
To illustrate muIti-causal categorisation, we will consider some commonly occurring 
'contributing causes' in more detail in the following section. 
Causal Tree Analysis 
The US Department of Energy developed a diagrammatical root cause analysis 
method [24] for the investigation of industrial incidents. 'Root causes' are defined as 
the causal factors that, if corrected, would prevent recurrence of the incident. Root 
causes are derived from and generally encompass several 'contributing causes'. These 
are higher-order, fundamental 'causal factors' that address classes of deficiencies, 
rather than single problems or faults. Root causes can include system deficiencies, 
management failures, performance errors, and inadequate organisational communic-
ation. The incident causation factors are then listed in a tree-shaped diagram, which 
guides the data collection, interpretation, and analysis. Thus, root cause analysis 
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provides a 'tool for thought' and a documentation means for causal chain analysis. 
The final aim is to identifY management weaknesses, or in Reason's terminology, 
latent organisational failures. 
Currently, the Edinburgh study does not proceed much beyond the "what and how" 
stage of incident analysis [25]. Given the contributing factors classification above, 
root cause analysis can be used to reflect the variety of levels in the incident causation 
tree. Multi-causal categorisation can then be used to reconstruct a root cause analysis. 
For instance, the common 'contributing factor' Inexperience With Equipment is often 
combined with several other factors in the data classification. This can be illustrated 
in a causal tree as shown in figure 2. 
The incident (e.g. ventilator related) was 'caused' by staff Inexperience With 
Equipment. This was then hypothesised to be mediated by Lack Of Suitable 
Equipment, which in tum pointed to Poor Equipment Design. Thus, a causal chain is 
established and documented. During root cause analysis, it could also be argued that 
Lack Of Suitable Equipment contributed directly to the occurrence of the incident. 
This hypothesis, again, has different implication for potential system redesign. Rather 
than focusing solely on targeting staff inexperience (by training, or worse, by blaming 
the individual's motivation), the provision of suitable equipment ought to be 
considered from an organisational and managerial point of view. 
Thus, this kind of analysis takes several levels of causation into account and aids 
reasoning about the 'root causes' of incident occurrence. Other factors that could be 
considered in lower levels of causation include work conditions, latent system 
failures, and alternative 'causes' and contributing factors (see figure 2). Rather than 
being a causal category, 'human error' should be seen as representing a symptom, and 
a starting point for investigation [26]. 
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Furthermore, the classification of incidents might be influenced by human thought 
biases such as the Fundamental Attribution Error [27]. This bias leads us to favour a 
situational perspective when explaining our own mistakes, but to overestimate 
personal factors, such as inattention, clumsiness, or thoughtlessness, when explaining 
others' behaviour. Clearly, this cognitive bias can exert an undesirable influence on 
error analysis. warranting a structured, formalised analysis approach. For instance, 
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Inexperience represents a personal factor that was listed as one of the commonest 
'contributing factors' in the incident data of 10 years (see table 2). Above we showed 
how this factor can be put into perspective by employing a formalised analysis 
approach that embeds personal factors in system factors such as the design or 
availability of equipment. 
The most common 'contributing factor' overall in the Edinburgh scheme is Thought-
lessness (see table 2). This represents a personal factor that on its own does not 
present much of a starting point for the analysis of latent factors potentially under-
lying the incident. The consideration of the other factors that were typically 
associated with Thoughtlessness, however, emphasises the benefits of multi-causal 
classification, as shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3 illustrates one common constellation of factors preceding an incident that 
involved Thoughtlessness. A Failure to Check Equipment led to these types of 
incident. Other contributing factors listed were Unit Busy, Night Time, and 
Thoughtlessness. The Edinburgh classification does not indicate the main 
contributing factor, or which factors are considered proximal or distal causal factors. 
There are several different interpretations of such a list of multiple contributing 
factors: Thoughtlessness could be considered the main causal factor; alternatively, 
Thoughtlessness could be considered a negligible causal factor, with PSFs (such as 
Night Time) being of prime importance in the incident's causation. In the Edinburgh 
classification system, there is no inherent way of expressing relative impact of 
different causal factors, or of reasoning about these alternative causal hypotheses. A 
causal tree analysis can show the factors' relative importance, whether they are 
considered proximal or distal, and thus it can be used to evaluate contrasting causal 
hypotheses. 
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NightTime 
Figure 3 also demonstrates how descriptive statistics that are based on single factor 
occurrences can be misleading in that they misrepresents a single factor's 
contribution to the incident. ~ore importantly, a causal tree analysis such as shown in 
figure 3 can also detail intervention points for preventative strategies. Since 
Thoughtlessness as causal factor on its own can seemingly only be targeted by 
reminding staff to be more thoughtful, the tree in figure 3 points towards alternative 
intervention points, such as staff fatigue at night time, or a busy unit. These can then 
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specificaIly be addressed by strategies that target lower levels of causation, such as 
management issues. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have illustrated in this paper how research into incident causation from safety-
critical domains other than medicine and its resulting understanding and methodology 
can be applied in a clinical setting. 
In many medical incident reporting schemes, in-depth analysis and a search for the 
root causes of adverse events does not take place [2; 28]. Thus, although active 
failures may be noted, the potentially more important latent failures may not be 
identified. In this paper, we applied a theory-driven analysis framework that 
supported the identification of latent factors. It also supported the reasoning about 
alternative hypotheses on incidents' causation. 
Incident investigation schemes often neglect formalised, in-depth analysis of single 
incidents in favour of a quantitative surface analysis. Stanhope et al. [29] suggested 
that a more systematic approach dealing with a smaller number of cases in more 
depth is likely to yield greater dividends in understanding incident causation and 
generating action recommendation than the 'many' cases currently analysed quite 
briefly and hence less effectively. We have shown in this paper how in-depth analysis 
of a few types of incidents can lead to valuable insights. 
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Implementation of Critical Incident 
Reporting in a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit 
ABSTRACT 
The occurrence of medical adverse events is a growing cause for concern worldwide. 
Critical incident reporting schemes have recently been suggested as an effective 
means to tackle the problem of medical adverse events. There are few comprehensive 
frameworks that accommodate the specific requirements of local settings as well as 
generic issues in incident reporting. The local setting radically influences a scheme's 
successful implementation and maintenance. Major issues that impact the overall 
success of incident reporting schemes concern the format of data collection, and 
especially, a meaningful data analysis. This paper reports on the introduction of a 
critical incident reporting scheme to a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). Issues 
concerning the implementation and maintenance of the reporting scheme are 
discussed. Incident analysis is described in terms of the process and the results of 
incident categorization. The implications of such a viewpoint are considered. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Adverse events in medicine have become a major public concern in recent years, after 
hospital tragedies such as the Bristol Baby Case in the UK (Kennedy et al. 2000). 
This spurned scientific studies into the nature of medical adverse events, their 
incidence, and whether their characteristics contain any clue as to how they can be 
remedied (Leape, 1994). Both the UK and US national governments have 
acknowledged the issue and have called into being organizations such as the US 
National Patient Safety Foundation, and the UK National Patient Safety Agency. The 
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need to reduce 'human error' in medicine has thus been publicly recognized, and 
there is an urgent demand to implement safety measure that can tackle the problem 
effectively. 
Critical incident reporting schemes have been cited as a major safety tool to combat 
human error and adverse events in medicine. These kinds of schemes are established 
in safety-critical domains such as aviation and process control as complementary 
safety management tools. Incident reporting schemes facilitate the collection and 
archiving of data concerning critical incidents, or near-misses, that have occurred in 
those industries. Typically, a distinction can be drawn between standardized, national 
schemes of broad scope but less depth, and smaller, local schemes. Local schemes 
permit close scrutiny of in situ adverse events. Their implementation can also be fine-
tuned to the local culture and conditions, a prerequisite for successful delivery of the 
scheme. This is at the expense of the benefits of statistical evaluation of the collected 
data that a more extensive, standardized data set offers. Both types of scheme operate 
by presenting employees with a data collection form, which prompts for a number of 
characteristics of the problem description. The nature of the form varies, but there are 
some fundamentals common to most schemes: general circumstances of the adverse 
events need first to be established (e.g. at what time did the incident occur?), as well 
as general facts about the reporters themselves (e.g. how experienced they are). 
Typically, this is followed by asking for a narrative description of the incident, and 
includes questions about the presumed 'causes' and contributing factors, and how the 
incident was detected. This is question is not typically included, but is clearly 
valuable for future incident avoidance. This data can then be used to instigate further, 
more in-depth investigation of the incident. It can also be categorized and archived 
for statistical purposes, if the data set permits. Major national safety schemes are 
NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), and its UK equivalent CHIRP 
(Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme). An example for a local 
incident reporting scheme that has been implemented in healthcare and maintained 
for over 10 years is described in (Busse and Wright, 2000). 
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This paper offers a report on the prerequisites to successfully running an incident 
reporting scheme. The implementation that is described here attempted to localize an 
incident reporting scheme by taking contextual factors such as safety culture into 
account. It had staff actively participate in the conception of the scheme and the 
design of the reporting form. This is argued to be crucial in achieving long-term staff 
participation. and is argued to optimize the scheme's efficiency. The scheme that is 
described here also attempted to incorporate standardization issues that are posed by 
schemes implemented on a grander, e.g. national, scale. The experiences with this 
standardization approach will be discussed. This paper thus presents a matrix of 
issues that still need to be addressed in any safety-critical domain that employs 
critical incident reporting schemes as part of ongoing safety management. 
2. INCIDENT REPORTING 
The cost of adverse events is high; not only In human suffering, but also in 
compensation claims and the need for prolonged treatment of afflicted patients. In 
1990, the Harvard Medical Practice Study (Leape, 1994) investigated the occurrence 
of patient injury caused by treatment - so-called adverse events. It found that nearly 
4% of patients suffered an injury that prolonged their hospital stay or resulted in 
measurable disability. Leape (1994) pointed out that, if these rates are typical of the 
US, then 180000 people die each year partly as a result of iatrogenic ('treatment-
caused') injury. In the UK, a Department of Health report (2000) revealed that as 
many as 850,000 adverse incidents are happening in UK hospitals each year. This, in 
terms of litigation and the extra care needed by victims, added up to a £2bn bill. 
(BBC News 02115/200 I). There is an urgent need to make patient safety one of the 
highest priorities. The BBC also cites fears that the medical community is 
"complacent" about the toll of accidents, and notes that to date the National Health 
Service "did not even collect figures on the number of medical accidents". 
Until recently, evidence of medical incidents (or near-misses) was mostly anecdotal. 
In the case their existence was acknowledged, the data typically did not leave a 
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hospital's boundaries. This lack of distribution of incident data can lead to the 
replication of similar, preventable incidents across hospitals. This not only concerns 
e.g. faulty or badly designed equipment which might lead to deadly consequences. It 
also concerns badly designed work procedures that might be in place in hospitals 
across the countr)" the safety threat of which might only be recognized locally and 
sporadically_ Similarly, it concerns drugs that might have similar sounding names, but 
that have very different effects on a patient's condition. In order to prevent incidents 
needlessly repeating themselves, incident data must be recorded, analyzed, and then 
made available for distribution. In industries such as process control for chemical 
plants and power stations, incident reporting schemes have often been used as 'early 
warning schemes'. This has yet to translate fully to the medical domain. 
Obstacles to the implementation of safety measure in medicine as established in 
aviation also lie in the differences between the two work domains. Not only are 
accidents in aviation comparatively infrequent but very visible, receiving high media 
attention, and often involve massive loss of life (Helmreich, 2000). In contrast, 
accidents in medicine typically only involve not more than one patient (or member of 
staft), with less or no media coverage, with news about adverse events often not 
leaving a hospital's boundaries. Also, the type of standardized, unified safety 
management measures implemented in aviation often cannot translate to the less 
standardized, less regulated, and thus less clear-cut work environment that medicine 
presents. Doctors and clinical staff often learn 'on the job' to a large extent, in 
contrast to aviation or nuclear power plant operation (a domain that also has a long-
term history of use of safety management measures such as incident reporting). 
Medicine, described recently again as a "humbling art and a complex team activity" 
(Berger, 200 J). deals with humans, whose conditions and responses is typically less 
predictable than an aircrafts' (Helmreich, 2000). Errors may be particularly difficult 
to recognize in health care because variations in an individual's response to treatment 
is expected. In addition, medical professionals may not recognize that a particular 
product or procedure may have contributed to or caused the problem because the 
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patient is already ill, the product is not expected to work perfectly at all times, or the 
event appears unrelated to the product or procedure (QuIC, 2000). 
Areas of Impact Local Incident Reporting 'Global' Incident Reporting 
Schemes Schemes 
Growth and • Learning opportunity • Learning opportunity is 
• Reflect on local work somewhat limited Training practice • Analysis removed from local 
• Discuss with superiors and setting 
peers 
• Co-analysis of incident data 
by staff representatives 
Safety Intervention • Identification of possible • Identification of possible 
safety intervention in local industry-wide safety 
context interventions 
• 'Trial and error', iterative • Identification of appropriate, 
solution development is context specific safety 
appropriate and possible solution is more difficult 
• Frequent testing and revision 
of local solutions is not 
feasible 
Threat Awareness • Keep staff 'in the loop' about • Staff awareness only of 
error potential in their local industry-wide safety threats 
work environment • Building safety culture 
• Inevitability of incidents is • Often focuses on 'human 
highlighted, as opposed to error' (guilt seems more 
'human error' easily assigned, since the 
involved parties seem 
'anonymous' and distant) 
Safety Culture • Building a safety community • Building safety culture, e.g. 
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through staff participation in through political weight 
scheme design and data co- given to the project 
analysis • public acknowledgement of 
• Raising safety culture importance of safety 
through active participation measures and awareness 
and heightened awareness 
Current safety level Statistical significance of Can gather more valid data on 
frequency data is limited industry-wide error frequency 
Safety level Statistical significance of trend Can gather more valid data on 
evolution data is limited industry-wide error trends 
Business Case • Incident data and generated • Incident data and analysis 
analysis and recommendations can be used as business case 
can be used as evidence of e.g. for equipment 
safety threat and safety effort procurement 
vis-a-vis management • Incident data can be used 
• Incident data can be used to for backing-up safety 
back-up business decision- strategy decisions 
making processes 
Table 1 - Local versus 'Global' Incident Reporting 
Studies suggest.. for instance. that uncertainty about the most effective diagnostic and 
therapeutic approaches is pervasive (Macias-ChapuJa, 1997). One area in medicine 
that resembles more closely the more proceduraJized and well-defined and thus more 
predictable task space of aviation is often cited to be anaesthesia. Correspondingly, 
safety measures such as in-depth error analysis (e.g. Gaba et aI., 1987) and incident 
reporting (e.g. Runciman et aI., 1993) have been applied to anaesthesia prior to a 
more wide-SPread adoption in other areas in medicine. The work of Runciman and his 
colleagtJes forms the basis of the incident analysis method described in this paper as 
applied to neOnatal intensive care. 
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The tendency to lay blame on staff involved in the incident rather than e.g. error-
prone equipment design (Busse and Johnson, 1999) further prohibits the use of 
incident reporting as a constructive safety measure in medicine. Thus, incidents might 
not necessarily be perceived by staff to be 'accidents waiting to happen' (Reason, 
1990). Incidents might be seen as mere task characteristics, with mistakes seen as 
human fallibility, and with incident detection and recovery taken for granted. Incident 
reporters might also not be aware of 'upstream precursors' to the incident, such as 
underlying system faults ('upstream' since in systemic incident analysis, multiple 
layers of incident causation are assumed, with systems factors being the lowest layer). 
Staff might not acknowledge the significance oflocal workplace factors. For instance, 
if staff have been accustomed to working with substandard equipment, they may not 
report this as a contributing factor since they see it as the 'normal' work context; if 
they habitually perform a task that should have been supervised but was not, they 
may not recognize the lack of supervision as a problem (Reason, 1997). This 
tendency, and the associated 'work-around' culture in medicine, emphasizes the need 
for explicit scrutiny of potential upstream precursors (i.e. system factors) in incident 
reporting and analysis. 
System factors might be organizational in nature, such as the notorious under-staffing 
in healthcare, with its associated stress on hospital staff, and the known increase in 
error-prone behaviour of individuals under stress. There might also be a lack of end-
user consideration when choosing and procuring equipment, and also, for instance, 
neglect of training requirements on part of the organization purchasing the equipment 
(Jeffcott and Johnson, 2001). Accidents can often be traced back to equipment design 
that induces 'human error'. It is rarely the case that accidents are caused by one single 
point of failure, and failure histories can usually be traced back through several layers 
of causation. While it is important for hospitals to prioritize error-tolerant and usable 
design and functionality in equipment procurement, there is often no empirical or 
analytical data available evaluating the system at hand in those terms. Thus, given 
difficult to use equipment design that seems obvious on scrutiny, accidents often 
265 
seem preventable in retrospect. This seems particularly unforgivable in safety-critical 
work environments such as surgery or intensive care units. 
Hospitals and healthcare trusts are increasingly confronting this issue of iatrogenic 
(treatment caused) illness as is shown by the recent debates in public media as well as 
in the increasing interest in safety management measures such as incident reporting. 
Incident reporting itself can help raise awareness of the risks of 'human error' in the 
day to day clinical work environment. It can also, of course, help gather data on near-
miss incidents, events that could have led to a full-blown adverse event, but didn't. 
These near-miss events were captured in time by observant staff, often enough 
coincidence playing a large role in their detection and recovery. Analyzing this data, 
and distributing it within the hospital unit and external to it, can help identifying 
system aspects that are prone to error. It can also help distinguishing random, 
coincidence based mishaps from systematic, design-induced error tendencies. This 
data can then provide valuable feedback to both the organization that targets a work 
environment with reduced risks associated with working its machines, and also to 
equipment designers and manufacturers that might not have been aware of the devices 
pitfalls, and that now are able to improve on their future design and also alert its 
current customer base. Equipment can be designed and developed in such a way as to 
minimize error and maximize safe productivity. Thus, device design can 
accommodate error prevention and tolerance to a certain degree. Medical equipment 
manufacturers, however, will need the appropriate feedback from the 'real-life', 
front-end users, in order to iteratively improve their systems. Current incident 
reporting schemes still often adhere to the 'old-school' punitive model, attempting to 
identify guilty individuals rather than constructively capturing improvement 
information. Still, even more notable attempts than punitive reporting often tend to be 
geared towards identifying error potential with the aim at finding work-arounds, with 
statffinding arrangements to 'make substandard systems work', rather than gathering 
information that would enable the generation of safety recommendations towards 
system re-design. 
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Introducing incident reporting into hospital wards is the first step towards recording 
infonnation on incidents' nature and frequency. Summary data can then be used for 
trend analysis to identify systematic sources of error, and to prompt more in-depth 
analysis of potential causes. However, in order to base valid and relevant conclusions 
on this frequency counts, the classification of incidents clearly needs to be 
meaningful. 
For instance, in current incident studies, most of the incidents' precursors are 
perceived to be 'human error' (e.g. Runciman et aI., 1993). There are doubts, 
however, how meaningful this category, and its implications, really are. Often, the 
fact that an incident does not fit a category such as 'equipment failure' alone is seen 
as justifying labelling the incident as 'human error'. Such categorization might 
provide an initial filtering of immediately attributable equipment faults, but does not 
tell us much about how to prevent future instances of such 'human error'. 
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Critical Incident Reporting Form 
Th Incident 
Description of what happened: 
(please also answer the questions overleaf in case or Drug Error) 
What factors contributed to the incident? 
What factors minimised the incident? 
The Circumstances 
Date: 
What procedure was being carried out? 
What monitoring was being used? 
Did the equipment alarm? 
Time: 
If equipment failure give details of equipment: 
Personnel 
Place: 
Grade of relevant responsible staff: Grade of staff discovering the incident: 
Were you involved in the incident? 
Outcome 
What happened to the patient? 
What is tile severity of potential outcome for the patient? 
Prevention 
H.ow might such incidents be avoided in the future? 
Figure 1 (I) - NICU Incident Reporting Form 
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Kind of Drug Error 
Was it a Drug Prescription Error or a Drug Administration Error or other (please explain)? 
Detai Is of Drug Error 
Was it the wrong drug or the wrong dose or the wrong babv or other (please explain)? 
Please give details: 
Critical Incident Study 
This is a study that looks at how and why people make mistake. Infonnation is collected from incident 
reporting forms (see overleaf) and will be analysed . The results of the analysis and the Ie sons learnt 
from the reported incidents will be presented to staff in due course. The reporting fonns arc anonymous. 
there is no interest in criticism or blame. We would encourage everyone working in the NI U. at 
whatever level of experience. to take part. Every incident reported. no matter how trivial. will give 
infonnation about the way people work and may help to save a life. 
When you have completed the fonn please place it in the Incident Fonn Box. 
Definition of a "Critical Incident" 
A critical incident is an occurrence that might have led (or did lead) - ifnot di covered in time - to an 
undesirable outcome. Complications that occur de pite nonnal management are not critical incidents. 
But if in doubt, fill in a fonn . 
Thank you for your participation! 
--Please contact Dr B Iiolland (QM NICU) or Daniela Busse (3398855 x09 17) with any qucries--
Figure 1 (II) - N1CU Incident Reporting Fonn 
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Furthennore. as soon as poor equipment design is considered as an instance of 
equipment failure. there is no telling as to what constitutes error-inducing design 
(such as similarly named drug containers) and what constitutes human error 
(mistaking the drug containers). Thus, the artificial distinction between equipment 
failure and human error (more meaningfully described by Rasmussen as 'Human-
Machine Mismatch') is cemented and perpetuated by such a classification. This 
clearly poses a very real problem for the validity of incident data and its analysis (a 
problem sometimes denoted as "GIGO" ("garbage in- garbage out». However, this 
subjectivity in the incident classification process, and the resulting spurious precision 
of trend analyses based on the data, is not sufficiently recognized as would seem 
necessary for any wider distribution of incident data beyond the local setting. 
There have been some notable attempts at creating grounded and relevant 
categorizations schemes in the recent past. An influential example is reported in 
Runciman et a!. (1993) who studied anaesthesia incidents in Australian hospitals as 
part of the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS). This study was 
subsequently extended to also investigate intensive care unit (ICU) incidents. The 
AIMS categorization scheme presents an integrated summary of previous 
categorization schemes. and has had substantial impact on future ones. For the study 
reported in this paper. the AIMS-ICU categorization scheme was utilized to analyze 
incident data that had been collected in a neonatal intensive care unit. In the following 
sections. the outcome of this process is reported 
3 THE NICU INCIDENT REPORTING SCHEME 
In the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) in which the study took place, current 
safety management included informal checks, communication and consultation with 
fellow members of staff, morbidity and mortality meetings, and an adverse events 
reporting scheme, which addresses incidents that in fact resulted in harm to the 
patient or to staff and that legally require investigation. Near-miss adverse events that 
do not require legal investigation, but that could also lead to harm to the patient or 
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staff, were dealt with on a local and immediate basis. They were not documented or 
kept track of, and distribution of known sources of error in the system was at best 
infrequent. There was demand to complement the existing safety management 
measures with a critical incident reporting scheme. 
3.1. Critical Incident Definition 
A 'critical incident' was here defined as follows: "A critical incident is an occurrence 
that might have led (or did lead) - if not discovered in time - to an undesirable 
outcome. Complications that occur despite normal management are not critical 
incidents." Staff that participated in the study were also asked to fill in an incident 
reporting form "if in doubt". This reflected the intention to collect rich, qualitative 
data, rather than data that would be fit for exact statistical analysis. 
3.2. Set Up 
A 'critical incident' thus includes near-misses as well as actual adverse events. 
Reporting schemes involve staff reporting critical incidents using the provided 
reporting forms on a voluntary and anonymous basis. The incident reports are 
regularly analyzed and categorized. The main aim of the analysis is to identify factors 
contributing to the causation of incidents that may be rectified. Accordingly, similar 
incidents are hoped to be avoided in future. 
3.3. Incident Reporting Form 
The incident form was developed iteratively, and evaluated by means of a 
questionnaire survey of the unit staff (Busse, 2000). The current form covers the 
following questions: the first section asked for a "description of what happened"; 
'Drug Confusion Error' is treated as a category distinct from other types of critical 
incident on the form, due to its known frequency (Bogner, 1994). This separate 
treatment allowed for more specific data to be gathered on drug errors. Other 
questions related to what factors contributed to the incident, and which factors 
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minimized it. The next section covers details on the circumstances: which procedure 
was being carried out, which monitoring was being used, and which equipment failed 
(if any). A question on the presence of alarms was added to the form, since it was felt 
that incidents discovered through alarm sounding fell in a sufficiently distinct 
category of incident circumstances. This was then validated by the data that was 
collected. One section of questions touched on the personnel that were involved in the 
incident and its detection. The data was collected on an anonymous basis, so the 
reporting staff was not asked to provide contact details. However, experience levels 
and job titles were covered in the personnel section. Another section noted the 
estimated and actual outcome of the incident to the patient (or in terms of other costs). 
The final section provided an open-ended question regarding suggestions for 
improvements by the reporting staff - future prevention of similar incident being the 
primary goal of the incident reporting scheme. 
3.4. Incident Analysis 
The AIMS-ICU analysis scheme was used. AIMS used a reporting form that 
consisted primarily of given categories which were to be ticked off by the reporting 
staff (see Figure 2). This way of recording staff reports could potentially lead to 
decreased analysis time (since the reporters essentially did the categorization 
themselves). It could also be argued that this decreased the degree of indirection in 
the analysis process - categorization based on fairly subjective interpretation of 
gathered data could be replaced by the reporter's own interpretation of the actual 
events. In the NICU study, the form that was used was specifically developed to 
address the local needs. However, the collected data was subsequently analyzed by 
assigning it to categories as listed in the AIMS. The breakdown of the results is 
shown in the following section. 
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SYSTEM-BASED FACTORS 
Physical environment I infrastructure 
Lack of space I room 
Lack offacility 
Excessive noise 
# 
High unit activity level. ................................. .4 
Staff mealtime 
Handover I ward round 
Lack of support staff 
Equipment (including monitors) 
Unavailable equipment 
Inadequate equipment 
Poor design............................................. 4 
Poor maintenance 
Equipment failure....................................... 3 
Inadequate inservice 
Work Practices I Policies I Protocols 
Communication problem ............................. . 
Inadequate assistance 
Lack of supervision 
Inadequate training 
Inadequate protocol 
Insufficient staff .... , .................................. . 
Unable to contact staff 
Inapprop. staff I patient allocation .................. . 
HUMAN FACTORS 
Knowledge-based error 
Lack or faulty knowledge .............................. .. 
Error of: 
Judgement. ............................................. . 
Problem recognition I anticipation 
Diagnosis 
Treatment decision 
Use of investigation procedures 
Timing of investigation procedures 
Omitting intended treatment. .......................... . 
Incorrect charting ....................................... .. 
Incorrect prescription 
Incorrect interpretation of information 
Information not sought 
Information not available 
Rule-based error 
Patient assessment inadequate 
Patient preparation inadequate 
Failure to check equipment 
Misuse of equipment 
Unfamiliar equipment 
Unfamiliar environment 
Unfamiliar patient 
# 
Failure to follow protocol................................ 2 
Labelling error 
Calculation error 
Skill-based error 
Distraction / inattention ................................. . 
Fatigue 
I-Iaotp 
Figure 2 Incident Categorization and Analysis 
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3.2. RESULTS 
As can be seen in Figure 2, 14 causes of incidents were classified as system factors, 
whereas only II where classified has human factors. This is in contrast to findings in 
comparable studies, where up to 80% of causal factors were classified as human 
error. The most commonly attributed subgroup of causal factors was ' equipment' 
with 7 occurrences, followed by ' physical environment/infrastructure' (4) and 
'knowledge-ba ed errors' (4). Furthermore, the categories ' rule-based errors', 'ski ll -
based errors ', 'technical errors', and ' work practices' were also all represented in the 
results . All causal factors could be categorized, and ' other system factors ' and 'other 
human factors ' were not assigned in this study. 
System Factors Human Factors 
Figure 3 - Distribution of System vs. Human Factors contributing to NICU incidents 
However, it was found that for most incidents, multiple categorizations were 
necessary. There were mostly several causal factors per incident, for instance the 
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categorizations listed above show at least two categorizations of causal factors per 
incident. The combination of factors proved to provide a more meaningful picture of 
the incident's causation and its potential future prevention, than single 
categorizations. This confirms previous findings (Busse and Wright, 2000). The most 
striking finding in this study was arguably the difficulty of arriving at a meaningful 
classification of incidents. The nature of a meaningful classification has not yet been 
discussed. let alone been operationalized, in the current discourse on incident 
reporting. Early work in the process control domain has covered substantial ground in 
delineating a meaningful analysis of Human Error (Rasmussen, 1982), but such work 
has still be addressed in incident categorization and analysis. 
4. FORM VALIDATION 
A questionnaire survey was carried out as an investigation of staff perception of the 
Critical Incident Reporting scheme as part of existing safety management at the unit. 
The study should also present an opportunity for staff to suggest improvements of the 
incident reporting scheme itself, as well as unit safety management in general. 
22 questionnaires were administered to two 11 person day shifts on the ward. 21 were 
returned and 19 were included in the analysis. The two outliers that were excluded 
from the analysis were responses from temporary staff. Both medical and nursing 
staff contributed to the study. 
Out of a total of 19 responses, 13 indicated awareness of the scheme, 4 said they had 
participated. and 11 could define "Critical Incident" (see graph below). Several 
valuable suggestions (see below) on form and scheme improvement were given by 
the study participants. Most survey participants responded positively to the overall 
impact of the scheme as part of safety management at the unit. Most participants 
stressed the crucial importance of feedback of incident data and analysis results back 
to unit staff. Raised awareness of existing error potential can be inferred from the 
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'shock reaction' that was reported on seeing the (anonymized) incident data and 
analysis results. Understandably, this led to frequent calls for urgent safety 
intervention on part of the survey respondents. 
Survey Question Staff Suggestions 
Form improvement • Include question on sta~baby ratio 
• Include question on workload levels 
Effectiveness of the scheme • Good for Awareness (N=4) 
• Need Action (N=3) 
• Need Feedback (N=2) 
Safety management improvement • Need Extra Staff (N=6) 
• Need Review (N=5) 
• Need Action (N=3) 
• Need Training (N=2) 
Table 2 - Summary of Staff Suggestions for Form Improvement 
The level of "safety culture" at the unit seems encouraging, with 2/3 of staff aware of 
the scheme and of the nature of critical incidents. Temporary staff, however, is still 
largely unaware. The scheme's intended implications for safety management needs 
better publication. Further measures are needed to feed analysis and action results 
back to the staff. Reassurance of staff is needed to let them know that the identified 
safety deficiencies are urgently and thoroughly addressed through safety interventions 
where possible. 
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Awareness Participation CI Definition 
Figure 4 - Staff Awareness, Participation, and Ability to define 'Critical Incident' 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The NICU incident reporting scheme succeeded in achieving staff engagement and 
participatory design of the reporting form. Most importantly, it impacted the overall 
safety culture in the unit, by raising awareness of clinical incidents, and raising the 
belief that the occurrence of ' mistakes ' can be dealt with ill a constructive way by 
higher level management (rather than following a ' punitive perfection model' (Leape, 
1994)). Equipment failures could be followed up by either contacting the 
manufacturer directly, or also, for instance, by being able to refer to the incidents as 
evidence of insufficient design of specific devices. This data provides the basis to 
pass on valuable lessons to other N1CUs that e.g. use similar devices. 
The UK Department of Health (2000) stated as their main conclusion to the Chief 
Medical Officer' s report: "We believe that, if the NHS is successfully to modernize 
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its approach to learning from failure, there are four key areas that must be addressed. 
In summary, the NHS needs to develop: 
~ unified mechanisms for reporting and analysis when things go wrong; 
~ a more open culture, in which errors or service failures can be reported and 
discussed; 
~ mechanisms for ensuring that, where lessons are identified, the necessary 
changes are put into practice; 
~ a much wider appreciation of the value of the system approach in 
preventing, analyzing and learning from errors." 
Additional to this, however, it needs to be stressed that the incorporation of the 
specific local conditions and requirements are necessary for the successful 
maintenance of an incident reporting scheme. Furthermore, if a unified mechanism 
for analysis is determined, it needs to take into account that the classification scheme 
should not only aid 'causal factor counting', but also their meaningful analysis. 
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Medical Incident Reporting and the 
Longitudinal Design Evaluation of Clinical 
Systems 
ABSTRACT 
Poor design of medical systems is a major factor in the causation of medical 
accidents. This paper argues for the use of incident reporting data in the longitudinal 
design evaluation of medical systems. Incident reporting schemes are first described, 
and then scrutinized for their failure of leading to safety recommendations that target 
system redesign. Similarly, the medical systems and human factors profession is 
called on to take advantage of the 'live' system use data offered by incident reporting 
by guiding fonn design and incident analysis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The costs of medical accidents are estimated to exceed billions of dollars, and 
thousands of preventable deaths per year are brought about by 'technical failure' or 
'human error' in medicine (Leape, 1994). Hospitals now increasingly use incident 
reporting schemes that gather data on error potential in their day-to-day work and in 
their use of medical equipment (QuIC, 2000). Incident data reflects actual system use, 
and can offer a longitudinal evaluation of medical systems design. This paper argues 
that this data needs to feed back into the design and development of medical systems. 
Currently, there is no such direct link. This means that there is a wealth of error-
oriented, 'live' human-system interaction data in hospital archives that is not put to 
use by medical system developers. 
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Healthcare work environments such as hospitals are often highly computerized, with 
information displays and devices fulfilling vital roles, e.g. in intensive care units, 
emergency medicine, radiology, and operating theatres. The usability of medical 
systems and devices has crucial impact on the success of the healthcare provided, and 
on the safety of the patient. Poor design of equipment (as well as its plain 
malfunction) still plays a major part in medical incidents and accidents, often with 
serious consequences. 
Despite this, the implications of such 'adverse events' for system and device design 
often go unnoticed. Incidents relating to the same design faults keep re-occurring, 
threatening patient safety and the effective health care delivery. 
Blame is often apportioned to the human operating the system rather than to the 
system design. Common responses to incidents thus include cautioning or 
reprimanding the staff involved, i.e. the users of the medical system. Evidently, such 
approaches are doomed to failure in preventing future incidents, since the actual 
'cause' for the incident in such cases typically is not human malice or negligence, but 
inherent usability or design deficiencies (Busse and Wright, 2000). 
2. MEDICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 
There is typically no usability feedback to designers and manufacturers in the case of 
medical incidents. This is so especially where 'human error' is concerned, and where 
work-arounds can be found by the clinical staff to provide a 'quick fix' to the 
perceived problem. The 'free lessons' offered by system deficiencies as revealed in 
real-life, day-to-day system use, often go un-used. The lack of proactive error data 
collection on the side of medical system providers might also seem surprising since 
most cater for a highly specialized market, and the difficulties that do occur often 
have a high probability of re-occurring (Busse and Wright, 2000). Even the early 
THERAC-25 accidents (Jacky, 1991) are a case in point. They showed that not only 
can design flaws in medical systems lead to loss of life, but they also show that a lack 
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of communication between system manufacturers and hospitals can lead to 
preventable accidents re-occurring in other hospitals. Incident reporting is one 
method to combat this lack of communication. 
3. MEDICAL INCIDENT REPORTING 
Incident Reporting is used in safety critical domains as part of systematic safety 
management that tries to ensure communication, and widespread dissemination, of 
potential sources of accident and error. An incident is typically defined as an 
occurrence that might have led (or did lead) to an undesirable outcome if not 
discovered in time. Thus, this definition includes near-misses as well as actual 
'adverse events'. Reporting schemes involve staff reporting incidents on a voluntary 
and confidential basis, using the provided reporting forms. Incident reports are 
regularly analyzed and categorized. The main aim of analysis is to identify factors 
contributing to the causation of incidents that may be rectified. Thus, similar incidents 
are hoped to be avoided in future. 
An incident reporting form, can collect data on, for example: a description of what 
happened, factors that contributed to the incident, and factors that minimized it; 
which tasks were being carried out, and which equipment was used; whether there 
were any alarms, and what grade of personnel was involved in the incident and its 
detection; and also on the estimated and actual consequence of the incident to the 
patient. Finally, it can include an open-ended question regarding suggestions for 
future prevention of similar incidents. This example is drawn from a form that was 
developed iteratively and in interaction with clinical staff (Busse, 2000). Form design 
needs to reflect human factors concerns in order to yield information that benefits 
ergonomic system evaluation and redesign. Thus, form designs might also need to be 
adapted, for instance, to address questions on the context of collaborative work 
among clinical staff. Lack of communication is a typicaJ cause for accidents arising 
out of collaborative work, and is often included as a category in incident taxonomies. 
However, incident forms rarely focus on information that would shed light on the 
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particulars of the communication and its context, or how this source of accidents 
could be addressed. 
4. DESIGN AND SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the collected incident data does come to use to inform system redesign, this 
typically occurs in the form of creating local 'work-arounds' to deficient equipment 
and work procedures. However, these work-arounds tend to increase the learning 
burden for new staff on training. They can often not be considered stable solutions 
that robustly tackle the accident source. And importantly, they are not communicated 
to other hospitals, or to the system manufacturer. 
Furthermore, the safety recommendations generated from incident analysis frequently 
focus on human input to error avoidance and recovery, instead of providing design 
recommendations for more fail-safe, error-tolerant, and usable systems. Incidents are 
initially categorized as either caused by technical or human factors. The latter 
category frequently draws up to 80% of the total incidents. The routine response to 
this category of incidents can be described as a 'blame and train' approach, since, 
apparently, no technical failure was existent that could be addressed by redesign 
measures. However, so-called 'human-error' is often induced by 'unkind work 
environments' (Rasmussen, 1980) and system design flaws (Busse and Wright, 
2000). The major distinction in error analysis schemes between 'technical failure' and 
'human error' often creates the misleading impression that technical failures can be 
remedied by technical measures, whereas the human error ought to be remedied by 
'changing the human'. Given this distinction, it is routinely overlooked that the prime 
contributing factors to 'human error' still constitute technical deficiencies such as 
'poor design', lack of consistency, misleading error messages, and confusing displays 
(Busse and Wright, 2000). 
5. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INCIDENT ANALYSIS 
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Therefore, an effective analysis method is needed in order to fully realize the positive 
potential of incident reporting. Data analysis should offer insights into an incident's 
existence and causation. But it also needs to lead to an understanding of the role of 
the human-system interaction that led to the incident, and how this can be addressed 
to avoid future re-occurrences. System redesign, rather than 'blame and train', should 
be envisaged as potential remedy. Lekberg (1997) observed that the analyst's 
background has crucial impact on the analysis result, and on the recommendations 
given. It might thus be argued that the focus on training as panacea is contingent on 
the professional background of the experts that are consulted for incident analysis. 
This suggests that if effective design recommendations are to be drawn from medical 
incidents, the system engineering perspective needs to play a major role in their 
analysis. 
Unfortunately, there is currently not one theoretical analysis framework that details 
how analysis results might feed into design recommendations and improve the 
usability and safety of medical systems. This clearly exacerbates the lack of design 
recommendation drawn from incident analysis. It seems ironic that the initial 
conceptions which paved the way for research into the design implications of 'human 
error' (Rasmussen, 1980; Norman, 1983) have led to a flurry of error models that are 
now widely applied, but that do not include pointers towards potential system re-
design. Current incident analysis models do not provide any support for the analyst in 
identifying potential systemic remedies. There is an urgent need to address this 
missing link between data collection and the generation of safety recommendations 
that target the design and usability of medical systems 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
Medical error is widespread, and many preventable deaths are its consequence. 
Usable and error-tolerant medical systems could prevent accidents from re-occurring. 
The healthcare community has recently embraced the use of incident reporting 
schemes to capture potential error sources, to the point of introducing national laws 
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and regulations. Therefore, medical system designers and manufacturers should 
respond to this opportunity and take advantage of the information gathered in 
hospitals that put their systems to everyday use. Incident reporting offers a wealth of 
data on problematic human-system interaction. It also presents an opportunity to 
actively support the data gathering process by fine-tuning reporting forms, and to 
make the most of data analysis by directly focusing on recommendations for 
improved system design. Both of these areas are still largely unexplored by research. 
Incident diaries are not unknown in human factors research, just as error reports 
inform iterative system development in practice. However, incident reporting data is 
largely gathered .on an ad-hoc basis, and data analysis techniques as well as safety 
recommendations need improving. Taking advantage of rich and relevant data 
sources like incident reporting is a prerequisite for the reduction of design-related 
medical accidents. 
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